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Bad Policy As A Recipe For Bad Federalism In The Regulation Of Canadian Financial Institutions: The Case Of Loan And Trust Companies, Ronald J. Daniels
Bad Policy As A Recipe For Bad Federalism In The Regulation Of Canadian Financial Institutions: The Case Of Loan And Trust Companies, Ronald J. Daniels
Ronald J. Daniels
This article addresses the impact of substantive policy on federal arrangements in the regulation of Canadian loan and trust companies. It is argued that reliance on market-suppressing policies (flat-rate based deposit insurance and selective bail·outs of depositors in the event of institutional failure) has undermined the value of competitive federalism in this area, and has spawned highly contentious policy initiatives such as Ontario's Equals Approach. To redress the federalism problems in the regulation of loan and trusts, a useful starting point would be the enhancement of market forces in substantive policy. Here, it is argued that the commitment to secrecy …
Breaking The Logjam: Proposals For Moving Beyond The Equals Approach, Ronald J. Daniels
Breaking The Logjam: Proposals For Moving Beyond The Equals Approach, Ronald J. Daniels
Ronald J. Daniels
Over the last decade, the structure and performance of Canadian financial institutions has undergone a profound transformation. Propelled by both regulatory changes and market innovations, Canadian financial institutions have found their historically protected markets opened to intense competition from a variety of different sources. The most significant regulatory change has been the piecemeal dismantling of the pillars that have traditionally separated the core activities of banks, insurance companies, loan and trust companies, and securities dealers from encroachment by one another. With lower entry barriers, institutions have scrambled to penetrate each other's markets. This entry has spurred a narrowing of differences …
Stakeholders And Takeovers: Can Contractarianism Be Compassionate?, Ronald J. Daniels
Stakeholders And Takeovers: Can Contractarianism Be Compassionate?, Ronald J. Daniels
Ronald J. Daniels
The issue of what, if any, purchase non-shareholder corporate constituencies (that is, employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, and communities) should have on the discretionary decisions of corporate management has proved to be one of the most durable, if not vexing, issues in modern corporate scholarship. Most recently, the issue has resurfaced in the context of the takeover wave of the 1980s, particularly during the latter part of the decade when control transactions became associated with high levels of leverage. At core, stakeholder advocates were riveted by the asymmetries involved in change-of-control transactions. While target shareholders earned consistent and sizeable returns from …
Growing Pains: The Why And How Of Canadian Law Firm Expansion, Ronald J. Daniels
Growing Pains: The Why And How Of Canadian Law Firm Expansion, Ronald J. Daniels
Ronald J. Daniels
Over the last decade, the Canadian corporate law firm, like its counterparts in other industrialized countries, has undergone a profound transformation, the most remarkable feature of which has been the rapid growth of individual firms. Whereas a mere decade ago only one Canadian firm could boast of having more than 100 lawyers, today there are at least 19 firms that can make this claim. Accompanying the firms' rapid growth has been their steady expansion into distant national and international markets. Significantly, even when that expansion has been confined to local markets, law firms have invoked a much broader array of …
The Capricious Cushion: The Implications Of The Directors And Insurance Liability Crisis On Canadian Corporate Governance, Ronald J. Daniels, Susan Hutton
The Capricious Cushion: The Implications Of The Directors And Insurance Liability Crisis On Canadian Corporate Governance, Ronald J. Daniels, Susan Hutton
Ronald J. Daniels
One of the clearest legacies of the growing concern expressed over the international competitiveness of Canadian and American businesses has been the urgency it has lent to a very old debate respecting the efficacy of the apparatus used to govern the business and affairs of large, public corporations. For instance, Michael Porter, one of the most articulate - if not the most prolific - of the new competitiveness scholars, has suggested that American economic performance could be improved by enhancing the performance of the traditional corporate governance apparatus. In this respect, his suggestions closely track the thrust of recent reform …