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Self-Determination In American Discourse: The Supreme Court’S Historical Indoctrination Of Free Speech And Expression, Jarred Williams Mar 2021

Self-Determination In American Discourse: The Supreme Court’S Historical Indoctrination Of Free Speech And Expression, Jarred Williams

Honors Theses

Within the American criminal legal system, it is a well-established practice to presume the innocence of those charged with criminal offenses unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a judicial framework-like approach, called a legal maxim, is utilized in order to ensure that the law is applied and interpreted in ways that legislative bodies originally intended.

The central aim of this piece in relation to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution is to investigate whether the Supreme Court of the United States has utilized a specific legal maxim within cases that dispute government speech or expression regulation. …


Law School News: Professor Gonzalez Is 2020 Rhode Island Lawyer Of The Year 01/11/21, Barry Bridges, Roger Williams University School Of Law Jan 2021

Law School News: Professor Gonzalez Is 2020 Rhode Island Lawyer Of The Year 01/11/21, Barry Bridges, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.


Missing Decisions, Merritt E. Mcalister Jan 2021

Missing Decisions, Merritt E. Mcalister

UF Law Faculty Publications

Significant numbers of federal appellate merits terminations—those decisions resolving appeals and other proceedings on the merits—are missing from Westlaw and Lexis, the leading commercial legal databases. Bloomberg Law has similar, and similarly incomplete, coverage. Across most of the circuits huge percentages—at least 25% or more—of the courts’ self-reported merits terminations, which predominately include unpublished adjudications, never make their way to navigable databases.

Although scholars have long considered how publication practices shapes access to court decisions—especially at the district court level—this is the first work to analyze commercial database access to unpublished federal appellate decisions. Since at least 2007, when a …


Revisiting The Precedential Status Of Crown Court Decisions, Kwan Ho Lau Sep 2020

Revisiting The Precedential Status Of Crown Court Decisions, Kwan Ho Lau

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

The binding authority of substantive decisions made by the Crown Court in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction is often assumed to be negligible. In 2013, the Court of Appeal appeared to confirm the correctness of that assumption. Yet there was little in the way of explanation or case law that was cited in support by the court. This article suggests that a re-evaluation of the place and treatment of such decisions within the doctrine of precedent is overdue, and considers that they should be recognised to have some binding effect if there is able to be established a reasonably …


Judicial Precedent In Emerging Constitutional Jurisdictions: Formulating A Doctrine Of Constitutional Stare Decisis For Singapore, Kenny Chng Jun 2020

Judicial Precedent In Emerging Constitutional Jurisdictions: Formulating A Doctrine Of Constitutional Stare Decisis For Singapore, Kenny Chng

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

Judicial precedents in constitutional law raiseunique stare decisis considerations. While they are authoritative pronouncementson the proper interpretation of the Constitution and are thus an essentialcomponent of constitutional law, they are also merely judicial precedents – andthus susceptible to being overturned. These considerations have been thesubject of a well-developed body of literature, especially in the context of USSupreme Court constitutional precedents.Yet, despite being a constitutional supremacy, little attention has beenpaid in Singapore to the question of the proper judicial approach towardsconstitutional precedents. This paper aims to address this issue. It will discernthe de facto principles that Singapore judges have thus far …


Our Principled Constitution, Mitchell N. Berman Jan 2018

Our Principled Constitution, Mitchell N. Berman

All Faculty Scholarship

Suppose that one of us contends, and the other denies, that transgender persons have constitutional rights to be treated in accord with their gender identity. It appears that we are disagreeing about “what the law is.” And, most probably, we disagree about what the law is on this matter because we disagree about what generally makes it the case that our constitutional law is this rather than that.

Constitutional theory should provide guidance. It should endeavor to explain what gives our constitutional rules the contents that they have, or what makes true constitutional propositions true. Call any such account a …


The Disparate Impact Canon, Michael T. Morley Jan 2017

The Disparate Impact Canon, Michael T. Morley

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.


Newsroom: Kuckes On Discovery Ruling 7-7-2016, Sheri Qualters, Roger Williams University School Of Law Jul 2016

Newsroom: Kuckes On Discovery Ruling 7-7-2016, Sheri Qualters, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.


