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Full-Text Articles in Law

Regulating Irrational Exuberance And Anxiety In Securities Markets , Peter H. Huang Dec 2003

Regulating Irrational Exuberance And Anxiety In Securities Markets , Peter H. Huang

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This paper analyzes the regulatory implications of irrational exuberance and anxiety in securities markets. U.S. federal securities laws mandate the disclosure of certain information, but regulate only the cognitive form and content of that information. An important and unstudied question is how to regulate securities markets where some investors respond not only cognitively to the form and content of information, but also emotionally to the form and content of information. This paper investigates that question when some investors feel exuberance or anxiety that is unjustified by cognitive processing of the available information. This paper develops the implications for mandatory ...


How To Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal For Securities Intermediaries, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2003

How To Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal For Securities Intermediaries, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley And Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, William W. Bratton Jan 2003

Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley And Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Defeating Class Certification In Securities Fraud Actions, Kermit Roosevelt Iii Jan 2003

Defeating Class Certification In Securities Fraud Actions, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Securities Analyst As Agent: Rethinking The Regulation Of Analysts, Jill E. Fisch, Hillary A. Sale Jan 2003

The Securities Analyst As Agent: Rethinking The Regulation Of Analysts, Jill E. Fisch, Hillary A. Sale

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Shareholder Value And Auditor Independence, William W. Bratton Jan 2003

Shareholder Value And Auditor Independence, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This Article questions the practice of framing problems concerning auditors’ professional responsibility inside a principal-agent paradigm. If professional independence is to be achieved, auditors cannot be enmeshed in agency relationships with the shareholders of their audit clients. As agents, the auditors by definition become subject to the principal’s control and cannot act independently. For the same reason, auditors’ duties should be neither articulated in the framework of corporate law fiduciary duty, nor conceived relationally at all. These assertions follow from an inquiry into the operative notion of the shareholder-beneficiary. The Article unpacks the notion of the shareholder and tells ...


Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen Jan 2003

Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Following the collapse of the Enron Corporation, the ethical obligations of corporate attorneys have received increased scrutiny. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in response to calls for corporate reform, specifically requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to address the lawyer’s role by requiring covered attorneys to “report up” evidence of corporate wrongdoing to key corporate officers, and, in some circumstances, to the board of directors. Failure to “report up” subjects a lawyer to liability under federal law.

This Article argues that the reporting up requirement reflects a second-best approach to corporate governance reform. Rather than focusing on the ...


The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile Jan 2003

The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission introduced a new corporate governance structure, the qualified legal compliance committee, as part of the professional standards of conduct for attorneys mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. QLCCs are consistent with the Commission’s general approach to improving corporate governance through specialized committees of independent directors. This Article suggests, however, that assessing the benefits and costs of creating QLCCs may be more complex than is initially apparent. Importantly, QLCCs are unlikely to be effective in the absence of incentives for active director monitoring. This Article concludes by considering three ways of increasing these incentives.


Corporate Control Transactions: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter Jan 2003

Corporate Control Transactions: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient, Michael L. Wachter Jan 2003

Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient, Michael L. Wachter

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This paper evaluates the impact of developments in the understanding of asset value pricing for alternative legal standards for takeover defenses: the management discretion and the shareholder rights positions. Both sides place considerable, albeit implicit, reliance on alternative views of the efficiency of financial markets. Developments in finance theory show that when financial markets are only "relatively efficient," stock prices can incorrectly value the corporation at any point in time, at the same time as investors cannot outperform the market on an ongoing basis. I focus on financial market anomalies arising from the failure of the capital asset pricing model ...