Law Commons^™

The Constitutional Law Of Interpretation, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark

Notre Dame Law Review

The current debate over constitutional interpretation often proceeds on the assumption that the Constitution does not provide rules for its own interpretation. Accordingly, several scholars have attempted to identify applicable rules by consulting external sources that governed analogous legal texts (such as statutes, treaties, contracts, etc.). The distinctive function of the Constitution—often forgotten or overlooked—renders these analogies largely unnecessary. The Constitution was an instrument used by the people of the several States to transfer a fixed set of sovereign rights and powers from one group of sovereigns (the States) to another sovereign (the federal government), while maintaining the “States” as …

On The Rightful Deprivation Of Rights, Frederick Schauer

Notre Dame Law Review

When people are deprived of their property rights so that the state can build a highway, a school, or a hospital, they are typically compensated through what is commonly referred to as “takings” doctrine. But when people are deprived of their free speech rights because of a clear and present danger, or deprived of their equal protection, due process, or free exercise rights because of a “compelling” governmental interest, they typically get nothing. Why this is so, and whether it should be so, is the puzzle that motivates this Article. Drawing on the philosophical literature on conflicts of rights and …

Debs And The Federal Equity Jurisdiction, Aditya Bamzai, Samuel L. Bray

Notre Dame Law Review

The United States can sue for equitable relief without statutory authorization. The leading case on this question is In re Debs, and how to understand that case is of both historical and contemporary importance. Debs was a monumental opinion that prompted responses in the political platforms of major parties, presidential addresses, and enormous academic commentary. In the early twentieth century, Congress enacted several pieces of labor legislation that reduced Debs’s importance in the specific context of strikes. But in other contexts, the question whether the United States can bring suit in equity remains disputed to this day. The …

Solidarity Federalism, Erin F. Delaney, Ruth Mason

Notre Dame Law Review

Studies of federalism, especially in the United States, have mostly centered on state autonomy and the vertical relationship between the states and the federal government. This Article approaches federalism from a different perspective, one that focuses on state solidarity. We explain how solidarity structures found in constitutional federations—including the United States—generate solidarity obligations, such as duties not to harm other states or their citizens. These duties give rise to principles, such as nondiscrimination, that are vital to federalism. Focusing on interstate relations and relations between states and citizens of other states, we argue that affirming both solidarity and autonomy as …

State Digital Services Taxes: A Good And Permissible Idea (Despite What You Might Have Heard), Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Darien Shanske

Notre Dame Law Review

Tax systems have been struggling to adapt to the digitalization of the economy. At the center of the struggles is taxing digital platforms, such as Google or Facebook. These immensely profitable firms have a business model that gives away “free” services, such as searching the web. The service is not really free; it is paid for by having the users watch ads and tender data. Traditional tax systems are not designed to tax such barter transactions, leaving a gap in taxation.

One response, pioneered in Europe, has been the creation of a wholly new tax to target digital platforms: the …

Social Trust In Criminal Justice: A Metric, Joshua Kleinfeld, Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg

Notre Dame Law Review

What is the metric by which to measure a well-functioning criminal justice system? If a modern state is going to measure performance by counting something—and a modern state will always count something—what, in the criminal justice context, should it count? Remarkably, there is at present no widely accepted metric of success or failure in criminal justice. Those there are—like arrest rates, conviction rates, and crime rates—are deeply flawed. And the search for a better metric is complicated by the cacophony of different goals that theorists, policymakers, and the public bring to the criminal justice system, including crime control, racial justice, …

Democracy's Forgotten Possessions: U.S. Territories' Right To Statehood Through Constitutional Liquidation, Joshua Stephen Ebiner

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note argues that the Territories must be granted statehood consistent with the equal footing doctrine. This thesis does not challenge Congress’s power to acquire or govern territory, or its constitutional authority to admit (and place reasonable conditions on the admission of) territory into the Union as states. These matters have long been settled through constitutional practice. Neither does this thesis suggest that acquired territory must be immediately annexed into the Union, since there are valid reasons to delay such a decision. Instead, the claim is that permanently inhabited territories that have longstanding, constitutionally significant relationships with the United States …

Put Mahanoy Where Your Mouth Is: A Closer Look At When Schools Can Regulate Online Student Speech, Courtney Klaus

