Law Commons^™

Constitutional Existence Conditions And Judicial Review, Michael C. Dorf, Matthew D. Adler

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Although critics of judicial review sometimes call for making the entire Constitution nonjusticiable, many familiar norms of constitutional law state what we call "existence conditions" that are necessarily enforced by judicial actors charged with the responsibility of applying, and thus as a preliminary step, identifying, propositions of sub-constitutional law such as statutes. Article I, Section 7, which sets forth the procedures by which a bill becomes a law, is an example: a putative law that did not go through the Article I, Section 7 process and does not satisfy an alternative test for legal validity (such as the treaty-making provision …

The Evolution Of Equality In American Law, Gerald Torres

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Moral Rights, Judicial Review, And Democracy: A Response To Horacio Spector, Laura S. Underkuffler

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Legal Indeterminacy And Institutional Design, Michael C. Dorf

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Legal And Political Future Of Physician-Assisted Suicide, Larry Palmer

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Property As A Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example, Gregory S. Alexander

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

This article examines an apparent paradox in comparative constitutional law. Property rights are not treated as a fundamental right in American constitutional law; they are, however, under the Basic Law (i.e., constitution) of Germany, a social-welfare state that otherwise gives less weight to property. The article uses this apparent paradox as a vehicle for considering the different reasons why constitutions protect property. It explains the difference between the German and American constitutional treatment of property on the basis of the quite different approaches taken in the two systems to the purposes of constitutional protection of property.

Property As A Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example, Gregory S. Alexander

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Liberalism And The Establishment Clause, Steven H. Shiffrin

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Every political theory tolerates some things and not others. Every political theory promotes a particular kind of person even if it denies it is doing so. But the best liberalism does not confine itself to promoting a Rawlsian-tolerant citizen. Liberalism, like conservatism, has greater ambitions in the socialization of the young. The best liberalism, a neo-Millian liberalism, promotes a creative, independent, autonomous, engaged citizen and human being who works with others to make for a better society and speaks out against unjust customs, habits, institutions, traditions, hierarchies, and authorities.

Although government may promote a particular conception of the good life, …

Designing Judicial Review: A Comment On Schauer, Emily Sherwin

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In his characteristically lucid paper, Neutrality and Judicial Review, Frederick Schauer revisits the meaning and plausibility of Herbert Wechsler’s argument for neutral principles in constitutional adjudication. Unlike some critics, Schauer takes the argument seriously, on its own terms, and does an excellent job of sorting through the different ideas that lie behind it. Schauer identifies four different versions of the argument for neutrality. At least three of these are drawn from Wechsler’s 1959 article. Schauer is particularly interested in a fourth version, which favors neutrality in the design and management of the institution of judicial review.

The "Blaine" Debate: Must States Fund Religious Schools?, Laura S. Underkuffler

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the United States Supreme Court held-by a vote of 5 to 4-that the funding of religious schools with taxpayer money through voucher programs does not violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. Emboldened by this success, voucher proponents now attack state constitutional provisions (often called "Blaine Amendments") that prohibit taxpayer funding of religious schools. These state provisions, which may stand in the way of religious-school voucher programs, are attacked as violative of the federal Constitution, rooted in anti-religious bias, or otherwise illegal or unwise.

It is my view that efforts to force states …