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Series

Antitrust

2014

Discipline
Institution
Publication

Articles 1 - 30 of 31

Full-Text Articles in Law

How Not To Apply Actavis, Michael A. Carrier Dec 2014

How Not To Apply Actavis, Michael A. Carrier

NULR Online

No abstract provided.


Potential Competitive Effects Of Vertical Mergers: A How-To Guide For Practitioners, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley Dec 2014

Potential Competitive Effects Of Vertical Mergers: A How-To Guide For Practitioners, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The purpose of this short article is to aid practitioners in analyzing the competitive effects of vertical and complementary product mergers. It is also intended to assist the agencies if and when they undertake revision of the 1984 U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines. Those Guidelines are out of date and do not reflect current enforcement or economic thinking about the potential competitive effects of vertical mergers. Nor do they provide the tools needed to carry out a modern competitive effects analysis. This article is intended to partially fill the gap by summarizing the various potential competitive harms and benefits that ...


Market Power Without Market Definition, Daniel A. Crane Dec 2014

Market Power Without Market Definition, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Antitrust law has traditionally required proof of market power in most cases and has analyzed market power through a market definition/market share lens. In recent years, this indirect or structural approach to proving market power has come under attack as misguided in practice and intellectually incoherent. If market definition collapses in the courts and antitrust agencies, as it seems poised to do, this will rupture antitrust analysis and create urgent pressures for an alternative approach to proving market power through direct evidence. None of the leading theoretic approaches—such as the Lerner Index or a search for supracompetitive profits ...


Recent Journalism Awards Won By "Old," "New," And "Hybrid" Media, Robert H. Lande, Thomas J. Horton, Virginia Callahan Dec 2014

Recent Journalism Awards Won By "Old," "New," And "Hybrid" Media, Robert H. Lande, Thomas J. Horton, Virginia Callahan

All Faculty Scholarship

This compares the quality of the "old" media to that of the "new" media by determining how often each type of media source wins major journalism awards. It divides media sources into three categories: old, new and hybrid. New media is limited to publications that were started purely as online news publications. Old media is classified in the traditional sense to include such newspapers as the New York Times. Hybrid media combines elements of both new and old media. Our research compares the number of Pulitzer Prizes and other major journalism awards won by these three types of media sources ...


Teece's Competing Through Innovation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Oct 2014

Teece's Competing Through Innovation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This essay reviews David J. Teece's book, Competing Through Innovation: Technological Strategies and Antitrust Policies (2013).


Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro Oct 2014

Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.

As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply ...


Non-Price Competition In “Substitute" Drugs: The Ftc's Blind Spot, Gregory Dolin Oct 2014

Non-Price Competition In “Substitute" Drugs: The Ftc's Blind Spot, Gregory Dolin

All Faculty Scholarship

As the recent case of United States v. Lundbeck illustrates, the Federal Trade Commission’s lack of knowledge in medical and pharmacological sciences affects its evaluation of transactions between medical and pharmaceutical companies that involve transfers of rights to manufacture or sell drugs, causing the agency to object to such transactions without solid basis for doing so. This article argues that in order to properly define a pharmaceutical market, one must not just consider the condition that competing drugs are meant to treat, but also take into account whether there are “off-label” drugs that are used to treat a relevant ...


Death By Daubert: The Continued Attack On Private Antitrust, Christine P. Bartholomew Aug 2014

Death By Daubert: The Continued Attack On Private Antitrust, Christine P. Bartholomew

Journal Articles

In 2011, with five words of dicta, the Supreme Court opened Pandora’s box for private antitrust enforcement. By suggesting trial courts must evaluate the admissibility of expert testimony at class certification, the Court placed a significant obstacle in the path of antitrust class actions. Following the Supreme Court’s lead, most courts now permit parties to bring expert challenges far earlier than the traditional summary judgment or pretrial timing. Premature rejection of expert testimony dooms budding private antitrust suits — cases that play an essential role in modern antitrust enforcement. The dangers for private antitrust plaintiffs are compounded by the ...


Where Do We Go From Here: Open Questions And Policy Considerations, Jonathan Baker, Fiona Scott Morton, Daniel Crane, Richard Steuer, Michael Whinston, C. Hemphill, Deborah Feinstein, Renata Hesse Jun 2014

Where Do We Go From Here: Open Questions And Policy Considerations, Jonathan Baker, Fiona Scott Morton, Daniel Crane, Richard Steuer, Michael Whinston, C. Hemphill, Deborah Feinstein, Renata Hesse

Presentations

The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice held a one-day public workshop on June 23, 2014 to explore the economics and legal policy implications of certain pricing practices, such as loyalty and bundled pricing. The workshop, consisted of presentations and roundtable discussions, that focused on practices in which prices are explicitly or effectively contingent on commitments to purchase or sell a specified share or volume of a single product or a mix of multiple products. Workshop participants considered theoretical and empirical developments in the economic understanding of these practices, discussed developments in the relevant ...