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note proposes a way to approach online student speech in three different contexts: cyberbullying, online threats, and other kinds of incendiary speech. Each approach is informed by a combination of lower court precedent, historical trends, and Supreme Court dicta to piece together when exceptions to online student speech protection may apply. Each analysis provides an explanation of how Tinker can and should be used to justify school discretion over particular kinds of online speech. Part I provides the history behind how the First Amendment has been used to protect public school student speech and discusses the unique issues the …

The Moral Authority Of Original Meaning, J. Joel Alicea

Notre Dame Law Review

One of the most enduring criticisms of originalism is that it lacks a sufficiently compelling moral justification. Scholars operating within the natural law tradition have been among the foremost critics of originalism’s morality, yet originalists have yet to offer a sufficient defense of originalism from within the natural law tradition that demonstrates that these critics are mistaken. That task has become more urgent in recent years due to Adrian Vermeule’s critique of originalism from within the natural law tradition, which has received greater attention than previous critiques. This Article is the first full-length response to the natural law critique of …

Against Secondary Meaning, Jeanne C. Fromer

Notre Dame Law Review

Trademark law premises protection and scope of marks on secondary meaning, which is established when a mark develops sufficient association to consumers with a business as a source of goods or services in addition to the mark’s linguistic primary meaning. In recent years, scholars have proposed that secondary meaning plays an even more central role in trademark law than it already does. Yet enshrining secondary meaning in the law undermines the ultimate goals of trademark law: promoting fair competition and protecting consumers. The dangers of enshrining secondary meaning include the problematic doctrine that has built up to assess it or …

"A Sword In The Bed": Bringing An End To The Fusion Of Law And Equity, Brooks M. Chupp

Notre Dame Law Review

Those who called for the fusion of law and equity have, throughout the years, argued that the existence of a parallel court system for equity would be inefficient and confusing for parties. While there is limited merit to this viewpoint, the United States has been willing to create courts of limited jurisdiction to hear cases of a highly specialized or technical nature in other areas of the law (for example, tax and bankruptcy). This Note argues that the specialized-courts approach is viable as it relates to equity and that it is, in fact, preferable to the current system. This Note …

Remedying The Immortal: The Doctrine Of Accession And Patented Human Cell Lines, Julia E. Fissore-O'Leary

Notre Dame Law Review

Importantly, though this Note employs Henrietta Lacks as the illustrative, paradigmatic case for the theory of accession it proposes, accession can be, and should be, broadly construed to apply to all like-situated patients. Part I of this Note briefly explains the timeless human-body-as-property debate. Next, Part II addresses the concept of accession—its theoretical underpinnings, definitions, and amenability to this and other lawsuits. Part III applies accession to HeLa and develops a methodology for calculating damages in this unique setting. This Note does not pretend to present a perfectly wrought formula. Instead, it offers several possibilities for determining compensation. Finally, …

Privacy Qui Tam, Peter Ormerod

Notre Dame Law Review

Privacy law keeps getting stronger, but surveillance-based businesses have proven immune to these new legal regimes. The disconnect between privacy law in theory and in practice is a multifaceted problem, and one critical component is enforcement.

Today, most privacy laws are enforced by governmental regulators—the Federal Trade Commission, the nascent California Privacy Protection Agency, and state attorneys general. An enduring impasse for proposed privacy laws is whether to supplement public enforcement by using a private right of action to authorize individuals to enforce the law.

Both of these conventional enforcement schemes have significant shortcomings. Public enforcement has proven inadequate because …

Religious Liberty And Judicial Deference, Mark L. Rienzi

Notre Dame Law Review

Many of the Supreme Court’s most tragic failures to protect constitutional rights—cases like Plessy v. Ferguson, Buck v. Bell, and Korematsu v. United States—share a common approach: an almost insuperable judicial deference to the elected branches of government. In the modern era, this approach is often called “Thayerism,” after James Bradley Thayer, a nineteenth-century proponent of the notion that courts should not invalidate actions of the legislature as unconstitutional unless they were clearly irrational. Versions of Thayerism have been around for centuries, predating Thayer himself.

