Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Series

SSRN

Business Organizations Law

2013

Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Law

Protecting Reliance, Victor P. Goldberg Jan 2013

Protecting Reliance, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Reliance plays a central role in contract law and scholarship. One party relies on the other’s promised performance, or its statements, or its anticipated entry into a formal agreement. Saying that reliance is important, however, says nothing about what we should do about it. In this paper the focus is on the many ways that parties choose to protect reliance. The relation between what parties do and what contract doctrine cares about is tenuous at best. Contract performance takes place over time and the nature of the parties’ future obligations can be deferred to take account of changing circumstances ...


The Case For An Unbiased Takeover Law (With An Application To The European Union), Luca Enriques, Ronald J. Gilson, Alessio M. Pacces Jan 2013

The Case For An Unbiased Takeover Law (With An Application To The European Union), Luca Enriques, Ronald J. Gilson, Alessio M. Pacces

Faculty Scholarship

Takeover regulation should neither hamper nor promote takeovers, but instead allow individual companies to decide the contestability of their control. Based on this premise, we advocate a takeover law exclusively made of default and menu rules supporting an effective choice of the takeover regime at the company level. For reasons of political economy bearing on the reform process, we argue that different default rules should apply to newly public companies and companies that are already public when the new regime is introduced. The first group should be governed by default rules crafted against the interest of management and of controlling ...


Making Corporate Governance Codes More Effective: A Response To The European Commission's Action Plan Of December 2012, Peter Böckli, Paul L. Davies, Eilis Ferran, Guido Ferrarini, José M. Garrido Garcia, Klaus J. Hopt, Alain Pietrancosta, Katharina Pistor, Markus Roth, Rolf Skog, Stanislaw Soltysinski, Jaap W. Winter, Eddy Wymeersch Jan 2013

Making Corporate Governance Codes More Effective: A Response To The European Commission's Action Plan Of December 2012, Peter Böckli, Paul L. Davies, Eilis Ferran, Guido Ferrarini, José M. Garrido Garcia, Klaus J. Hopt, Alain Pietrancosta, Katharina Pistor, Markus Roth, Rolf Skog, Stanislaw Soltysinski, Jaap W. Winter, Eddy Wymeersch

Faculty Scholarship

This paper contains the European Company Law Experts' response to one of the main issues raised in the European Commission’s Action Plan of 12 December 2012, namely how to make corporate governance codes more effective. The concept of “codes’ effectiveness” has two meanings: effectiveness of the comply-explain mechanism (disclosure effectiveness) and level of adoption of the codes’ recommendations themselves (substantive effectiveness). The ECLE believes that it is of crucial importance to keep the advantages of regulation by codes while finding adequate improvements of the quality of the reports and the explanations. The relationship between the content of corporate governance ...


Response To The European Commission's Report On The Application Of The Takeover Bids Directive, Peter Böckli, Paul L. Davies, Eilis Ferran, Guido Ferrarini, José M. Garrido Garcia, Klaus J. Hopt, Alain Pietrancosta, Katharina Pistor, Rolf Skog, Stanislaw Soltysinski, Jaap W. Winter, Eddy Wymeersch Jan 2013

Response To The European Commission's Report On The Application Of The Takeover Bids Directive, Peter Böckli, Paul L. Davies, Eilis Ferran, Guido Ferrarini, José M. Garrido Garcia, Klaus J. Hopt, Alain Pietrancosta, Katharina Pistor, Rolf Skog, Stanislaw Soltysinski, Jaap W. Winter, Eddy Wymeersch

Faculty Scholarship

This paper contains the European Company Law Experts' response to the report of the European Commission of 28 June 2012 on the application of the Takeover Bids Directive of 2004 and the reform initiatives announced. For evaluating these initiatives the rationale of the mandatory bid rule is relevant (exit rationale, control premium rationale and undistorted choice rationale). On this basis the paper discusses each of the concerns raised by the European Commission: 1) The concept of "acting in concert": The ECLE are of the opinion that a uniform concept for the Takeover Bids Directive, the Transparency Directive and the Acquisition ...


Agency Capitalism: Further Implications Of Equity Intermediation, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon Jan 2013

Agency Capitalism: Further Implications Of Equity Intermediation, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter continues our examination of the corporate law and governance implications of the fundamental shift in ownership structure of U.S. public corporations from the Berle-Means pattern of widely distributed shareholders to one of Agency Capitalism – the reconcentration of ownership in intermediary institutional investors as record holders for their beneficial owners. A Berle-Means ownership distribution provided the foundation for the agency cost orientation of modern corporate law and governance – the goal was to bridge the gap between the interests of managers and shareholders that dispersed shareholders could not do for themselves. The equity intermediation of the last 30 years ...


Designing Corporate Bailouts, Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric L. Talley, Ivo Welch Jan 2013

Designing Corporate Bailouts, Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric L. Talley, Ivo Welch

Faculty Scholarship

Although common economic wisdom suggests that government bailouts are inefficient because they reduce incentives to avoid failure and induce excessive entry by marginal firms, in practice bailouts are difficult to avoid for systemically significant enterprises. Recent experience suggests that bailouts also induce litigation from shareholders and managers complaining about expropriation and wrongful termination by the government. Our model shows how governments can design tax-financed corporate bailouts to reduce these distortions and points to the causes of inefficiencies in real-world implementations such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Bailouts with minimal distortion depend critically on the government’s ability to expropriate ...