Law Commons^™

The New Doj: Lessons Learned From The Ticketmaster Live Nation Decision, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Will, Judgment, And Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter And The Mistranslation Of The Due Process Clause, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Wickard Through An Antitrust Lens, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

The Market Power Model Of Contract Formation: How Outmoded Economic Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

Transaction cost economics ("TCE") has radically altered industrial organization's explanation for so-called "non-standard contracts, "including "exclusionary" agreements that exclude rivals from access to inputs or customers. According to TCE, such integration usually reduces transaction costs without producing anticompetitive harm. TCE has accordingly exercised growing influence over antitrust doctrine, with courts invoking TCE's teachings to justify revision of some doctrines once hostile to such contracts. Still, old habits die hard, even for courts of increasing economic sophistication. This Article critiques one such habit, namely, courts'continuing claim that firms use market or monopoly power to impose exclusionary contracts on unwilling trading partners. …

Tying Meets The New Institutional Economics: Farewell To The Chimera Of Forcing, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

The Team Production Theory Of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

The Externality Of Victim Care, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Team Teaching, Sarah L. Stafford, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Standard Oil As Lochner's Trojan Horse, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Reinventing Bakke, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Scamlaw And The Macroeconomy, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Robert Bork's Forgotten Role In The Transaction Cost Revolution, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

The last few decades have witnessed a scientific revolution in the field of industrial organization in the form of transaction cost economics (TCE). This revolution has radically altered economists’ understanding and interpretation of both partial and complete economic integration. Not surprisingly, this sea change has substantially influenced antitrust law and policy, impelling the Supreme Court to reverse or greatly modify various precedents.

This essay supplements the received historiography of the TCE revolution. It contends that Robert Bork played a hitherto underappreciated role in that revolution. In particular, the essay contends that in 1966, before the official onset of the transaction …

Section 2 Enforcement And The Great Recession: Why Less (Enforcement) Might Mean More (Gdp), Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

The Great Recession has provoked calls for more vigorous regulation in all sectors, including antitrust enforcement. After President Obama took office, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice abandoned the Bush Administration’s standard of liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act, which forbids unlawful monopolization, as insufficiently interventionist. Based on the premise that similarly lax antitrust enforcement caused and deepened the Great Depression, the Obama Administration outlined a more intrusive and consumer-focused approach to section 2 enforcement as part of a larger national strategy to combat the “extreme” economic crisis the nation was then facing.

This Essay draws …

Regulation Of Franchisor Opportunism And Production Of The Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly Or Competition Between The States?, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

Most scholars would agree that a merger between General Motors and Ford should not be judged solely by Delaware corporate law, even if both firms are incorporated in Delaware. Leaving the standards governing such mergers to state law would assuredly produce a race to the bottom that would result in unduly permissive treatment of such transactions. Similarly, if the two firms agreed to divide markets, most would agree that some regulatory authority other than Michigan or Delaware should have the final word on the agreement. Thus, in order to forestall monopoly or its equivalent, the national government must itself exercise …

Reframing The (False?) Choice Between Purchaser Welfare And Total Welfare, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

This Article critiques the role that the partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm plays in the debate over the definition of “consumer welfare” that courts should employ when developing and applying antitrust doctrine. The Article contends that common reliance on the paradigm distorts the debate between those who would equate “consumer welfare” with “total welfare” and those who equate consumer welfare with “purchaser welfare.” In particular, the model excludes, by fiat, the fact that new efficiencies free up resources that flow to other markets, increasing output and thus the welfare of purchasers in those markets. Moreover, the model also assumes that both …

Reframing Antitrust In Light Of Scientific Revolution: Accounting For Transaction Costs In Rule Of Reason Analysis, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

This Article contends that modern rule of reason analysis, informed by workable competition’s partial equilibrium trade-off paradigm, is suitable for evaluating only a subset of agreements that may reduce transaction costs. The Article distinguishes between “technological” and “non-technological” transaction costs. Technological transaction costs entail the bargaining and information costs first emphasized by Ronald Coase, while non-technological transaction costs result from more fundamental departures from perfect competition, departures creating a risk of opportunism that accompanies relationship-specific investments. Modern law does accurately assess restraints that may reduce technological transaction costs—costs that are analogous to the sort of production costs recognized by the …

Raising Rivals' Costs: Can The Agencies Do More Good Than Harm?, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Professors Alan J. Meese And Nathan B. Oman On Why Hobby Lobby And For-Profit Corporations Are Rfra Persons, Alan J. Meese, Nathan B. Oman

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Property Rights And Intrabrand Restraints, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

Intrabrand restraints limit the discretion of one or more sellers-usually dealers-with respect to the disposition of a product sold under a single brand. While most scholars believe that such contracts can help assure optimal promotion of a manufacturer's products, there is disagreement about the exact manner in which such restraints accomplish this objective. Many scholars believe that such restraints themselves induce dealers to engage in promotional activities desired by the manufacturer. Others believe that such restraints merely serve as "performance bonds," which dealers will forfeit if they fail to follow the manufacturer's precise promotional instructions. Some scholars reject both approaches, …

Property, Aspen, And Refusals To Deal, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Q: Will The Supreme Court Intervention In Florida Fail The Test Of Time?, Ira Glasser, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Premerger Review And Bankruptcy: The Meaning Of Section 363(B)(2), Robert B. Greenbaum, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Price Theory And Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

The Chicago School of antitrust analysis has exerted a strong influence over the law of vertical restraints in the past two decades, leading the Supreme Court to abandon much of its traditional hostility toward such agreements. Chicago's success has provoked a vigorous response from Populists, who support the traditional approach. Chicago, Populists claim, has improperly relied upon neoclassical price theory to inform the normative and descriptive assumptions that drive its analysis of trade restraints generally and of vertical restraints in particular. This reliance is misplaced, Populists assert, because the real world departs from that portrayed by price-theoretic models and, at …

Monopoly Bundling In Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Price Theory, Competition, And The Rule Of Reason, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

Challenging traditional antitrust jurisprudence, Professor Alan J. Meese argues that the present structure of Rule of Reason analysis, applied pursuant to Standard Oil v. United States, has become outdated. The Rule of Reason as currently applied by the courts rests upon neoclassical price theory, an economic paradigm that assumes that legitimate competition consists of unbridled technological rivalry, unconstrained by nonstandard contracts. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has begun to apply a competing paradigm- Transaction Cost Economics-when determining whether a contract is unreasonable "per se" or instead deserving of Rule of Reason scrutiny. Professor Meese argues that Transaction Cost Economics more …

Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Liberty And Antitrust In The Formative Era, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Judicial Review And Nongeneralizable Cases, Neal Devins, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Justice Scalia And Sherman Act Textualism, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.