Law Commons^™

To Know A Veil, Douglas C. Michael

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Lawyers, judges, law students, and law professors have a love-hate relationship with the doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil”—the idea that shareholders might sometimes be personally liable for the debts of the corporation. It is the subject covered more than all others in courses on corporation law. It is widely litigated, being the subject of thousands of opinions. Yet, for all this attention, it is routinely vilified by the experts. Most commentators recognize that it is jurisprudence without substance.

This Article is an attempt to form a basis for rigorous analysis of virtually every veil-piercing case and to rid the …

Should State Corporate Law Define Successor Liability - The Demise Of Cercla's Federal Common Law, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

During the 1980s and early 1990s, a series of decisions broadly interpreting the liability provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCIA) appeared destined to transform corporate law practice. CERCIA does not directly address successor liability, but the statute's complex and contradictory legislative history arguably implies that Congress wanted federal courts to apply broad liability principles to achieve the statute's fundamental remedial goal of making polluters and their successors pay for cleaning up hazardous substances.

Notably, a number of courts rejected state corporate law principles that usually limit the liability of successor corporations and instead …

Corporate Finance, Corporate Law And Finance Theory, Peter H. Huang, Michael S. Knoll

Publications

No abstract provided.

Delaware As Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor Cary's Polemic, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

No abstract provided.

Teaching Corporate Law From An Option Perspective, Peter H. Huang

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Conundrum Of Executive Compensation, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

Much of the scholarship on executive compensation that appears in law reviews assumes that large U.S. corporations overpay their chief executive officers ("CEOs"). This assumption is understandable, as many of these compensation packages are indeed stunning. The question of whether CEOs are overpaid, however, is complicated. Some scholars in other disciplines, principally in economics and management science, have studied the issue but, as this Article demonstrates, this literature does not confirm the assumption. Indeed, some studies suggest that CEO pay is competitive. Moreover, efforts to reduce the level of executive compensation may have the unintended consequence of achieving the opposite …

The Direction Of Corporate Law: The Scholars' Perspective, John C. Coffee Jr., Richard A. Booth Marbury Research Professor Of Law, R. Franklin Balotti, David C. Mcbride, Edward P. Welch

Faculty Scholarship

Transcript of a panel on a scholar's approach to corporation law.