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Series

SSRN

Business Organizations Law

2011

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

A Model Of Optimal Corporate Bailouts, Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric L. Talley, Ivo Welch Jan 2011

A Model Of Optimal Corporate Bailouts, Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric L. Talley, Ivo Welch

Faculty Scholarship

We analyze incentive-efficient government bailouts within a canonical model of intra-firm moral hazard. Bailouts exacerbate the moral hazard of firms and managers in two ways. First, they make them less averse to failing. Second, the taxes to fund bailouts dampen their incentives. Nevertheless, if third-party externalities from keeping the firm alive are strong, bailouts can improve welfare. Our model suggests that governments should use bailouts sparingly, where social externalities are large and subsidies small; eliminate incumbent owners and managers to improve a priori incentives; and finance bailouts through redistributive taxes on productive firms instead of forcing recipients to repay in ...


The Measure Of A Mac: A Quasi-Experimental Protocol For Tokenizing Force Majeure Clauses In M&A Agreements, Eric L. Talley, Drew O'Kane Jan 2011

The Measure Of A Mac: A Quasi-Experimental Protocol For Tokenizing Force Majeure Clauses In M&A Agreements, Eric L. Talley, Drew O'Kane

Faculty Scholarship

We develop a protocol for using a well known lawyer-coded data set on Material Adverse Change/Effect clauses in acquisitions agreements to tokenize and calibrate a machine learning algorithm of textual analysis. Our protocol, built on both regular expression (RE) and latent semantic analysis (LSA) approaches, is designed to replicate, correct, and extend the reach of the hand-coded data. Our preliminary results indicate that both approaches perform well, though a hybridized approach improves predictive power even more. We employ Monte Carlo simulations show that our results generally carry over to out-of-sample predictions. We conclude that similar approaches could be used ...


Rules For Growth: Promoting Innovation And Growth Through Legal Reform, Robert E. Litan, Yochai Benkler, Henry N. Butler, John Henry Clippinger, Robert Cook-Deegan, Robert Cooter, Aaron Edlin, Nicole Garnett, Ronald J. Gilson, Oliver Goodenough, Gillian Hadfield, Mark Lemley, Frank Partnoy, George Priest, Larry E. Ribstein, Charles F. Sabel, Peter Schuck, Hal Scott, Robert E. Scott, Alex Stein, Victoria Stodden, John E. Tyler, Alan D. Viard, Benjamin Wittes Jan 2011

Rules For Growth: Promoting Innovation And Growth Through Legal Reform, Robert E. Litan, Yochai Benkler, Henry N. Butler, John Henry Clippinger, Robert Cook-Deegan, Robert Cooter, Aaron Edlin, Nicole Garnett, Ronald J. Gilson, Oliver Goodenough, Gillian Hadfield, Mark Lemley, Frank Partnoy, George Priest, Larry E. Ribstein, Charles F. Sabel, Peter Schuck, Hal Scott, Robert E. Scott, Alex Stein, Victoria Stodden, John E. Tyler, Alan D. Viard, Benjamin Wittes

Faculty Scholarship

The United States economy is struggling to recover from its worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. After several huge doses of conventional macroeconomic stimulus – deficit-spending and monetary stimulus – policymakers are understandably eager to find innovative no-cost ways of sustaining growth both in the short and long runs.

In response to this challenge, the Kauffman Foundation convened a number of America’s leading legal scholars and social scientists during the summer of 2010 to present and discuss their ideas for changing legal rules and policies to promote innovation and accelerate U.S. economic growth. This meeting led to the publication ...