Law Commons^™

Dred Scott And The Crisis Of 1860, Louise Weinberg

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Recent suggestions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Dred Scott decision and the controversy over the extension of slavery into the territories were at the very center of the crisis of 1860. This paper fills in the social, political, economic, and legal backgrounds of that crisis in order to clarify the centrality of Dred Scott in the election of Abraham Lincoln and to the ensuing destruction of the Union.

Thirteen Ways Of Looking At Dred Scott, Jack M. Balkin, Sanford Levinson

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Dred Scott v. Sandford is a classic case that is relevant to almost every important question of contemporary constitutional theory.

Dred Scott connected race to social status, to citizenship, and to being a part of the American people. One hundred fifty years later these connections still haunt us; and the twin questions of who is truly American and who America belongs to still roil our national debates.

Dred Scott is a case about threats to national security and whether the Constitution is a suicide pact. It concerns whether the Constitution follows the flag and whether constitutional rights obtain in federally …

Rethinking Dred Scott: New Context For An Old Case, Austin Allen

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Scholars have misunderstood the context in which Dred Scott emerged. Leading historical interpretations of the decision have relied too heavily on accounts developed by antebellum Republicans and on mid-twentieth-century legal theory. This article offers an alternative account of Dred Scott's origins and argues that the decision emerged from a series of unintended consequences resulting from the Taney Court's efforts to incorporate a Jacksonian vision of governance into constitutional law. By 1857, this effort had generated tensions that made a sweeping decision like Dred Scott nearly unavoidable. The inescapable nature of Dred Scott carries implications for constitutional theorists, especially those …

The New Fiction: Dred Scott And The Language Of Judicial Authority, Mark A. Graber

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Claims that the Justices in Dred Scott abandoned a tradition of judicial restraint rely on an anachronistic measure for judicial activism. Antebellum Justices asserted that laws were unconstitutional only when restraining state officials. Judicial etiquette, in their opinion, required more circumspection when imposing constitutional limits on a coordinate branch of the national government. Contrary to accepted wisdom, the Justices before the Civil War imposed constitutional limitations on federal power in approximately twenty cases. They did so, however, without explicitly declaring federal legislation unconstitutional. The Justices in some federal cases ignored the plain meaning of federal statutes on the ground that …

Dred Scott: Tiered Citizenship And Tiered Personhood, Henry L. Chambers Jr.

Chicago-Kent Law Review

The Dred Scott Court accepted and perpetuated the notion that our Constitution afforded multiple tiers of citizenship and multiple tiers of personhood through which different groups of citizens and different groups of persons would receive varying sets of rights. Through their language and interpretation, the Reconstruction Amendments largely resolved this issue by providing a formal equality that created a single tier of citizenship and a single tier of personhood. Though, as a formal matter, tiered citizenship and tiered personhood are unacceptable, the issue is not fully resolved as a practical matter. Tiered citizenship and tiered personhood may exist when the …

Emergence Of Equality As A Constitutional Value: The First Century, William M. Wiecek

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Equality as a constitutional value was unprecedented when it made its appearance in 1868 in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It reflected antebellum abolitionist ideals adopted hesitantly by Northern Republicans during Reconstruction, but these were incompatible with the expectations of most white Americans of the era, as well as with all previous American experiences. In this sense, equality was a revolutionary constitutional value. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended the Equal Protection Clause and its embedded ideal of interracial equality to reverse the racist dicta of the Dred Scott opinion, to validate the Civil Rights Act …

The Last Angry Man: Benjamin Robbins Curtis And The Dred Scott Case, Earl M. Maltz

Chicago-Kent Law Review

The dissenting opinion of Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis in Dred Scott has generally received lavish praise from commentators. Curtis is typically praised not only for his substantive conclusions, but also for his seemingly dispassionate analysis of the legal issues presented by the case. In many respects, this praise is well-deserved; Curtis's discussions of the issues of slavery in the territories and citizenship for free blacks are models of legal reasoning. However, a close analysis of other aspects of his opinion reveals that Curtis's analysis was at times distorted by his anger with the actions of Chief Justice Taney and other …

Legality And Legitimacy In Dred Scott: The Crisis Of The Incomplete Constitution, Michael P. Zuckert

Chicago-Kent Law Review

The original Constitution was incomplete in that it contained a disparity between the principles of legitimacy of the system and the legality of the institution of slavery. Political communities marked by such disharmony are beset with pressures to make the system consistent in one way or another. Such indeed was the fate of the U.S. during the antebellum era. Three typical responses arose: to make legality correspond to legality (by redefining the principles of legitimacy of the system), to make legality conform to legitimacy (by doing away with slavery), or to maintain the tension in ever more creative ways. The …

Benjamin Curtis: Top Of The List, R. Owen Williams

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Among the many brave and brilliant dissents from the Supreme Court, few are more historically significant than that of Benjamin Curtis in Dred Scott v. Sandford. Earl Maltz insists that the traditional view of Curtis as a dispassionate Justice is incorrect; Curtis is better seen as the "Last Angry Man." This paper considers the famous dissent, the man who wrote it, and the technical analysis Maltz claims as sine qua non to a proper understanding of the opinion.