Submerged Precedent, Elizabeth Mccuskey Apr 2016

Submerged Precedent, Elizabeth Mccuskey

Faculty Scholarship

Numerous studies have pointed to the skewed picture of trial courts' workload, management, and disposition of cases that exists from examining Westlaw and Lexis opinions alone, akin to navigating the iceberg from its tip.4 But submerged precedent pushes docketology in an uncharted direction by identifying a mass of reasoned opinions-putative precedent and not mere evidence of decision-making-that exist only on dockets. Submerged precedent thus raises the specter that docket-based research may be necessary in some areas to ascertain an accurate picture of the law itself not just trial courts' administration of it.

The existence of a submerged body …


Precedent Revisited: Carter V Canada (Ag) And The Contemporary Practice Of Precedent, Debra Parkes Jan 2016

Precedent Revisited: Carter V Canada (Ag) And The Contemporary Practice Of Precedent, Debra Parkes

All Faculty Publications

In addition to the important substantive changes to Canadian law brought about by Carter v Canada (AG), the decision is significant for its consideration of the doctrine of stare decisis. This article examines the circumstances under which Canadian courts, including courts lower in the relevant hierarchy, might be entitled to revisit otherwise binding, higher court precedents and to depart from them. At least in constitutional cases, the Carter trial decision affirms that trial judges may reconsider rulings of higher courts where a new legal issue is raised or where there is a change in circumstances or evidence that “fundamentally shifts …


Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent On The Meaning Of Federal Law?, Amanda Frost Jan 2015

Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent On The Meaning Of Federal Law?, Amanda Frost

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

The conventional wisdom is that state courts need not follow lower federal court precedent when interpreting federal law. Upon closer inspection, however, the question of how state courts should treat lower federal court precedent is not so clear. Although most state courts now take the conventional approach, a few contend that they are obligated to follow the lower federal courts, and two federal courts of appeals have declared that their decisions are binding on state courts. The Constitution’s text and structure send mixed messages about the relationship between state and lower federal courts, and the Supreme Court has never squarely …


The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel Nov 2014

The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel

Journal Articles

The scope of Supreme Court precedent is capacious. Justices of the Court commonly defer to sweeping rationales and elaborate doctrinal frameworks articulated by their predecessors. This practice infuses judicial precedent with the prescriptive power of enacted constitutional and statutory text. The lower federal courts follow suit, regularly abiding by the Supreme Court's broad pronouncements. These phenomena cannot be explained by—and, indeed, oftentimes subvert—the classic distinction between binding holdings and dispensable dicta.

This Article connects the scope of precedent with recurring and foundational debates about the proper ends of judicial interpretation. A precedent's forward-looking effect should not depend on the superficial …


Second Thoughts About The First Amendment, Randy J. Kozel Jan 2014

Second Thoughts About The First Amendment, Randy J. Kozel

Journal Articles

The U.S. Supreme Court has shown a notable willingness to reconsider — and depart from — its First Amendment precedents. In recent years the Court has marginalized its prior statements regarding the constitutional value of false speech. It has revamped its process for identifying categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection. It has rejected its past decisions on corporate electioneering and aggregate campaign contributions. And it has revised its earlier positions on union financing, abortion protesting, and commercial speech. Under the conventional view of constitutional adjudication, dubious precedents enjoy a presumption of validity through the doctrine of stare decisis. This Article …


The Impact Of Codification On The Judicial Development Of Copyright, Christopher S. Yoo Jan 2013

The Impact Of Codification On The Judicial Development Of Copyright, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection of common law copyright in Wheaton v. Peters and the more specific codification by the Copyright Act of 1976, courts have continued to play an active role in determining the scope of copyright. Four areas of continuing judicial innovation include fair use, misuse, third-party liability, and the first sale doctrine. Some commentators have advocated broad judicial power to revise and overturn statutes. Such sweeping judicial power is hard to reconcile with the democratic commitment to legislative supremacy. At the other extreme are those that view codification as completely displacing courts’ authority to develop legal principles. …


Judicial Innovation And Sexual Harassment Doctrine In The U.S. Court Of Appeals., Laura P. Moyer, Holley Takersley Dec 2012

Judicial Innovation And Sexual Harassment Doctrine In The U.S. Court Of Appeals., Laura P. Moyer, Holley Takersley

Faculty Scholarship

The determination that sexual harassment constituted “discrimination based on sex” under Title VII was first made by the lower federal courts, not Congress. Drawing from the literature on policy diffusion, this article examines the adoption of hostile work environment standards across the U.S. Courts of Appeals in the absence of controlling Supreme Court precedent. The results bolster recent findings about the influence of female judges on their male colleagues and suggest that in addition to siding with female plaintiffs, female judges also helped to shape legal rules that promoted gender equality in the workplace.