The Supreme Court took a decidedly Thayerian approach to the First Amendment …

Recovering Classical Legal Constitutionalism: A Critique Of Professor Vermeule's New Theory, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Kevin C. Walsh

Notre Dame Law Review

This Review proceeds in three Parts. Part I briefly summarizes Common Good Constitutionalism and provides a more detailed description of four of the book’s distinctive features. Part II critiques Vermeule’s argument in light of the classical tradition’s four essential aspects of law, namely that it is an ordinance of reason, for the common good, made by one who has care of the community, and promulgated. Part III draws on those reflections to respond to Vermeule’s criticisms of work like ours that argues that original-law-based understandings of the Constitution are at home in the classical legal tradition. A Conclusion briefly reflects …

Interpreting State Statutes In Federal Court, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article addresses a problem that potentially arises whenever a federal court encounters a state statute. When interpreting the state statute, should the federal court use the state’s methods of statutory interpretation—the state’s canons of construction, its rules about the use of legislative history, and the like—or should the court instead use federal methods of statutory interpretation? The question is interesting as a matter of theory, and it is practically significant because different jurisdictions have somewhat different interpretive approaches. In addressing itself to this problem, the Article makes two contributions. First, it shows, as a normative matter, that federal courts …

Interring The Unitary Executive, Christine Kexel Chabot

Notre Dame Law Review

The President’s power to remove and control subordinate executive officers has sparked a constitutional debate that began in 1789 and rages on today. Leading originalists claim that the Constitution created a “unitary executive” President whose plenary removal power affords her “exclusive control” over subordinates’ exercise of executive power. Text assigning the President a removal power and exclusive control appears nowhere in the Constitution, however, and unitary scholars have instead relied on select historical understandings and negative inferences drawn from a supposed lack of independent regulatory structures at the Founding. The comprehensive historical record introduced by this Article lays this debate …

Equity's Atrophy, Andrew Kull

Notre Dame Law Review

Current U.S. law sees numerous decisions from which a once- predictable, traditional equitable corrective has simply disappeared. The salient cases are those in which, until recently—recent history for this purpose comprising just one or two generations of lawyers and judges—equitable intervention would have been at least highly likely: because the unmodified legal outcome diverges so plainly from equity and good conscience, and because an established equitable response was part of what everybody knew. The idea that equity in U.S. law has been losing some previous degree of vitality is so venerable that it can scarcely be debatable at this point,11 …

Empire In Equity, Seth Davis

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay tells a story of how a contest for empire contributed to the law of justiciability in the U.S. federal courts. It begins in the eighteenth century in the Carnatic, a region in East India, winds its way through the territory of the Cherokee Nation in the nineteenth century, and eventually touches on the State of Tennessee in the twentieth. It is a story about a 1793 decision of the English Court of Chancery that American lawyers and judges would come to cite for the principles that courts will not address political questions and that equity will not intervene …

Equity And The Sovereign, Mila Sohoni

Notre Dame Law Review

Equity traces its genesis to kingly power. But the new American constitutional order shattered the crown and left equity unanchored. Who or what, if anything, inherited the role of the sovereign in federal equity? Is the sovereign the executive branch—or is it Congress? Is it “the United States” or “the people of the United States”? However we conceive of the sovereign, is the sovereign entitled to special deference in a federal court of equity—or to the reverse?

Federal courts have not arrived at consistent answers to these puzzles. They have vacillated on who the sovereign is. And they have vacillated …

Getting Into Equity, Samuel L. Bray, Paul B. Miller

Notre Dame Law Review

For two centuries, common lawyers have talked about a “cause of action.” But “cause of action” is not an organizing principle for equity. This Article shows how a plaintiff gets into equity, and it explains that equity is shaped by the interplay of its remedial, procedural, and substantive law. Equity is adjectival, that is, it modifies law rather than the other way around. Its power comes from remedies, not rights. And for getting into equity, what is central is a grievance. To insist on an equitable cause of action is to work a fundamental change in how a plaintiff gets …

Federal Judicial Power And Federal Equity Without Federal Equity Powers, John Harrison

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article discusses the ways in which the federal courts do and do not have equity powers. Article III courts have the judicial power, which enables them to apply the law, primary and remedial. Applicable remedial law often includes the law of equitable remedies, so the federal courts have the power and obligation to give remedies pursuant to equitable principles. The law of equitable remedies, written and unwritten, is external to the courts, not created by them, the same way written law is external to the courts. Because the unwritten law of equitable remedies is found largely in judicial practice, …

Abstaining Equitably, Fred O. Smith Jr.

