Law Commons^™

Procompetitive Justifications In Antitrust Law, John M. Newman

Articles

The Rule of Reason, which has come to dominate modern antitrust law, allows defendants the opportunity to justify their conduct by demonstrating procompetitive effects. Seizing the opportunity, defendants have begun offering increasingly numerous and creative explanations for their behavior.

But which of these myriad justifications are valid? To leading jurists and scholars, this has remained an "open question," even an "absolute mystery." Examination of the relevant case law reveals multiple competing approaches and seemingly irreconcilable opinions. The ongoing lack of clarity in this area is inexcusable: procompetitive-justification analysis is vital to a properly functioning antitrust enterprise.

This Article provides answers …

The Antitrust Jurisprudence Of Neil Gorsuch, John M. Newman

Articles

In 2017, the U.S. Senate confirmed Neil M. Gorsuch's nomination to serve on the Supreme Court. Like Justice Stevens before him, Gorsuch's primary area of expertise is antitrust law. Like Stevens, Gorsuch both practiced and taught in the field before joining the bench. As a judge for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Gorsuch penned multiple substantive antitrust opinions.

His unique expertise will likely situate Gorsuch as one of the Court's leading voices on antitrust matters for decades to come. A close examination of his prior antitrust opinions thus offers vital insight into his approach to antitrust principles and execution. …

Balancing Effects Across Markets, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

In Philadelphia National Bank (PNB), the Supreme Court held that it is improper to weigh a merger's procompetitive effects in one market against the merger's anticompetitive effects in another. The merger in question, which ostensibly reduced retail competition in the Philadelphia area, could not be justified on the grounds that it increased competition against New York banks and hence perhaps enhanced competition in business banking in the mid-Atlantic region. I will refer to the Supreme Court's prohibition on balancing effects across markets as a "market-specificity" rule. Under this rule, efficiencies that may counterbalance anticompetitive aspects must be specific to …

Market Power Without Market Definition, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Antitrust law has traditionally required proof of market power in most cases and has analyzed market power through a market definition/market share lens. In recent years, this indirect or structural approach to proving market power has come under attack as misguided in practice and intellectually incoherent. If market definition collapses in the courts and antitrust agencies, as it seems poised to do, this will rupture antitrust analysis and create urgent pressures for an alternative approach to proving market power through direct evidence. None of the leading theoretic approaches—such as the Lerner Index or a search for supracompetitive profits—provides a robust …

The Tempting Of Antitrust: Robert Bork And The Goals Of Antitrust Policy, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Of all Robert Bork’s many important contributions to antitrust law, none was more significant than his identification of economic efficiency, disguised as consumer welfare, as the sole normative objective of U.S. antitrust law. The Supreme Court relied primarily on Bork’s argument that Congress intended the Sherman Act to advance consumer welfare in making its landmark statement in Reiter v. Sonotone that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” This singular normative vision proved foundational to the reorientation of antitrust law away from an interventionist, populist, Brandeisian, and vaguely Jeffersonian conception of antitrust law as a constraint on …

Actavis, The Reverse Payment Fallacy, And The Continuing Need For Regulatory Solutions, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

The Actavis decision punted more than it decided. Although narrowing the range of possible outcomes by rejecting the legal rules at the extremes and opting for a rule of reason middle ground, the opinion failed to grapple with the most challenging issues of regulatory policy raised by pharmaceutical patent settlements. In particular, it failed to clearly delineate the social costs of permitting and disallowing patent settlements, avoided grappling with the crucial issues of patent validity and infringement, and erroneously focused on “reverse payments” as a distinctive antitrust problem when equally or more anticompetitive settlements can be crafted without reverse payments. …

Antitrust And The Judicial Virtues, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Although commentators frequently debate how judges should decide antitrust cases substantively, little attention has been paid to theories of judicial virtue in antitrust decision making. This essay considers four pairings of virtues: (1) striving for substantive purity versus conceding to institutional realism; (2) incrementalism versus generalism; (3) presenting a unified face versus candidly conceding differences among judges on an appellate panel; and (4) adhering strictly to stare decisis versus freely updating precedents to reflect evolving economic learning or conditions. While recognizing the complexities that sometimes pull judges in the opposite direction, this Article gives the nod to institutional realism, incrementalism, …

"The Magna Carta Of Free Enterprise" Really?" , Daniel A. Crane

Articles

In U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc., Justice Thurgood Marshall announced that "[a] ntitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.", In The Antitrust Constitution, Thomas Nachbar takes seriously the idea that federal antitrust laws serve a constitutional function. He argues that, contrary to common assumptions, the antitrust laws cannot be understood merely as a form of economic utilitarianism. Rather, they serve the additional purpose of preventing "regulatory harm," the assertion of law-like control over the conduct of others outside the sphere of one's own property interests.

A Neo-Chicago Perspective On Antitrust Institutions, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

It has long been fashionable to categorize antitrust by its "schools." From the Sherman Act's passage to World War II, there were (at least) neo-classical marginalism, populism, progressivism, associationalism, business commonwealthism, and Brandeisianism. From World War II to the present, we have seen (at least, and without counting the European Ordo-Liberals) PaleoHarvard structuralism, the Chicago School, Neo-Harvard institutionalism, and Post -Chicagoans. So why not Neo-Chicago? I am already on record as suggesting the possible emergence of such a school, so it is too late for me to dismiss the entire "schools" conversation as window-dressing. This Symposium is dedicated to defining …

Reflections On Section 5 Of The Ftc Act And The Ftc's Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

The Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC’s”) unprecedented enforcement action against Intel raises profound issues concerning the scope of the FTC’s powers to give a construction to Section 5 of the FTC Act that goes beyond the substantive reach of the Sherman Act. While I have urged the FTC to assert such independence from the Sherman Act, this is the wrong case to make a break. Indeed, if anything, Intel poses a risk of seriously setting back the development of an independent Section 5 power by provoking a hostile appellate court to rebuke the FTC’s effort and cabin the FTC’s powers in …

Chicago, Post-Chicago, And Neo-Chicago, Daniel A. Crane

Reviews

Of all of Chicago's law and economics conquests, antitrust was the most complete and resounding victory. Chicago, of course, is a synecdoche for ideological currents that swept through and from Hyde Park beginning in the 1950s and reached their peak in the 1970s and 1980s. From early roots in antitrust and economic regulation, the Chicago School branched outward, first to adjacent fields like securities regulation, corporate law, property, and contracts, and eventually to more distant horizons like sexuality and family law. Predictably, the Chicago School exerted its greatest influence in fields closely tied to commercial regulation. But never did Chicago …

Linkline's Institutional Suspicions, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Antitrust scholars are having fun again. Not so long ago, they were the poor, redheaded stepchildren of the legal academy, either pining for the older days of rigorous antitrust enforcement or trying to kill off what was left of the enterprise. Other law professors felt sorry for them, ignored them, or both. But now antitrust is making a comeback of sorts. In one heady week in May of 2009, a front-page story in the New York Times reported the dramatic decision of Christine Varney-the Obama Administration's new Antitrust Division head at the Department of Justice-to jettison the entire report on …

Obama's Antitrust Agenda, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Antitrust law is back in vogue. After years in the wilderness, antitrust enforcement has reemerged as a hot topic in Washington and in the legal academy. In one heady week inMay of 2009, a frontpage story in the New York Times reported the dramatic decision of Christine Varney —theObama administration’s new AntitrustDivision head—to jettison the entire report onmonopolization offenses released by the Bush JusticeDepartment just eightmonths earlier. In a speech before the Center for American Progress, Varney announced that the Justice Department is “committed to aggressively pursuing enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.” As if to prove that …

Does A Monopolist Have A Duty To Deal With Its Rivals? Some Thoughts On The Aspen Skiing Case, Arthur H. Travers Jr.

Publications

No abstract provided.

Connell: Antitrust Law At The Expense Of Labor Law, Theodore J. St. Antoine

Articles

From the outset, the difficulty in applying the antitrust concept to organized labor has been that the two are intrinsically incompatible. The antitrust laws are designed to promote competition, and unions, avowedly and unabashedly, are designed to limit it. According to classical trade union theory, the objective is the elimination of wage competition among all employees doing the same job in the same industry. Logically extended, the policy against restraint of trade must condemn the very existence of labor organizations, since their minimum aim has always been the suppression of any inclination on the part of working people to offer …

Attempts And Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer To The Prophylactic Riddle Of Section Two, Edward H. Cooper

Articles

The efforts of activist antitrust lawyers to redefine the contours of attempted monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act1 have again forced the courts to wrestle with the classic antitrust dilemma: How far must single-firm competitive behavior be restrained to make competition free? The answer given by the majority of current decisions is that, absent some other established offense, single-firm behavior should be prohibited as an attempt to monopolize only when there is a specific intent to monopolize and the firm has come dangerously near to unlawful monopolization. A contemporary challenge to this orthodox answer is rapidly gaining force. …

Secondary Boycott: From Antitrust To Labor Relations, Theodore J. St. Antoine

Articles

The ethos of the labor movement cuts against the American grain at several points. Our national instinct, reflected in many statutes and much judge-made law, is to exalt the rugged individualist over the anonymous group, to favor wide-open competition rather than a controlled market, and to prize the right of each person to remain aloof from the quarrels and concerns of his neighbors. It is not for nothing that our most universal folk hero is the frontiersman, who proudly stands alone and self-sufficient. Yet the ordinary workingman does not have the capacity to assume that heroic stance. For him strength …

The Consent Decree In Antitrust Enforcement--Analysis And Criticism, J. Dennis Hynes

Publications

No abstract provided.

Can A Manufacturer Be Compelled To Sell?, Henry M. Bates

Articles

The fight for price maintenance is not yet completely settled, despite, the decisions in Dr. Miles Medical Company v. Parks & Sons Company, 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376, 55 L. Ed. 502, and Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 616, 58 L. Ed. 1041, which held invalid contracts, whether nominally of agency, or of sale, between manufacturer and wholesaler or jobber whereby the latter in purchasing agreed himself to maintain and to sell only to others who would maintain a schedule of prices established by the manufacturer. But there are more …

The Commodity Clause Of The Hepburn Act, Edwin C. Goddard

Articles

The Supreme Court of the United States has added another to the interesting line of cases construing the so-called "Commodity Clause" of the HEPBURN ACT of 1906. In United States v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co. and the Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Coal Co., decided on June 21, 1915, 35 Sup. Ct. 873, the court reversed the decree of the District Court as reported in 213 Fed. 240, and found the relation and contract between the Railroad Company and the Coal Company to be in violation of the HEPBURN ACT and the SHERMAN ACT.

The Standard Oil Decision: The Rule Of Reason, Horace Lafayette Wilgus

Articles

After twenty-one years the Sherman Anti Trust Act has been applied to the typical combination restraining interstate commerce, which that act was designed to prevent.

The Northern Securities Decision, Horace Lafayette Wilgus

Articles

March 14 the Supreme Court of the United States decided one of the most important cases that has been before it for a number of years. The litigation referred to is the Northern Securities case. The question involved was whether the control of the Great Northern and Northern Pacific railway companies through the ownership of the majority of the stock of each of those companies by the Securities company violated the national anti-trust act. The majority of the Supreme Court held it did, but four of the judges dissented.