Transtemporal Separation Of Powers In The Law Of Precedent, Randy Beck Jan 2012

Transtemporal Separation Of Powers In The Law Of Precedent, Randy Beck

Scholarly Works

The rule of stare decisis creates a presumption that a court’s ruling on a legal question remains binding in later decisions by the same court or hierarchically inferior courts. This presumption promotes stability in the law and protects reliance interests. Decisions that narrowly construe or overrule prior opinions can therefore seem like unprincipled threats to the rule of law.

This article seeks to highlight some countervailing themes in the case law, showing that stability and the protection of reliance interests are not the exclusive concerns underlying the law of precedent. The relevant doctrine attempts to balance these objectives with competing …


Contemporary Meaning And Expectations In Statutory Interpretation, Hillel Y. Levin Jan 2012

Contemporary Meaning And Expectations In Statutory Interpretation, Hillel Y. Levin

Scholarly Works

This Article introduces and explores an approach to, or theme within, statutory interpretation, one grounded in contemporary meaning and expectations. This approach posits that judges interpreting ambiguous statutes are and should be constrained by the understanding and expectations of the contemporary public as to the law’s meaning and application. These are developed in response to, and mediated by, the actions and statements of government officials and the broader community. The Article argues that this apparently radical approach is necessary in order for law to maintain its moral force, and further that the principles underlying it are embedded in several doctrines …


Administrative Change, Randy J. Kozel, Jeffrey Pojanowski Jan 2011

Administrative Change, Randy J. Kozel, Jeffrey Pojanowski

Journal Articles

Determining the standard of review for administrative actions has commanded judicial and scholarly interest like few other topics. Notwithstanding the extensive debates, far less consideration has been given to the unique features of agencies’ deviations from their own precedents. In this article we examine this puzzle of administrative change. By change, we mean a reversal of the agency’s former views about the best way to implement and interpret its regulatory mandate. We trace the lineage of administrative change at the Supreme Court and analyze features that distinguish agency reversals from other administrative actions. In particular, we contend that because administrative …


The Pragmatic Incrementalism Of Common Law Intellectual Property, Shyamkrishna Balganesh Nov 2010

The Pragmatic Incrementalism Of Common Law Intellectual Property, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

All Faculty Scholarship

‘Common law intellectual property’ refers to a set of judge-made legal regimes that create exclusionary entitlements in different kinds of intangibles. Principally the creation of courts, many of these regimes are older than their statutory counterparts and continue to co-exist with them. Surprisingly though, intellectual property scholarship has paid scant attention to the nuanced law-making mechanisms and techniques that these regimes employ to navigate through several of intellectual property law’s substantive and structural problems. Common law intellectual property regimes employ a process of rule development that this Article calls ‘pragmatic incrementalism’. It involves the use of pragmatic and minimalist techniques …


Stipulating The Law, Gary S. Lawson Sep 2010

Stipulating The Law, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, the Supreme Court decided important questions of structural constitutionalism on the assumption, shared by all of the parties, that members of the Securities and Exchange Commission are not removable at will by the President. Four Justices strongly challenged the majority’s willingness to accept what amounts to a stipulation by the parties on a controlling issue of law. As a general matter, the American legal system does not allow parties to stipulate to legal conclusions, though it welcomes and encourages stipulations to matters of fact. I argue that one ought to …


Clear As Mud: How The Uncertain Precedential Status Of Unpublished Opinions Muddles Qualified Immunity Determinations, David R. Cleveland Jan 2010

Clear As Mud: How The Uncertain Precedential Status Of Unpublished Opinions Muddles Qualified Immunity Determinations, David R. Cleveland

Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


A Review Of “How Judges Think” By Richard A Posner, Chad Flanders Jan 2009

A Review Of “How Judges Think” By Richard A Posner, Chad Flanders

All Faculty Scholarship

This is a short review of How Judges Think by Richard Posner.