Foreign Authority, American Exceptionalism, And The Dred Scott Case, Sarah H. Cleveland

Chicago-Kent Law Review

One distinctive feature of the Dred Scott decision for modern readers is the extent to which the Supreme Court Justices looked to foreign and international law in support of their decisions. The legal status of a slave who entered a free jurisdiction was a question that had been confronted by many courts at home and abroad, and international law had played an important role in American and European adjudication of slavery questions. The Justices therefore were confronted with the strikingly modern question of the extent to which U.S. law embraced, or distinguished itself from, foreign practice. Arguments from foreign and …

Searching For A Needle In A Haystack: The Constitutionality Of Police Dna Dragnets, Sepideh Esmaili

Chicago-Kent Law Review

DNA dragnets—the mass warrantless DNA testing of individuals whom authorities have neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to believe perpetrated a crime, but who merely live or work near a crime scene—have increasingly been used by police departments in a desperate attempt to solve puzzling crimes. The lack of success and the Fourth Amendment constitutional concerns raised by DNA dragnets, however, lead this practice to be suspect. Under the Fourth Amendment, all searches of an individual must be reasonable. The reasonableness of any search typically depends on the government obtaining a warrant prior to the search. While there are well-established …

Politics, Police, Past And Present: Larry Kramer's The People Themselves, Christopher Tomlins

Chicago-Kent Law Review

This article addresses aspects of the debate over Larry Kramer's The People Themselves and, more generally, current interest in popular constitutionalism before engaging, briefly, with the book itself. Because I find Kramer's book in general terms unexceptionable I see no particular reason to engage in the kind of lengthy critical assessment undertaken by those scholars whose disagreements with the book are pronounced. Instead I focus on three "sites" that the book traverses that I consider sites of missed opportunity. They are, first, the question of the people and the Constitution; second, the people and politics; third, the question of police …

A Discrete And Cosmopolitan Minority: The Loyalists, The Atlantic World, And The Origins Of Judicial Review, Daniel J. Hulsebosch

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Historical interest in popular constitutionalism has enlivened the search for the origins of judicial review. Several precursors of judicial review in the state courts during the 1780s, in particular, demand explanation. If early modern Anglo-Americans did not perceive courts as enforcers of constitutional limits on legislatures, what explains these attempts by judges to curtail statutes in the "critical period" before the Philadelphia Convention? This article argues that these cases involved antiloyalist legislation and related laws that violated the Peace Treaty of 1783 or the law of nations, or otherwise obstructed diplomatic and commercial relations with the other empires of the …

Kramer's Popular Constitutionalism: A Quick Normative Assessment, Sarah Harding

Chicago-Kent Law Review

This paper steps outside of the historical debate about the origins and development of judicial review and focuses on the normative claim that Kramer makes near the end of Popular Constitutionalism. Should the Court, as Kramer argues, have a little more humility when it comes to judicial review and its authority over constitutional interpretation? Should the Court have more respect for legislative decision-making? These questions are addressed through a brief exploration of the ideas of a leading skeptic of judicial review, Jeremy Waldron, and a glimpse at the experiences of other rights-respecting nations.

A Historiography Of The People Themselves And Popular Constitutionalism, Morton J. Horwitz

Chicago-Kent Law Review

The People Themselves intervenes in a growing contemporary debate about the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system that began to emerge after the end of the Warren Court and reached a crescendo with Bush v. Gore. For the second time since Lochner v. New York was decided, some liberals have begun once again to switch sides on the virtues of judicial review. Many recent liberal books and articles inevitably bring to mind the flood of Progressive attacks on the democratic legitimacy of judicial review written between 1905 and 1937. Yet the book can be approached independently …

Iredell Reclaimed: Farewell To Snowiss's History Of Judicial Review, Gerald Leonard

