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Full-Text Articles in Law

Junior Bar Law Review 1 (2010), 21-40 Judicial Activism Revisited: Reflecting On The Role Of Judges In Enforcing Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, Gehan D. Gunatilleke Mr. Dec 2010

Junior Bar Law Review 1 (2010), 21-40 Judicial Activism Revisited: Reflecting On The Role Of Judges In Enforcing Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, Gehan D. Gunatilleke Mr.

Gehan D Gunatilleke Mr.

Following the conclusion of military operations in Sri Lanka in 2009, the issue of economic development and distributive justice appears to have remerged on the country’s agenda. Within this post-conflict context, the judiciary in Sri Lanka is confronted with a major challenge in terms of defining its proper role in the promotion of Economic Social and Cultural (“ESC”) rights. The precise extent to which judges should be ‘activist’ in promoting these rights should be contrasted with the level of activism required of judges in the sphere of civil and political rights. Advocating ESC rights in Sri Lanka simply cannot ...


Delivering The Goods: Herein Of Mead, Delegations, And Authority, Patrick Mckinley Brennan Jun 2010

Delivering The Goods: Herein Of Mead, Delegations, And Authority, Patrick Mckinley Brennan

Patrick McKinley Brennan

This paper argues, first, that the natural law position, according to which it is the function of human law and political authorities to instantiate certain individual goods and the common good of the political community, does not entail judges' having the power or authority to speak the natural law directly. It goes on to argue, second, that lawmaking power/authority must be delegated by the people or their representatives. It then argues, third, that success in making law depends not just on the exercise of delegated power/authority, but also on the exercise of care and deliberation or, in the ...


Concurring In Part & Concurring In The Confusion, Sonja West May 2010

Concurring In Part & Concurring In The Confusion, Sonja West

Sonja R. West

When a federal appellate court decided last year that two reporters must either reveal their confidential sources to a grand jury or face jail time, the court did not hesitate in relying on the majority opinion in the Supreme Court's sole comment on the reporter's privilege--Branzburg v. Hayes. "The Highest Court has spoken and never revisited the question. Without doubt, that is the end of the matter," Judge Sentelle wrote for the three-judge panel on the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. By this declaration, the court dismissed with a wave of its judicial hand ...


Visionary Pragmatism And The Value Of Privacy In The Twenty-First Century, Danielle Keats Citron, Leslie Meltzer Henry Jan 2010

Visionary Pragmatism And The Value Of Privacy In The Twenty-First Century, Danielle Keats Citron, Leslie Meltzer Henry

Leslie Meltzer Henry

Despite extensive scholarly, legislative, and judicial attention to privacy, our understanding of privacy and the interests it protects remains inadequate. At the crux of this problem is privacy’s protean nature: it means “so many different things to so many different people” that attempts to articulate just what it is, or why it is important, generally have failed or become unwieldy. As a result, important privacy problems remain unaddressed, often to society’s detriment. In his newest book, Understanding Privacy, Daniel J. Solove aims to reverse this state of affairs with a pluralistic conception of privacy that recognizes the societal ...


Visionary Pragmatism And The Value Of Privacy In The Twenty-First Century, Danielle Keats Citron, Leslie Meltzer Henry Jan 2010

Visionary Pragmatism And The Value Of Privacy In The Twenty-First Century, Danielle Keats Citron, Leslie Meltzer Henry

Danielle Keats Citron

Despite extensive scholarly, legislative, and judicial attention to privacy, our understanding of privacy and the interests it protects remains inadequate. At the crux of this problem is privacy’s protean nature: it means “so many different things to so many different people” that attempts to articulate just what it is, or why it is important, generally have failed or become unwieldy. As a result, important privacy problems remain unaddressed, often to society’s detriment. In his newest book, Understanding Privacy, Daniel J. Solove aims to reverse this state of affairs with a pluralistic conception of privacy that recognizes the societal ...


Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules Or Predilective Tools, Stephen Durden Jan 2010

Textualist Canons: Cabining Rules Or Predilective Tools, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

Justice Scalia proclaims homage to the “dead” Constitution. Justice Brennan honors the “living” Constitution. Others believe in “a partially living and partially dead Constitution.” But, whichever moniker selected, constitutional analysis remains (to the interpreter) personal; however, personal does not necessarily mean irrational or even singular (i.e., that no one else agrees with the interpretation). Rather, personal means that no matter how narrow the interpretational method, an interpreter of the Constitution inevitably makes personal choices when using any interpretational method - choices not required by, or perhaps even inconsistent with, the chosen interpretational method. This Article uses canons of construction to ...


Partial Textualism, Stephen Durden Jan 2010

Partial Textualism, Stephen Durden

Stephen Durden

This Article seeks to demonstrate that plain meaning textualists do not apply plain meaning textualism to the entire Constitution. Instead, plain meaning textualists indulge their personal predilections and apply the doctrine of “partial textualism,” which selectively applies plain meaning textualism to only part of, rather than the entire, Constitution. Partial textualism destroys any possible fairness value to plain meaning textualism. Indeed, such an approach is entirely inconsistent with the goals of plain language textualism. Through examining the Takings Clause, this Article demonstrates that a plain meaning textualist will commonly apply plain meaning textualism to a part of the Constitution that ...


Pearson, Iqbal, And Procedural Judicial Activism, Goutam U. Jois Jan 2010

Pearson, Iqbal, And Procedural Judicial Activism, Goutam U. Jois

Goutam U Jois

In its most recent term, the Supreme Court decided Pearson v. Callahan and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, two cases that, even at this early date, can safely be called “game-changers.” What is fairly well known is that Iqbal and Pearson, on their own terms, will hurt civil rights plaintiffs. A point that has not been explored is how the interaction between Iqbal and Pearson will also hurt civil rights plaintiffs. First, the cases threaten to catch plaintiffs on the horns of a dilemma: Iqbal says, in effect, that greater detail is required to get allegations past the motion to dismiss stage ...


Constructing The Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution Of Federalist 10, Ian C. Bartrum Jan 2010

Constructing The Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution Of Federalist 10, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This paper is part of larger symposium convened for the 2010 AALS annual meeting. In it I adapt some of my earlier constitutional theoretical work to engage the topic of that symposium: the so-called “interpretation/construction distinction”. I make two related criticisms of the distinction: (1) it relies on a flawed conception of linguistic meaning, and (2) while these flaws may be harmless in the “easy” cases of interpretation, they are much more problematic in the difficult cases of most concern. Thus, I doubt the ultimate utility of the distinction as part of a “true and correct” model of constitutional ...


The Constitutional Canon As Argumentative Metonymy, Ian C. Bartrum Jan 2010

The Constitutional Canon As Argumentative Metonymy, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This article builds on Philip Bobbitt's Wittgensteinian insights into constitutional argument and law. I examine the way that we interact with canonical texts as we construct arguments in the forms that Bobbitt has described. I contend that these texts serve as metonyms for larger sets of associated principles and values, and that their invocation usually is not meant to point to the literal meaning of the text itself. This conception helps explain how a canonical text's meaning in constitutional argument can evolve over time, and hopefully offers the creative practitioner some insight into the kinds of arguments that ...


Should Bush Administration Lawyers Be Prosecuted For Authorizing Torture?, Claire Oakes Finkelstein, Michael Lewis Jan 2010

Should Bush Administration Lawyers Be Prosecuted For Authorizing Torture?, Claire Oakes Finkelstein, Michael Lewis

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.