Shadow Precedents And The Separation Of Powers: Statutory Interpretation Of Congressional Overrides, Deborah Widiss Jan 2009

Shadow Precedents And The Separation Of Powers: Statutory Interpretation Of Congressional Overrides, Deborah Widiss

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In both judicial decisions and critical commentary on statutory interpretation, the possibility of congressional override is generally considered a significant balance to the countermajoritarian reality that courts, through statutory interpretation, make policy. This Article demonstrates that the "check" on judicial power provided by overrides is not as robust as is typically assumed. One might assume that overridden precedents are functionally erased or reversed. But because Congress technically cannot overrule a prior decision, courts must determine whether the enactment of an override fully supersedes the prior judicial interpretation. Overrides thus raise unique, and previously largely ignored, questions of statutory interpretation. Using …


Celebrating Thurgood Marshall: The Prophetic Dissenter, Susan Low Bloch Jan 2009

Celebrating Thurgood Marshall: The Prophetic Dissenter, Susan Low Bloch

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Thurgood Marshall was born 100 years ago into a country substantially divided along color lines. Marshall could not attend the University of Maryland School of Law because he was a Negro; he had trouble locating bathrooms that were not for “whites only.” Today, by contrast, we celebrate his life and accomplishments. Broadway has a play called Thurgood devoted to him; Baltimore/Washington International Airport is now BWI Thurgood Marshall Airport; even the University of Maryland renamed its law library in his honor. How did we come this far? How far do we still have to go? This article will consider what …


Reconfiguring Law Reports And The Concept Of Precedent For A Digital Age, Peter W. Martin Jan 2008

Reconfiguring Law Reports And The Concept Of Precedent For A Digital Age, Peter W. Martin

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Adherence to the “rule of law” entails a strong commitment to consistency - a belief that throughout a jurisdiction and across time judges should treat like cases alike. For over a century, the U.S. judiciary's pursuit of this aim has relied principally upon print law reports. With unsettling rapidity, digital technology has dislodged that system, in practical fact, if not yet in the way lawyers and judges talk and think about case law. This article explores gains one might hope for from a “judicial consistency” system liberated from the constraints of print, likely effects on concepts of precedent, as well …


'The Law Of The Circuit' Revisited: What Role For Majority Rule?, Arthur D. Hellman Jan 2008

'The Law Of The Circuit' Revisited: What Role For Majority Rule?, Arthur D. Hellman

Articles

In April 2017, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals announced that the full 15-judge court would convene to hear the challenge to President Trump’s executive order “to protect the Nation from terrorist activities by foreign nationals admitted to the United States.” This was a significant departure from the usual practice in the federal courts of appeals. Initial en banc hearing is extremely unusual, and rehearing en banc after a panel decision is almost as rare.

Ordinarily, two features define the ordinary course of adjudication in the federal courts of appeals. First, cases are heard and decided by panels of three …


The View From The Trenches: Report On The Breakout Sessions At The 2005 National Conference On Appellate Justice, Arthur D. Hellman Jan 2006

The View From The Trenches: Report On The Breakout Sessions At The 2005 National Conference On Appellate Justice, Arthur D. Hellman

Articles

In November 2005, four prominent legal organizations sponsored the second National Conference on Appellate Justice. One purpose was to take a fresh look at the operation of appellate courts 30 years after the first National Conference. As part of the 2005 Conference, small groups of judges and lawyers gathered in breakout sessions to discuss specific issues about the operation of the appellate system. This article summarizes and synthesizes the participants' comments. The article is organized around three major topics, each of which builds on a different contrast with the 1975 conference.

First, the participants in the earlier conference apparently assumed …


The Supreme Court In Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, And The Future Of Unenumerated Rights, Lawrence B. Solum Jan 2006

The Supreme Court In Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, And The Future Of Unenumerated Rights, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This essay advances a formalist conception of constitutional stare decisis. The author argues that instrumentalist accounts of precedent are inherently unsatisfying and that the Supreme Court should abandon adherence to the doctrine that it is free to overrule its own prior decisions. These moves are embedded in a larger theoretical framework--a revival of formalist ideas in legal theory that he calls "neoformalism" to distinguish his view from the so-called "formalism" caricatured by the legal realists (and from some other views that are called "formalist").

In Part II, The Critique of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, the author sets the stage by …


Stare Decisis And Due Process, Amy Coney Barrett Jan 2003

Stare Decisis And Due Process, Amy Coney Barrett

Journal Articles

In this Article, I argue that the preclusive effect of precedent raises due-process concerns, and, on occasion, slides into unconstitutionality. The Due Process Clause requires that a court give a person notice and an opportunity for a hearing before depriving her of life, liberty or property. Because of this requirement, courts have held in the context of issue preclusion that as a general rule, judicial determinations can bind only parties. The preclusion literature asserts that this parties only requirement does not apply to stare decisis because stare decisis, in contrast to issue preclusion, is a flexible doctrine. Yet stare decisis …


The Practice Of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, And The Meaning Of Precedent In An Interpretive Community, Lauren K. Robel Jan 2002

The Practice Of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, And The Meaning Of Precedent In An Interpretive Community, Lauren K. Robel

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.