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Even after the publication of Larry Kramer's The People Themselves, the early history of judicial review suffers from the unfortunate influence of Sylvia Snowiss's Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution. Snowiss misread, among other things, James Iredell's foundational argument in 1786 for the inevitability and necessity of judicial review. Snowiss claimed that early understandings of judicial review conceptualized it not as a legal doctrine but as a doctrine of political and revolutionary resistance. In fact, however, Iredell argued for judicial review as a straightforward, legalistic consequence of popular sovereignty. In Iredell's influential account, the transition from …

Pre-Revolutionary Popular Constitutionalism And Larry Kramer's The People Themselves, Richard J. Ross

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Larry Kramer's depiction of pre-Revolutionary constitutionalism rests on two dichotomies that are valuable yet exclude middle positions. First, he distinguishes between fundamental law and ordinary law. Second, he argues that pre-Revolutionary judges could play one of two roles—since they were not supreme constitutional interpreters (the first of these roles), they must have possessed no special authority to determine constitutional meanings (the second, and remaining, possibility). Both of these dichotomies obscure middle positions that capture important aspects of the pre-Revolutionary constitutional tradition. My comments briefly identify these middle positions and suggest what is at stake in recovering them.

Popular Constitutionalism As Political Law, Mark Tushnet

Chicago-Kent Law Review

The People Themselves develops the idea that constitutional law is a special kind of law, political law. Examining some of the book's reviews, this Article explains how political law can be developed through relatively unstructured interactions among the people, political leaders in Congress and the presidency, and the courts. It argues that understanding how constitutional law as political law is developed requires, not the development of crisp analytic criteria, but close historical analysis of particular interactions. The Article identifies criteria for evaluating how popular constitutionalism compares to judicial review as a mechanism for enforcing constitutional rights, arguing that a serious …

Tom Delay: Popular Constitutionalist?, Neal Devins

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Focusing on congressional efforts to override state court decisionmaking in the Terri Schiavo case, this essay examines some of the practical problems associated with implementing Larry Kramer's popular constitutionalism. In particular, lawmakers will invoke the "will of the people" when, in fact, they are pursuing special interest politics. More than that, the Schiavo case calls attention to the increasing partisanship within Congress. This partisanship, contrary to the objectives of popular constitutionalism, makes lawmakers less likely to advance the national interest and more likely to focus their energies on their increasingly partisan base. For this very reason, today's Congress is less …

Constitutional Education For The People Themselves, Sheldon Nahmod

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Professor Nahmod, like Dean Kramer, remains profoundly disturbed by the Supreme Court's triumphalist decision in Bush v. Gore. However, he does not go so far as Dean Kramer in arguing normatively for a return to "popular constitutionalism." Rather, his more modest position is that the Supreme Court, Congress, and the President, together with the bar and the media, have a normative obligation to educate "the people themselves" in constitutional matters. This often-overlooked and vitally important "constitutional education" of the people is based on the self-government rationale of both our constitutional structure and the First Amendment. Professor Nahmod suggests how …

Comment: Popular Law And The Doubtful Case Rule, Frank I. Michelman

Chicago-Kent Law Review

A "doubtful case" or "clear mistake" rule is a rule calling for substantial deference by a reviewing court to a legislature's implicit affirmation of the constitutional probity of the statutes it enacts. Americans of the early Republic reportedly found a grounding for such a rule of judicial conduct in a conception of constitutional law as popular (not "ordinary") law. On examination, it proves difficult to trace a persuasive connection between the popular-law conception and demands for judicial adherence to a rule of deference to the implicit constitutional judgments of legislatures. Rather, the popular law conception calls for a kind of …

Katrina, The Constitution, And The Legal Question Doctrine, Robin West

Chicago-Kent Law Review

The article argues that the non-existence of welfare rights in American Constitutional law, and the non-existence of a widely shared sense of moral obligation to attend to poverty through the use of law, cannot be explained by reference to the Constitutional text or history. Rather, it is a function of the over-identification of ordinary morality with Constitutionalism, of the Constitution with law, and of law, with adjudicative law—what the article calls "the legal question doctrine." As courts cannot, will not, and possibly should not enforce "welfare rights," as a matter of adjudicated Constitutional law, so, we conclude, neither the Constitution, …

The Uses Of History In The Supreme Court's Takings Clause Jurisprudence, Jonathan Lahn

Chicago-Kent Law Review

In a series of seminal cases interpreting the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, the United States Supreme Court has used arguments that can be called "historical" to justify its holdings and negotiate the relationship between the static language of the Constitution and the dynamic realities of American life. While historical arguments have been a recurring theme in Takings Clause jurisprudence over the past eighty years, the way in which they are used has shifted. While historical accounts of changes in American society over time once served to justify new forms of governmental intervention in the realm of private property, a new …