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Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in Law
Learning To Love The State Action Doctrine, William S. Brewbaker
Learning To Love The State Action Doctrine, William S. Brewbaker
William S. Brewbaker III
The state action doctrine receives relatively little attention in the Federal Trade Commission/Department of Justice 2004 report on competition in the health care sector. Not surprisingly, the report focuses primarily on urging states to reconsider specific laws that tend to restrict competition in health care markets but that are clearly shielded by the state action doctrine. Relatively little attention is given to the interpretation of the doctrine itself. This article employs the twin themes of institutional choice and market failure to evaluate a number of interpretive proposals affecting the state action doctrine that were available to, but not taken up …
A Comparison Of Merger Remedies In The U.S. And Eu, Thomas J. Horton
A Comparison Of Merger Remedies In The U.S. And Eu, Thomas J. Horton
Thomas J. Horton
No abstract provided.
Antitrust Damages And Deadweight Loss (Symposium), Christopher Leslie
Antitrust Damages And Deadweight Loss (Symposium), Christopher Leslie
Christopher R. Leslie
No abstract provided.
Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, And Cartel Stability, Christopher R. Leslie
Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, And Cartel Stability, Christopher R. Leslie
Christopher R. Leslie
This paper reviews, and proposes revisions to, the government's Corporate Leniency Policy, which confers leniency upon the first member of a price-fixing cartel to expose the illegal activity to the DOJ's Antitrust Division. Three important limitations apply. First, the ringleader of the cartel is ineligible for immunity. Second, leniency is not automatic if the government has its own internal investigation significantly underway. Third, a firm must confess "promptly" in order to qualify for amnesty. This paper proposes doing away with these limitations. It may seem counter-intuitive to enact policies that make it easier for the worst antitrust criminals to escape …
The Anticompetitive Effects Of Unenforced Invalid Patents, Christopher R. Leslie
The Anticompetitive Effects Of Unenforced Invalid Patents, Christopher R. Leslie
Christopher R. Leslie
Antitrust law and patent law assume that an invalid patent cannot distort competition unless the patentee enforces the patent by initiating infringement litigation or explicitly threatening to do so. The Article argues that invalid patents can destroy competition - even without such enforcement efforts - by creating legitimate fears of litigation, increasing the costs of market entry, delaying market entry, scaring away competitors' customers and business partners, and deterring research. Despite the anticompetitive risks posed by invalid patents, neither patent law nor antitrust law does an effective job of ridding the marketplace of invalid patents. In particular, because antitrust law …
Concentrated Monopolies (In Hebrew), Michal Gal, Menachem Perlman, Talya Solomon
Concentrated Monopolies (In Hebrew), Michal Gal, Menachem Perlman, Talya Solomon
Michal Gal
No abstract provided.
Monopolies In Competition: The Balance Between Innovativeness And Competition In The Israeli Competition Law (In Hebrew), Michal Gal
Michal Gal
No abstract provided.
Competition Or Monopoly? The Implications Of Complexity Science, Chaos Theory, And Evolutionary Biology For Antitrust Competition Policy, Thomas J. Horton
Competition Or Monopoly? The Implications Of Complexity Science, Chaos Theory, And Evolutionary Biology For Antitrust Competition Policy, Thomas J. Horton
Thomas J. Horton
No abstract provided.
A Modest Enterprise, Reza Dibadj
A Modest Enterprise, Reza Dibadj
Reza Dibadj
This article discusses The Antitrust Enterprise by Herbert Hovenkamp. While generally praising the book for its refreshing style, its recognition of antitrust's institutional limits, and its efforts to simplify antitrust doctrine, the article ultimately criticizes it as unnecessarily wedded to neoclassical economics. The piece discusses similarities between Hovenkamp's ideas and Chicago school economics, as well as Hovenkamp's apparent skepticism of post-Chicago thinking. Ultimately, the article calls for a more dramatic reimagination of antitrust's role, arguing that neoclassical economics should not be the frontline arbiter of competition policy. Instead, the author urges returning antitrust to its former prominence through the use …
Regulation By Declaration: A Novel Method To Limit Abuse Of Market Power, Michal Gal
Regulation By Declaration: A Novel Method To Limit Abuse Of Market Power, Michal Gal
Michal Gal
In most jurisdictions the legal inquiry into whether a firm enjoys a monopoly position is an integral part of an inquiry into whether a firm has abused its market power, and a positive answer to the first is a precondition for conducting the second. This combination creates some inefficiencies. Most notably, market participants, including the would-be monopolist, are uncertain of the monopolist's market position until its conduct is challenged before the courts. This paper explores a novel regulatory mechanism which seeks to separate the two stages of inquiry and to empower the antitrust authorities to declare a firm a monopoly …
What Is An Agreement? (In Hebrew), Michal Gal