Law Commons^™

Valuing Having Children, Carter Dillard

Carter Dillard

Are there objective values on which to base the claim of a right to procreate? Can we articulate reasons for having children so powerful that they justify our doing so, as a matter of right, even where it would conflict with the interests and values of others? This Article systematically and critically examines many of the values that, before now, courts and commentators have simply presumed and relied upon when making the claim that there is and ought to be a fundamental right to have children. This Article first develops a methodology for examining the values and interests on which …

Future Children As Property, Carter Dillard

Carter Dillard

Between Skinner v. Oklahoma and the advent of modern substantive due process, procreation, at least in the eyes of many courts and commentators, became entrenched as a fundamental, if not absolute, right. And yet ironically, the establishment of this right, often taken as symbolic of personal liberty, has diminished autonomy for those persons inevitably caught on the other end of it – our future children. Expanding procreative autonomy has diminished public norms that might otherwise ensure that future children are born into circumstances that also expand their autonomy. Instead, the broad, modern, privacy-based version of the right to procreate leaves …

Antecedent Law: The Law Of People Making, Carter Dillard

Carter Dillard

In our conception of law we have largely presumed the process by which the people whose behavior the law is meant to regulate come to be present and susceptible to the law's influence. As a result, that process is largely outside of our account of the law, and any role the law might have over the matter is relatively ignored. This article introduces a simple and concrete conceptual device, a form of law called antecedent law, which seeks to undo this presumption and refocus our attention on that which can determine the presence of persons in the polity and their …

Procreation, Harm, And The Constitution, Carter Dillard

Carter Dillard

This Essay provides relatively novel answers to two related questions: First, are there moral reasons to limit the sorts of existences it is permissible to bring people into, such that one would be morally prohibited from procreating in certain circumstances? Second, can the state justify a legal prohibition on procreation in those circumstances using that moral reasoning, so that the law would likely be constitutional?

These questions are not new, but my answers to them are and add to the existing literature in several ways. First, I offer a possible resolution to a recent debate among legal scholars regarding what …