Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Clemency Process In Virginia, Walter A. Mcfarlane Jan 1993

The Clemency Process In Virginia, Walter A. Mcfarlane

University of Richmond Law Review

When asked to contribute an article on the issue of clemency, I immediately knew the area I wanted to address: the procedural and practical aspects of the clemency process in Virginia. While numerous articles have been written about clemency, few have examined the procedural rules and none have comprehensively studied the executive viewpoint regarding this area of the law.


Pardon For Good And Sufficient Reasons, Kathleen Dean Moore Jan 1993

Pardon For Good And Sufficient Reasons, Kathleen Dean Moore

University of Richmond Law Review

The preamble to an executive grant of clemency from the Presi- dent of the United States implies that pardons are granted on the basis of "premises,... good and sufficient reasons." Yet, pardons have not always been regarded as the sort of acts that need to be justified by argument. In fact, most presidential pardons are issued without any statement of justification beyond the assurance that good reasons do exist. As a result, the issue of what constitutes good and sufficient reasons for a presidential pardon is seldom addressed and still unresolved.


Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President's Prerogative To Escape Accountability, James N. Jorgensen Jan 1993

Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President's Prerogative To Escape Accountability, James N. Jorgensen

University of Richmond Law Review

The United States Constitution vests the President with "power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment." Although Virginia delegate Edmund Randolph raised concerns about the executive branch possibly abusing the pardon power to conceal criminal conduct at the Constitutional Convention, Randolph's colleagues relied upon the presumption that a president would not break the law and defeated his motion to limit presidential pardon power to cases of treason. Recently, the scandalous Iran-Contra affair has demonstrated that, contrary to the Framers' expectations, presidents may circumvent or directly violate federal laws.