Notre Dame Law Review

The doctrine of Younger abstention—which counsels federal courts not to interrupt ongoing state criminal proceedings—balances dueling considerations. On the one hand, the doctrine preserves federal courts’ ability to exercise Congressionally conferred, properly invoked jurisdiction to prevent irreparable violations of the federal constitution. On the other, the doctrine provides space for autonomous state courts to carry out their traditional role in the realm of criminal justice. This Essay identifies four central features of the Younger doctrine that maintain this balance. By protecting these features, federal courts can ensure that Younger remains a doctrine of equitable restraint, instead of inequitable abdication.

First, …

Administrative Stays: Power And Procedure, Rachel Bayefsky

Notre Dame Law Review

Federal courts are often asked to issue various forms of expedited relief, including stays pending appeal. This Article explores a little examined device that federal courts employ to freeze legal proceedings until they are able to rule on a party’s request for a stay pending appeal: the “administrative” or “temporary” stay. A decision whether to impose an administrative stay can have significant effects in the real world, as illustrated by recent high-profile litigation on topics including immigration and abortion. Yet federal courts have not endorsed a uniform standard for determining whether an administrative stay is warranted or clarified the basis …

Equity's Federalism, Kellen Funk

Notre Dame Law Review

The United States has had a dual court system since its founding. One might expect such a pronouncement to refer to the division between state and federal courts, but in the early republic the equally obvious referent would have been to the division between courts of common law and the court of chancery—the distinction, that is, between law and equity. This Essay sketches a history of how the distinction between law and equity was gradually transformed into a doctrine of federalism by the Supreme Court. Congress’s earliest legislation jealously guarded federal equity against fusion with common law at either the …

Payors, Players, And Proximate Cause, Elisabeth F. Crusey

Notre Dame Law Review

At issue is whether pharmaceutical companies’ allegedly misleading drug labels that providers rely upon when prescribing drugs to patients, which plaintiffs classify as mail and wire fraud, are the proximate causes of third-party payors (TPPs) overpaying for medication, or enduring a financial injury, such that the TPPs fulfill RICO standing under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Included in this issue are questions about whether the alleged RICO violations directly caused the TPPs’ financial injuries such that plaintiffs meet the proximate cause requirements under § 1964(c) to state a valid claim. Presently, the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits agree that allegations of …

Attorneys, E-Discovery, And The Case For 37(G), Marilyn G. Mancusi

Notre Dame Law Review

There are currently various sources of authority that federal courts can invoke to sanction attorneys who bungle their e-discovery obligations, but each is insufficient. All fifty states have their own rules authorizing courts within the state to refer misbehaving attorneys to the local disciplinary body, but each state’s rule is different, leading to much inconsistency and lack of uniformity among the federal courts. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) address e-discovery abuse but do not authorize courts to impose sanctions on attorneys for their role in e-discovery abuse. This is a problem because attorneys have ethical and professional obligations …

Law, Equity, And Supplemental Jurisdiction, James E. Pfander, Peter C. Douglas

Notre Dame Law Review

As remedies scholars continue to reflect on the consequences of the 1938 merger of law and equity into one civil action, it may be worth pondering a second merger. In 1990, responding to a Supreme Court opinion that highlighted the absence of such authority, Congress adopted a statutory framework for the exercise of judge-made doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. In the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, Congress merged the two doctrines, lumping them together in a provision for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claims that bear an appropriate relationship to civil actions within the district courts’ original jurisdiction. …

Rethinking Patents Within The Natural Law, Nicholas A. D'Andrea

Notre Dame Law Review

Though one scholar has directly suggested an implementation of Thomas Aquinas’s natural law concepts to United States patent law, that proposal has not been analyzed in light of modern patent law subject matter eligibility jurisprudence. In Part I of this Note, I trace the origins of natural law and natural rights in patents through English and United States legal history. In Part II, I outline the philosophical principles of natural law and natural rights necessary for understand-ing patent law. In Part III, I highlight the deemphasis of property rights in patent law, including in cases such as Alice and Oil …

A Responsive Remedy For Unconstitutional Removal Restrictions, William C. Eisenhauer

Notre Dame Law Review

The Supreme Court has inconsistently approached the remedies in unlawful removal restriction cases. This inconsistency fails to redress plaintiffs injured by unlawful executive power, blurs the separation of powers, and discourages other constitutional actors from considering their actions’ implications.3 This Note proposes a straight-forward solution to those problems.

It begins in Part I by laying out the mechanics of appointment and removal, with special attention to the constitutional and precedential intricacies of the removal power. Part II introduces the remedial problem by describing the Supreme Court’s two most recent removal cases and identifying the problematic inconsistencies. Part III dis-cusses in …