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Full-Text Articles in Law

Law, Norms, And The Breakdown Of The Board, Renee M. Jones Nov 2006

Law, Norms, And The Breakdown Of The Board, Renee M. Jones

Boston College Law School Faculty Papers

This Article considers the dominant claim in corporate law literature that extra-legal mechanisms such as markets and social norms provide adequate safeguards against corporate mismanagement and opportunism. After noting recognized deficiencies in the arguments from market discipline, the Article draws on psychological insights to show that certain behavioral phenomena prevent social norms from appropriately constraining corporate conduct. It then argues that because neither markets nor social norms can sufficiently discipline corporate officials, a credible accountability mechanism is necessary to prevent director conduct standards from deteriorating. Unfortunately, an inveterate tradition of judicial deference in corporate law has undermined the role of ...


Too Big To Fail: Moral Hazard In Auditing And The Need To Restructure The Industry Before It Unravels, Lawrence A. Cunningham Sep 2006

Too Big To Fail: Moral Hazard In Auditing And The Need To Restructure The Industry Before It Unravels, Lawrence A. Cunningham

Boston College Law School Faculty Papers

Large audit firms may believe that they are too big to fail. Arthur Andersen’s 2002 criminal indictment reduced their number from five to four, and the government decided in 2005 to avoid indicting KPMG for crimes it admitted committing. If audit firms interpret the government’s reluctance to indict as signaling aversion to tough action against them, moral hazard arises. This offsets auditing improvements mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that are designed to strengthen auditors’ reputations with managers for thoroughness and improve financial statement reliability. Neutralizing this moral hazard requires a credible alternative industry structure so that ...


Conflict Of Laws For Transactions In Securities Held Through Intermediaries, James S. Rogers Apr 2006

Conflict Of Laws For Transactions In Securities Held Through Intermediaries, James S. Rogers

Boston College Law School Faculty Papers

The evolution of the modern system of securities holding through intermediaries poses particularly difficult conflict of laws issues. The traditional approach to conflict of laws suggests that the law governing a transaction in securities is determined by the location of the securities; yet under modern conditions it is difficult in practice, if not impossible in theory, to determine that location. A recent project of the Hague Conference on Private International Law has confronted these problems and devised a workable, modern approach. For any such project to succeed, lawyers must be willing to abandon traditional concepts of conflict of laws such ...