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Series

SSRN

Columbia Law School

International Law

2004

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Relative Costs Of Incorporating Trade Usage Into Domestic Versus International Sales Contracts, Avery W. Katz Jan 2004

The Relative Costs Of Incorporating Trade Usage Into Domestic Versus International Sales Contracts, Avery W. Katz

Faculty Scholarship

This Comment expands upon Clayton Gillette's defense of Article 8(2) of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), which directs tribunals to incorporate international trade usage into private contracts governed by the Convention, unless the parties agree otherwise. The Comment attempts to offer a more robust and systematic account of when substantive interpretative doctrines such as trade usage might be desirable, as well as why such doctrines appear to be especially useful in the transnational setting of the CISG. It argues that Gillette's account is incomplete because he does not provide an explanation of why ...


Self-Enforcing International Agreements And The Limits Of Coercion, Robert E. Scott, Paul B. Stephan Jan 2004

Self-Enforcing International Agreements And The Limits Of Coercion, Robert E. Scott, Paul B. Stephan

Faculty Scholarship

International law provides an ideal context for studying the effects of freedom from coercion on cooperative behavior. Framers of international agreements, no less than the authors of private contracts, can choose between self enforcement and coercive third-party mechanisms to induce compliance with the commitments they make. Studies of individual contracting provide some evidence that coercive sanctions may crowd out self enforcement, implying that too great a propensity by external actors to intervene in the contractual relationship may produce welfare losses. We explore the possibility that too much coercive third-party enforcement similarly can reduce the value of international agreements.

We argue ...