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The Case For Including Marks V. United States In The Canon Of Constitutional Law, Maxwell L. Stearns Jan 2000

The Case For Including Marks V. United States In The Canon Of Constitutional Law, Maxwell L. Stearns

Faculty Scholarship

In this essay, I would like to suggest adding a single case, with appropriate commentary, to the canon of constitutional law, as presented in introductory casebooks. Specifically, I suggest including Marks v. United States, as a principal case, or in the form of a detailed summary, immediately before or after the first major plurality decision. I should note that the case is rather short – nine pages in the U.S. Reports – and that it nominally involves obscenity doctrine. I would suggest, counterintuitively perhaps, that the case is more fruitfully presented toward the beginning of an introductory course in constitutional …


Protect The Press: A First Amendment Standard For Safeguarding Aggressive Newsgathering, Erwin Chemerinsky Jan 2000

Protect The Press: A First Amendment Standard For Safeguarding Aggressive Newsgathering, Erwin Chemerinsky

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Treaty Power And American Federalism, Part Ii, Curtis A. Bradley Jan 2000

The Treaty Power And American Federalism, Part Ii, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Proactive Legislation And The First Amendment, Stuart M. Benjamin Jan 2000

Proactive Legislation And The First Amendment, Stuart M. Benjamin

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, I contend that First Amendment principles dictate a presumption against legislation that is based on predictive harms, but that the presumption will be overcome if a court independently determines that there is a likelihood of irreparable harm. Part I briefly discusses the level of harm required to justify legislation that infringes upon First Amendment rights. Part II turns to proactive legislation, giving some examples of predictive harms. Part III describes the Supreme Court's responses to legislative findings in the First Amendment context, and Part IV discusses the difference between predictive harms and other legislative findings. Part V …


Our Imperial First Amendment, Paul D. Carrington Jan 2000

Our Imperial First Amendment, Paul D. Carrington

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, Donald L. Horowitz Jan 2000

Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, Donald L. Horowitz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Customary International Law And Private Rights Of Action, Curtis A. Bradley Jan 2000

Customary International Law And Private Rights Of Action, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Treaties, Human Rights, And Conditional Consent, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith Jan 2000

Treaties, Human Rights, And Conditional Consent, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Variations On Some Themes Of A Disporting Gazelle And His Friend: Statutory Interpretation As Seen By Jerome Frank And Felix Frankfurter, Kent Greenawalt Jan 2000

Variations On Some Themes Of A Disporting Gazelle And His Friend: Statutory Interpretation As Seen By Jerome Frank And Felix Frankfurter, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

In 1947, this Review published two lectures on statutory interpretation by Jerome Frank and Felix Frankfurter. Both jurists were concerned with a basic question: How constrained are judges when they interpret legislation? The answers each gives, while similar in some respects, differ strikingly. In arguing that interpretation necessarily involves a creative element, Frank analogizes the role of a judge in interpreting legislation to that of a performer in interpreting a musical composition. Although he argues that judicial creativity is constrained, Frank views statutory interpretation as "a kind of legislation." For Frankfurter, by contrast, in construing a statute, a judge is …