Law Commons^™

The Individual Mandate, Sovereignty, And The Ends Of Good Government: A Reply To Professor Randy Barnett, Patrick Mckinley Brennan

Working Paper Series

Randy Barnett has recently argued that the individual mandate is unconstitutional because it is an improper regulation under the Necessary and Proper Clause (in conjunction with the Commerce Clause) because it improperly "commandeers" the people and thereby violates their sovereignty. In this paper, I counter that the argument from sovereignty is unavailing because it is, among other defects, hopelessly ambiguous. The variety of historically attested meanings of "sovereignty" renders the concept useless for purposes of answering questions of comparative authority, including the authority of the Congress to mandate that individuals purchase health insurance from a private market. There is no …

Equality, Conscience, And The Liberty Of The Church: Justifying The Controversiale Per Controversialius, Patrick Mckinley Brennan

Working Paper Series

This paper considers the central normative claim of Martha Nussbaum’s Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality, viz., that the U.S. Constitution’s religion clauses should be construed to provide equal (and extensive) protection to the vulnerable human faculty called conscience. The paper argues that Nussbaum’s argument from Rawlsian political liberalism that leads to her normative constitutional claim amounts, perversely, to an attempt to justify the controversial by the more controversial. The paper goes on to argue that while equality and conscience are concepts that are reasonably contested, Nussbaum illegitimately gives them priority over the also reasonably …

Delivering The Goods: Herein Of Mead, Delegations, And Authority, Patrick Mckinley Brennan

Working Paper Series

This paper argues, first, that the natural law position, according to which it is the function of human law and political authorities to instantiate certain individual goods and the common good of the political community, does not entail judges' having the power or authority to speak the natural law directly. It goes on to argue, second, that lawmaking power/authority must be delegated by the people or their representatives. It then argues, third, that success in making law depends not just on the exercise of delegated power/authority, but also on the exercise of care and deliberation or, in the article's terms, …

``No One Does That Anymore": On Tushnet, Constitutions, And Others, Penelope J. Pether

Working Paper Series

In this contribution to the Quinnipiac Law Review’s annual symposium edition, this year devoted to the work of Mark Tushnet, I read his antijuridification scholarship “against the grain,” concluding both that Tushnet’s later scholarship is neo-Realist rather than critical in its orientation, and that both his early scholarship on slavery and his post-9/11 constitutional work reveal an ambivalence about the claim that we learn from history to circumscribe our excesses, which anchors his popular constitutionalist rhetoric.

The likeness of Tushnet’s scholarship to the work of the Realists lies in this: while the Realists’ search for a science that would satisfy …

Differentiating Church And State (Without Losing The Church), Patrick Mckinley Brennan

Working Paper Series

There is an ongoing debate about whether the U.S. Constitution includes -- or should be interpreted to include -- a principle of "church autonomy." Catholic doctrine and political theology, by contrast, clearly articulated a principle of "libertas ecclesiae," liberty of the church, when during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Church differentiated herself from the state. This article explores the meaning and origin of the doctrine of the libertas ecclesiae and the proper relationship among churches, civil society, and government. In doing so, it highlights the points at which church and state should cooperate and the points at which …

Reviving The Subject Of Law, Penelope J. Pether

Working Paper Series

This essay is an advanced draft of work that will be published in On Philosophy and American Law (Francis J. Mootz III ed. forthcoming, Cambridge U.P., 2009). This edited collection includes responses by a wide range of scholars working in legal theory to Mootz’s challenge to respond to the current state of American legal philosophy, using Karl Llewellyn’s 1934 University of Pennsylvania law review account of the emergence of legal realism as a prompt. Drawing on the author’s recent scholarship on the emergence of a distinctive and impoverished model of “common law” judging in the U.S. since the mid- c20th, …

Market Triumphalism, Electoral Pathologies, And The Abiding Wisdom Of First Amendment Access Rights, Gregory P. Magarian

Working Paper Series

Forty years ago, Professor Jerome Barron made the classic case that the First Amendment requires not merely protection of speech against government interference but provision of access to the means of mass communication. The Supreme Court in the ensuing decades has largely rejected Barron’s approach. In this article, Professor Magarian defends Barron’s case for access rights against the two theoretical critiques that have underwritten its doctrinal rejection. The libertarian critique attacks the normative underpinnings of access rights, maintaining that the First Amendment insulates market-driven distributions of expressive opportunities. Professor Magarian demonstrates that politically progressive and conservative libertarian critics of access …

