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The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile
The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile
All Faculty Scholarship
The Securities and Exchange Commission introduced a new corporate governance structure, the qualified legal compliance committee, as part of the professional standards of conduct for attorneys mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. QLCCs are consistent with the Commission’s general approach to improving corporate governance through specialized committees of independent directors. This Article suggests, however, that assessing the benefits and costs of creating QLCCs may be more complex than is initially apparent. Importantly, QLCCs are unlikely to be effective in the absence of incentives for active director monitoring. This Article concludes by considering three ways of increasing these incentives.
Enron - When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction Or Roadmap To Corporate Governance Reform?, Douglas M. Branson
Enron - When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction Or Roadmap To Corporate Governance Reform?, Douglas M. Branson
Articles
This article raises the unthinkable proposition (for academics at least) that Enron may have been an aberration. The Enron debacle may have been the rare case in which nine, ten or more sets of monitors and gatekeepers failed. Alternatively, as with Tyco, WorldCom, Adelphia, Rite Aid or other celebrated corporate "busts," Enron may be the handiwork of one or two well placed wrongdoers, in this case, CFO Andrew Fastow. Enron then may not be the pathway to meaningful reform at all.
The article next proceeds to a critical review of Sarbanes-Oxley's principal provisions. The conclusion reached is that by and …
Corporations Without Labor: The Politics Of Progressive Corporate Law, Dalia Tsuk Mitchell
Corporations Without Labor: The Politics Of Progressive Corporate Law, Dalia Tsuk Mitchell
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
This article examines how, in the course of the twentieth century, legal scholars and political theorists helped remove the interests of workers (as differentiated from shareholders, officers, and directors) from the core concerns of corporate law and theory. Specifically, the article demonstrates how scholars' conversations about corporate entities and corporate power were influenced by a shared cultural and intellectual objection to Marxist class analysis with its focus on the proletariat. It further explores how the purging of the working class from the scholarly imagination paved a way, first, for the rise of the new classes of managers and owners and …