Antitrust And The Close Look: Transaction Cost Economics In Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp May 2014

Antitrust And The Close Look: Transaction Cost Economics In Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This paper briefly examines the contributions of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to antitrust analysis, focusing on vertical integration and its contractual substitutes, mainly, minimum and maximum resale price maintenance, vertical nonprice restraints, tying, bundled discounts and exclusive dealing and related exclusionary contracts.

TCE generally assumes that business firms organize their activities so as to maximize their value, which they can do both by economizing and also by obtaining higher prices. Sensible antitrust policy recognizes that both advantageous contracting and monopoly can be profitable to a firm, and it can be expected to pursue both when they are available. Nevertheless, the ...


Avishalom Tor Presented At 3rd Haifa-Loyola Conference On Recent Challenges To Antitrust, Avishalom Tor May 2014

Avishalom Tor Presented At 3rd Haifa-Loyola Conference On Recent Challenges To Antitrust, Avishalom Tor

Faculty Lectures and Presentations

Professor Tor presented his work on Boundedly Rational Consumers: Three Challenges for Antitrust at the 3rdHaifa-Loyola Conference on Recent Challenges to Antitrust on May 9.


The Proposed Damages Directive: The Real Lessons From The United States, Robert H. Lande Mar 2014

The Proposed Damages Directive: The Real Lessons From The United States, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Europeans should be doubly cautious when they study the U.S. experience with private antitrust enforcement. Nevertheless, there are ten specific lessons they can learn. None, however, is consistent with the conventional wisdom in the international competition community that U.S.-style private enforcement has been a disaster. Each should help Europe objectively consider the Commission's proposed Directive concerning private enforcement of Competition law.


Consent Of The Governed Or Consent Of The Government? The Problems With Consent Decrees In Government-Defendant Cases, Michael T. Morley Feb 2014

Consent Of The Governed Or Consent Of The Government? The Problems With Consent Decrees In Government-Defendant Cases, Michael T. Morley

Scholarly Publications

Consent decrees raise serious Article III concerns. When litigants agree on their rights and jointly seek the same relief from a court, they are no longer adverse and a justiciable controversy no longer exists between them. In the absence of an actual controversy between opposing parties, it is both inappropriate and unnecessary for a court to issue a substantive order declaring or modifying the litigants' rights. Whether Article Ill's adverseness requirement is seen as jurisdictional or prudential, federal courts should decline to issue consent decrees and instead require litigants that wish to voluntarily resolve a case to execute a ...


Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2014

Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

United States antitrust policy is said to promote some version of economic welfare. Antitrust promotes allocative efficiency by ensuring that markets are as competitive as they can practicably be, and that firms do not face unreasonable roadblocks to attaining productive efficiency, which refers to both cost minimization and innovation. One important welfare debate is whether antitrust should adopt a “consumer welfare” principle rather than a more general “total welfare” principle.

The simple version of the consumer welfare test is not a balancing test. If consumers are harmed by reduced output or higher prices resulting from the exercise of market power ...


Harm To Competition Under The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2014

Harm To Competition Under The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

In August, 2010, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission issued new Guidelines for assessing the competitive effects of horizontal mergers under the antitrust laws. These Guidelines were long awaited not merely because of the lengthy interval between them and previous Guidelines but also because enforcement policy had drifted far from the standards articulated in the previous Guidelines. The 2010 Guidelines are distinctive mainly for two things. One is briefer and less detailed treatment of market delineation. The other is an expanded set of theories of harm that justify preventing mergers or reversing mergers that have already occurred.

The ...


Merger Policy And The 2010 Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2014

Merger Policy And The 2010 Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

New Horizontal Merger Guidelines were issued jointly by the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission in August, 2010, replacing Guidelines issued in 1992 that no longer reflected either the law or government enforcement policy. The new Guidelines are a striking improvement. They are less technocratic, accommodating a greater and more realistic variety of theories about why mergers of competitors can be anticompetitive and, accordingly, a greater variety of methodologies for assessing them.

The unifying theme of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is to prevent the enhancement of market power that might result from mergers. The 2010 Guidelines state that “[a ...


Consumer Welfare In Competition And Intellectual Property Law, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2014

Consumer Welfare In Competition And Intellectual Property Law, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Whether antitrust policy should pursue a goal of "general welfare" or "consumer welfare" has been debated for decades. The academic debate is much more varied than the case law, however, which has consistently adopted consumer welfare as a goal, almost never condemning a practice found to produce an actual output reduction or price increase simply because productive efficiency gains accruing to producers exceeded consumer losses.

While some practices such as mergers might produce greater gains in productive efficiency than losses in consumer welfare, identifying such situations would be extraordinarily difficult. First, these efficiencies would have to be "transaction specific," meaning ...


Robert Bork And Vertical Integration: Leverage, Foreclosure, And Efficiency, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2014

Robert Bork And Vertical Integration: Leverage, Foreclosure, And Efficiency, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Robert H. Bork wrote his fist article about vertical integration and antitrust policy in 1954, a year after he graduated from the University of Chicago Law School. He noted a recent increase in antitrust attacks on vertical integration and disagreed with those who believed that these attacks were a novelty. At the time, judicial hostility toward vertical integration was rampant. But Bork overstated his case about the period prior to the 1930s. Through the 1920s judicial attitudes toward vertical integration were more benign than Bork suggested. This position was largely consistent with the pre-Depression economics literature, which emphasized production cost ...


