Law Commons^™

The Pentium Papers: A Case Study Of Collective Institutional Investor Activism In Litigation, Joseph A. Grundfest, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

This article suggests that institutional investors have rational incentives to become more active in the litigation arena, but that the current debate is falsely constrained because it rests on the assumption that institutional investors must participate either by (1) assuming the formal role of lead plaintiff, class representative, or intervenor or, (2) not participating at all. This is a false dichotomy because, as this article demonstrates, institutions have available to them a rich array of flexible, informal, and relatively inexpensive mechanisms by which they can make their views known to litigants and courts alike.

Our hypothesis that institutional investor activism …

In-Kind Class Action Settlements, Scott R. Peppet

Publications

No abstract provided.

Reflections Of Judicial Adr And The Multi-Door Courthouse At Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, Or Fledgling Adulthood, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

Like any trend, ADR has its skeptics and even some opponents. Considerable debate exists regarding the degree to which the increasing ADRization of traditionally judicial activity amounts to triumph or tragedy, a point well-illustrated by the past Schwartz Lectures. In the 1993 Schwartz Lecture, Professor Laura Nader described the ADR movement as a byproduct of society's attempt to suppress or conceal uncomfortable conflicts. In the 1994 Lecture, Professor Judith Resnik essentially concluded that the modern ADR movement has brought a regrettable de facto closing of the court house (or at least raised barriers to entry) and replaced reflective decision-making about …

The After-Acquired Evidence Rule: The Best Of All Possible Worlds?, Sharona Hoffman

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

An Analysis Of Fee Shifting Based On The Margin Of Victory: On Frivolous Suints, Meritorious Suits, And The Role Of Rule 11, Howard F. Chang, Lucian A. Bebchuk

All Faculty Scholarship

When plaintiffs cannot predict the outcome of litigation with certainty, neither the American rule (each litigant bears its own litigation expenses) nor the British rule (the losing litigant pays the attorneys' fees of the winning litigant) would induce optimal decisions to bring suit. Plaintiffs may bring frivolous suits when litigation costs are small relative to the amount at stake; plaintiffs may not bring meritorious suits when litigation costs are large relative to this amount. More general fee-shifting rules are based not only on the identity of the winning party but also on how strong the court perceives the case to …