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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Tenuous Case For Conscience, Steven D. Smith
The Tenuous Case For Conscience, Steven D. Smith
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series
If there is any single theme that has provided the foundation of modern liberalism and has infused our more specific constitutional commitments to freedom of religion and freedom of speech, that theme is probably “freedom of conscience.” But some observers also perceive a progressive cheapening of conscience– even a sort of degradation. Such criticisms suggest the need for a contemporary rethinking of conscience. When we reverently invoke “conscience,” do we have any idea what we are talking about? Or are we just exploiting a venerable theme for rhetorical purposes without any clear sense of what “conscience” is or why it …
Mental Disorder And The Civil/Criminal Distinction, Grant H. Morris
Mental Disorder And The Civil/Criminal Distinction, Grant H. Morris
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series
This essay, written as part of a symposium issue to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the University of San Diego Law School, discusses the evaporating distinction between sentence-serving convicts and mentally disordered nonconvicts who are involved in, or who were involved in, the criminal process–people we label as both bad and mad. By examining one Supreme Court case from each of the decades that follow the opening of the University of San Diego School of Law, the essay demonstrates how the promise that nonconvict mentally disordered persons would be treated equally with other civilly committed mental patients was made and …
Appointing Federal Judges: The President, The Senate, And The Prisoner's Dilemma, David S. Law
Appointing Federal Judges: The President, The Senate, And The Prisoner's Dilemma, David S. Law
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series
This paper argues that the expansion of the White House's role in judicial appointments since the late 1970s, at the expense of the Senate, has contributed to heightened levels of ideological conflict and gridlock over the appointment of federal appeals court judges, by making a cooperative equilibrium difficult to sustain. Presidents have greater electoral incentive to behave ideologically, and less incentive to cooperate with other players in the appointments process, than do senators, who are disciplined to a greater extent in their dealings with each other by the prospect of retaliation over repeat play. The possibility of divided government exacerbates …