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The Missing Element Of Environmental Cost-Benefit Analysis: Compensation For The Loss Of Regulatory Benefits, Karl S. Coplan
The Missing Element Of Environmental Cost-Benefit Analysis: Compensation For The Loss Of Regulatory Benefits, Karl S. Coplan
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
Despite its critics, cost-benefit analysis remains a fixture of the environmental regulation calculus. Most criticisms of cost-benefit analysis focus on the impossibility of monetizing environmental and health amenities protected by regulations. Less attention has been paid to the regressive wealth-transfer effects of regulations foregone based on cost-benefit analysis. This regressive effect occurs as long as downwind communities that suffer health and harms from environmental contamination are generally less wealthy than the owners of pollution sources that avoid regulatory-compliance costs. The availability of compensation to pollution-victims has the potential to ameliorate this regressive effect. This Article recommends that the availability of …
Takings And Property Rights Legislation, John R. Nolon
Takings And Property Rights Legislation, John R. Nolon
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
Over the years, regulatory takings case law has supported land use regulations by cloaking them with a presumption of validity and placing a heavy burden on their challengers of proving either that the regulation fails to substantially advance a legitimate public purpose or that it deprives the owner of all economically beneficial use of the land. Insulated in this way, regulators, on occasion, have transgressed the boundaries of fundamental fairness.
A Unifying Theory For The Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation And Public Use, John A. Humbach
A Unifying Theory For The Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation And Public Use, John A. Humbach
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
This discussion begins with some remarks concerning the concept of property as a general matter. It will then consider briefly an approach to the problem which, though promising and advanced, nevertheless falls short of achieving an internally consistent, unifying theory. Following this introduction, an attempt will be made to specify the two distinctive conceptual components of property interests on whose difference the cases seem to turn, and then to demonstrate the suitability of this conceptual distinction as the foundation for a coherent theory of the law.