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Articles 1 - 12 of 12
Full-Text Articles in Law
Procuring The Right To An Unfair Trial: Federal Rule Of Evidence 804(B)(6) And The Due Process Implications Of The Rule's Failure To Require Standards Of Reliability For Admissible Evidence, Kelly Rutan
American University Law Review
This Comment argues that though the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing allows a court to forfeit both a defendant’s right to object to the admission of hearsay statements and the right of confrontation, the current state of the law requires all out-of-court statements admitted under Rule 804(b)(6) to possess some level of reliability in order to satisfy due process. Part I of this Comment discusses the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, the courts’ treatment of this principle prior to 1997, and its codification into the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part II looks at Confrontation Clause issues unique to hearsay exceptions …
Davis And Hammon: A Step Forward, Or A Step Back?, Tom Lininger
Davis And Hammon: A Step Forward, Or A Step Back?, Tom Lininger
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and lower court judges hoped that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereafter simply Davis) would provide a primer on testimonial hearsay. In retrospect, these hopes were somewhat unrealistic. The Davis ruling could not possibly clear up all the confusion that followed Crawford v. Washington, the landmark 2004 case in which the Court strengthened the right of the accused to confront declarants of testimonial hearsay. In Davis, the Court focused on the facts under review and developed a taxonomy that will be useful in similar cases, but …
Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin
Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
The Supreme Court’s consolidated ruling in United States v. Davis and United States v. Hammon is a classic of the genre of consensus opinions to which the Roberts Court aspired in its first, transitional term. The opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, contains practical accommodations unusual in a decision by the Court’s fiercest proponent of first principles. The restraint that characterized the term is, of course, more about considerations of logistics (including the desire to avoid re-arguments after the mid-term replacement of Justice O’Connor) than about the alignment of logic. Because it reflects temporary institutional constraints rather than intellectual agreement, the …
Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, And The Supreme Court: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Joan S. Meier
Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, And The Supreme Court: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Joan S. Meier
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
The Supreme Court’s consolidated decision in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana offers something for everyone: by “splitting the difference” between the two cases—affirming one and reversing the other—the opinion provides much grist for advocates’ mills on both sides of this issue. While advocates for defendants’ rights are celebrating the opinion’s continued revitalization of the right to confrontation, which began in Crawford v. Washington, advocates for victims have cause for celebration as well: the decision is notable for its reflection of the Court’s growing—albeit incomplete— awareness and understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence and their implications for justice. …
Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles
Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
In his concurring opinion in Crawford v. Washington, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for holding that the Confrontation Clause applies to “testimonial” statements but leaving for “another day” any effort to define sufficiently what “testimonial” means. Prosecutors and defendants, he said, “should not be left in the dark in this manner.” Over the next two years, both sides grappled with the meaning of testimonial, each gleaning import from sections of Crawford that seemingly proved their test was the right one. When the Court granted certiorari in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereinafter Davis), hopes were high that …
Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller
Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
I begin with a question of effectiveness: does the new Confrontation Clause doctrine effectively protect defendants with respect to the most im-portant types of problematic out-of-court statements? Although they leave much room for the introduction of hearsay in the immediate aftermath of crime generally, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (together hereinafter Davis) are better opinions from that broad perspective than I had feared. The new doctrine now covers and provides substantial procedural protection for a very important class of problematic hearsay—statements made to government agents investigating past crime.
Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine
Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Clarification of the Supreme Court’s newly minted interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was desperately needed, and Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana promised to provide it. Two terms earlier, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court had worked a revolutionary transformation of Confrontation Clause analysis by overruling Ohio v. Roberts and severing the link between hearsay jurisprudence and the Clause. Crawford was hailed by the criminal defense bar, since it seemed to presage a sharp reduction in the frequency of so-called “victimless” trials by holding that “testimonial” hearsay, no matter how reliable, was constitutionally inadmissible in the absence of …
Cheating The Constitution, Pamela R. Metzger
Cheating The Constitution, Pamela R. Metzger
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
It is black letter constitutional law: To prove a criminal offense, the prosecution must prove every element of the offense, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the constitution entitles a defendant to confront and cross-examine all witnesses against him. Yet, for the past thirty years, state legislatures have quietly approved laws that cheat the constitution. By that, I mean that these laws fly, undetected, beneath the constitutional radar while violating fundamental constitutional rights.
Although other constitutional cheats abound, in this article I consider one archetypical cheat: statutes that permit state prosecutors to use hearsay state crime laboratory reports, in …
Crawford At Two: Testimonial Hearsay And The Confrontation Clause, H. Patrick Furman
Crawford At Two: Testimonial Hearsay And The Confrontation Clause, H. Patrick Furman
Publications
This article addresses the response of Colorado courts, and that of certain other jurisdictions, to the 2004 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Crawford v. Washington.
Admissibility Of Co-Conspirator Statements In A Post-Crawford World, Michael L. Seigel, Daniel Weisman
Admissibility Of Co-Conspirator Statements In A Post-Crawford World, Michael L. Seigel, Daniel Weisman
UF Law Faculty Publications
This Article takes the position that co-conspirator statements must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they are testimonial and thus subject to exclusion under the Confrontation Clause. Further, in light of the fact that the author of the majority opinions in Crawford and Davis was Justice Antonin Scalia, this Article examines whether interpreting the Sixth Amendment as a bar to the admission of certain coconspirator statements would violate an originalist interpretation of that provision. The conclusion reached is that it would not. In the current era of ever-narrowing rights for criminal defendants, reaffirming the law's commitment to …
The Story Of Crawford, Richard D. Friedman
The Story Of Crawford, Richard D. Friedman
Book Chapters
Michael Crawford had been charged with assault. At his trial, the prosecution offered a statement made in the police station on the night of the incident by Crawford's wife Sylvia, who did not testify at trial. He objected, in part on the ground that this violated his right under the Confrontation Clause. The trial court nevertheless admitted the statement, and Crawford was convicted. The Washington Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the judgment. In rejecting the Confrontation Clause challenge, that court purported to apply the then governing doctrine of Ohio v. Roberts, under which the Clause posed no obstacle to admissibility if …
We Really (For The Most Part) Mean It!, Richard D. Friedman
We Really (For The Most Part) Mean It!, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
I closed my petition for certiorari in Hammon v. Indiana by declaring, “ ‘We really mean it!’ is the message that lower courts need to hear, and that decision of this case can send.” The prior year, Crawford v. Washington had transformed the law of the Confrontation Clause, holding that an out-ofcourt statement that is testimonial in nature may be admitted against an accused only if the maker of the statement is unavailable and the accused has had an opportunity to cross-examine her. But Crawford deliberately left undetermined what the term “testimonial” meant. Many lower courts gave it a grudging …