Law Commons^™

Why Health Courts Are Unconstitutional, Amy Widman

Pace Law Review

No abstract provided.

Revisiting The Tense Relationship Between The U.S. Supreme Court, Administrative Procedure, And The National Environmental Policy Act, Jason J. Czarnezki

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This Article addresses the possibility, under the prevailing understanding of NEPA, that an agency might draft a comprehensive report containing information about potential environmental effects and alternate approaches to a proposed plan--and then wholly disregard all of this information in making its final decision. Although an agency may contend that it has “considered” the environmental consequences of alternative courses of action, what if these factors have no actual impact on its final decision? Hypothetically, an agency could simply “steamroll” toward its preferred decision, hurdling NEPA's procedural obstacles without genuinely considering potential environmental harms or the means to avoid them.

This …

The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation Of Legal Interpretation, Jason J. Czarnezki

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This Article tests a model of judicial decisionmaking that incorporates elements of both the attitudinal model and the legal model, along with measures of institutional and judicial background characteristics such as collegiality and trial court experience. We develop a measure of interpretive philosophy relying primarily on judicial opinions, which we code for certain indicators of traditional interpretive approaches (i.e., the use of interpretive tools). The critical question is whether judges with similar interpretive philosophies are more likely to agree with one another when deciding cases. Our general finding is that ideology and interpretive philosophy are not significant predictors of agreement. …

The Dubitante Opinion, Jason J. Czarnezki

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

A dubitante (pronounced d[y]oo-bi-tan-tee) opinion indicates that “the judge doubted a legal point but was unwilling to state that it was wrong.” Judges rarely write dubitante opinions or use the term, and informal polling suggests not many legal scholars are aware of the practice. This short essay endeavors to shed some light on the use of the term dubitante in judicial opinions and spark discussion as to the merits of the dubitante opinion--What is a dubitante opinion? When was the term first used, and how often is the term used? Who uses it and how? What are the consequences of …