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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Law
Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Claims By Plaintiffs In Diversity Cases: Making Sense Of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (B), Darren J. Gold
Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Claims By Plaintiffs In Diversity Cases: Making Sense Of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (B), Darren J. Gold
Michigan Law Review
This Note examines the language and legislative history of section 1367(b) and proposes a uniform test for determining the circumstances in which subsection (b) authorizes the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Part I of this Note explains the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and examines how the Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. United States called these doctrines into question. Part II examines the language and legislative history of section 1367 and concludes that the statute only prohibits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs in diversity cases when doing so would permit plaintiffs to circumvent the complete …
The Single-Scheme Exception To Criminal Deportations And The Case For Chevron's Step Two, David A. Luigs
The Single-Scheme Exception To Criminal Deportations And The Case For Chevron's Step Two, David A. Luigs
Michigan Law Review
This Note applies the two-step Chevron analysis to the single-scheme exception and argues that courts should reject the BIA's single-act test. In applying Chevron, this Note uses the narrow controversy over the proper interpretation of the single-scheme exception as a window on the larger ambiguity that plagues the Supreme Court's Chevron jurisprudence. This Note suggests an answer to a broader issue that has remained unclear under the Supreme Court's precedents: how courts should review agency interpretations at Chevron's second step.
Are Trojan Horse Union Organizers "Employees"?: A New Look At Deference To The Nlrb's Iterpretation Of Nlra Section 2(3), Jonathan D. Hacker
Are Trojan Horse Union Organizers "Employees"?: A New Look At Deference To The Nlrb's Iterpretation Of Nlra Section 2(3), Jonathan D. Hacker
Michigan Law Review
This Note takes a different approach to interpreting section 2(3). Although this Note agrees that section 2(3) neither clearly includes nor clearly excludes trojan horse organizers, it also argues that the definition of employee under section 2(3) must be determined by looking to common law principles of agency. In other words, the question whether courts should defer to the Board's interpretation of section 2(3) does not turn on statutory ambiguity. Rather, courts have a continuing duty to ensure that the Board interprets employee consistently with common law agency principles. Nevertheless, the correct interpretation of employee under agency principles ultimately turns …
The Limited Relevance Of Plain Meaning, Stephen F. Ross
The Limited Relevance Of Plain Meaning, Stephen F. Ross
Journal Articles
In this essay, the author takes the position that linguists' principal expertise - ascertaining how language is used by ordinary speakers of English - is often of little value in interpreting controversial non-criminal federal statutes. Although linguistic techniques might still aid in understanding their meaning, the author's thesis is that extrinsic evidence that is known and accessible to this small sub-community - such as legislative history, established norms of construction, and other evidence about the context in which the legislation arose - is more likely than linguistic analysis to help an outside judge shed light on what Congress meant and …
The Modern Parol Evidence Rule And Its Implications For New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, Stephen F. Ross, Daniel Trannen
The Modern Parol Evidence Rule And Its Implications For New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, Stephen F. Ross, Daniel Trannen
Journal Articles
Part I of this article focuses on the history of parol evidence in contract interpretation, describing both Williston's and Corbin's definition and application of the parol evidence rule. With the adoption of the UCC and the Second Restatement, we suggest that Corbin's position-that expansion of admissibility of parol evidence will more accurately reflect the drafters' manifest intentions and minimize the judge's personal biases-has been accepted by experts and legislators alike. In Part II, we summarize the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, focusing on the rise of the New Textualism and its critique of the use of legislative history …
Law And Linguistics: Is There Common Ground?, William D. Popkin
Law And Linguistics: Is There Common Ground?, William D. Popkin
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.
Book Review. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation By William N. Eskridge, Jr., William D. Popkin
Book Review. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation By William N. Eskridge, Jr., William D. Popkin
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.
Severability In Statutes And Contracts, Mark L. Movsesian
Severability In Statutes And Contracts, Mark L. Movsesian
Faculty Publications
Established doctrine on the severability of unconstitutional statutory provisions has drawn criticism on almost every conceivable basis. Commentators have condemned severability doctrine as too malleable and as too rigid; as encouraging judicial overreaching and as encouraging judicial abdication. They have criticized the doctrine's reliance on legislative intent and its disregard of legislative intent; its excessive attention to political concerns and its inattention to political concerns; its lack of any coherent explanation.
The reasons for this lingering controversy are easy to discern. One is purely pragmatic. "We live in an age of statutes." Legislation provides our primary source of law in …