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Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

2010

Economics

Steve P. Calandrillo

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Law

Baseball's Moral Hazard: Law, Economics And The Designated Hitter Rule, Steve P. Calandrillo Feb 2010

Baseball's Moral Hazard: Law, Economics And The Designated Hitter Rule, Steve P. Calandrillo

Steve P. Calandrillo

No subject prompts greater disagreement among baseball fans than the designated hitter rule, which allows teams to designate a player to hit for the pitcher. The rule increases the number of hit batsmen, and some have suggested this effect is a result of “moral hazard,” which recognizes that persons insured against risk are more likely to engage in dangerous behavior. Because American League pitchers do not bat, they allegedly are not deterred by the full cost of making risky, inside pitches—namely, retribution during their next at bat. Using a law-and-economics approach, this Article concludes that the designated hitter rule creates …


Baseball's Moral Hazard: Law, Economics And The Designated Hitter Rule, Steve P. Calandrillo Feb 2010

Baseball's Moral Hazard: Law, Economics And The Designated Hitter Rule, Steve P. Calandrillo

Steve P. Calandrillo

No subject prompts greater disagreement among baseball fans than the designated hitter rule, which allows teams to designate a player to hit for the pitcher. The rule increases the number of hit batsmen, and some have suggested this effect is a result of “moral hazard,” which recognizes that persons insured against risk are more likely to engage in dangerous behavior. Because American League pitchers do not bat, they allegedly are not deterred by the full cost of making risky, inside pitches—namely, retribution during their next at bat. Using a law-and-economics approach, this Article concludes that the designated hitter rule creates …