Interpreting Immunity, Chaim Saiman

Working Paper Series

This paper offers an examination and critique of the Supreme Court’s doctrine of qualified immunity—the immunity from constitutional tort liability granted to government officials in cases in which the tort was not “clearly established” by prior case law. Currently, courts must engage in a two-pronged inquiry: first, whether the official’s conduct was unconstitutional, and second, whether the unconstitutionality was clearly established. This paper argues that while the first question presents a standard case of common law interpretation and analysis, the second inquiry forces courts to approach the body of constitutional tort law as if it were a legislated code. However, …

Harmonizing Plural Societies: The Cases Of Lasallians, Families, Schools – And The Poor, Patrick Mckinley Brennan

Working Paper Series

The modern state characteristically assumes or asserts a monopoly over “group persons” and their right to exist; group persons are said to exist at the pleasure or concession of the state. According to Catholic social teaching, by contrast, these unities of order -- such as church and family, as well as corporations and schools and the like -- are, at least in potency, ontologically prior to the state. Such group persons both constitute conditions of the possibility of human flourishing and, correlatively, impose limitations on the “sovereign” state. Such group persons are not mere concessions of an unbounded state: They …

A Quandary In Law? A (Qualified) Catholic Denial, Patrick Mckinley Brennan

Working Paper Series

A contribution to the second law review symposium dedicated to Steven Smith’s Law’s Quandary (Harvard 2004), this paper asks whether the “quandary” in which Smith finds modern law and jurisprudence is not, at least in part, the consequence of misunderstanding the classical natural law jurisprudence. The paper advances an interpretation of natural law according to which the natural law is the human person’s “participation” in the eternal law itself, with literally cosmic consequences for how we understand the ends and measures of human lawmaking. Mounting an argument against Justice Scalia’s thesis that “God applies the natural law,” the paper goes …

The Jurisprudence Of Colliding First Amendment Interests: From The Dead End Of Neutrality To The Open Road Of Participation Enhancing Review, Gregory P. Magarian

Working Paper Series

No abstract provided.

The Pragmatic Populism Of Justice Stevens' Free Speech Jurisprudence, Gregory P. Magarian

Working Paper Series

In his three decades on the Supreme Court, Justice John Paul Stevens has developed a distinctive approach to the First Amendment. During his tenure, the Court’s majority has crystallized a theory of First Amendment speech protection as an abstract, negative protection of individual autonomy against government interference. In contrast, Justice Stevens’ pragmatic judicial methodology has caused him to place greater emphasis on free speech decisions’ practical consequences, particularly their effectiveness in making democratic debate inclusive as to both participants and subject matter in order to ensure robust, well-informed public discourse. Alone on the present Court, Justice Stevens manifests a deep …

Substantive Due Process As A Source Of Constitutional Protection For Nonpolitical Speech, Gregory P. Magarian

Working Paper Series

Present First Amendment doctrine presumptively protects anything within the descriptive category “expression” from government regulation, subject to balancing against countervailing government interests. As government actions during the present war on terrorism have made all too clear, that doctrine allows intolerable suppression of political debate and dissent – the expressive activity most integral to our constitutional design. At the same time, present doctrine fails to give a clear account of why the Constitution protects expressive autonomy and when that protection properly should yield to government interests, leading to an inconsistent and unsatisfying free speech regime. In this article, Professor Magarian advocates …

Religious Organizations And Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons Of Smith, Kathleen A. Brady

Working Paper Series

Much has been written about the protections afforded by the Free Exercise Clause when government regulation impacts the religious practices of individuals, and if one looks for guidance from the Supreme Court, the rules are fairly clear. Prior to 1990, the Supreme Court had long employed a balancing approach that afforded—at least in theory—significant relief. Under this approach individuals were entitled to exemptions from laws which substantially burdened religious conduct unless enforcement was justified by a compelling state interest. In 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court abandoned this balancing test for all but a few categories of …