Delay And Its Benefits For Judicial Rulemaking Under Scientific Uncertainty, Rebecca Haw Allensworth Jan 2014

Delay And Its Benefits For Judicial Rulemaking Under Scientific Uncertainty, Rebecca Haw Allensworth

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court’s increasing use of science and social science in its decision-making has a rationalizing effect on law that helps ensure that a rule will have its desired effect. But resting doctrine on the shifting sands of scientific and social scientific opinion endangers legal stability. The Court must be be responsive, but not reactive, to new scientific findings and theories, a difficult balance for lay justices to strike. This Article argues that the Court uses delay — defined as refusing to make or change a rule in light of new scientific arguments at time one, and then making or ...


After Search Neutrality: Drawing A Line Between Promotion And Demotion, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2014

After Search Neutrality: Drawing A Line Between Promotion And Demotion, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

The Federal Trade Commission's (“FTC” or “the commission”) January 3, 2013 decision to close its longstanding investigation of Google1 brings to a close a flurry of discussion over the possibility that Google could become subject to a “search neutrality” principle in the United States. Although the Commission found against Google on several grounds, it rejected petitions from Google's critics to create a search neutrality principle as a matter of antitrust law. This essay briefly analyzes what remains of U.S. antitrust scrutiny of Internet search bias after the Google settlement. In particular, it suggests that a sensible line ...


Actavis, The Reverse Payment Fallacy, And The Continuing Need For Regulatory Solutions, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2014

Actavis, The Reverse Payment Fallacy, And The Continuing Need For Regulatory Solutions, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

The Actavis decision punted more than it decided. Although narrowing the range of possible outcomes by rejecting the legal rules at the extremes and opting for a rule of reason middle ground, the opinion failed to grapple with the most challenging issues of regulatory policy raised by pharmaceutical patent settlements. In particular, it failed to clearly delineate the social costs of permitting and disallowing patent settlements, avoided grappling with the crucial issues of patent validity and infringement, and erroneously focused on “reverse payments” as a distinctive antitrust problem when equally or more anticompetitive settlements can be crafted without reverse payments ...


Technological Determinism And Its Discontents, Christopher S. Yoo Jan 2014

Technological Determinism And Its Discontents, Christopher S. Yoo

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This book review takes a critical review of the claim advanced by Susan Crawford in Captive Audience that the merger between Comcast and NBC Universal would harm consumers and that policymakers should instead promote common carriage regulation and subsidize municipal symmetrical gigabit fiber-to-the-home (FTTH). First it evaluates the extent to which next-generation digital subscriber lines (DSL) and wireless broadband technologies can serve as effective substitutes for cable modem service, identifying FCC data showing that the market has become increasingly competitive and likely to continue to do so. Furthermore, the market is not structured in a way that would permit the ...


The Tempting Of Antitrust: Robert Bork And The Goals Of Antitrust Policy, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2014

The Tempting Of Antitrust: Robert Bork And The Goals Of Antitrust Policy, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Of all Robert Bork’s many important contributions to antitrust law, none was more significant than his identification of economic efficiency, disguised as consumer welfare, as the sole normative objective of U.S. antitrust law. The Supreme Court relied primarily on Bork’s argument that Congress intended the Sherman Act to advance consumer welfare in making its landmark statement in Reiter v. Sonotone that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” This singular normative vision proved foundational to the reorientation of antitrust law away from an interventionist, populist, Brandeisian, and vaguely Jeffersonian conception of antitrust law as ...


“Antitrust's Least Glorious Hour”: The Robinson-Patman Act, Roger D. Blair, Christina Depasquale Jan 2014

“Antitrust's Least Glorious Hour”: The Robinson-Patman Act, Roger D. Blair, Christina Depasquale

UF Law Faculty Publications

In The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork explored many of antitrust’s misadventures. Specifically, Bork severely criticized the Robinson-Patman Act, which he characterized as “antitrust’s least glorious hour.” In this paper, we explore Bork’s criticism of the Robinson-Patman Act along with those of other legal scholars and economists. We analyze the central prohibitions of the act and explore their competitive implications. We also show that the act’s unfortunate prohibitions have been muted by the antitrust agencies’ benign neglect and three recent Supreme Court decisions.


The Law And Economics Of (Functional) Antitrust Standing In The United States And The European Union, Jeffrey L. Harrison Jan 2014

The Law And Economics Of (Functional) Antitrust Standing In The United States And The European Union, Jeffrey L. Harrison

UF Law Faculty Publications

To date, and despite pressures toward convergence, the United States and the European Union have taken different paths with respect to the enforcement of antitrust laws by private parties and, therefore, differ dramatically in levels of functional standing. U.S. law is more encouraging to private enforcement than E.U. law but has a narrower view of whom those private parties are permitted to be. In the European Union, the eligible parties are broad but the motivation of any single party to bring an action is quite low. In the United States, the substantive law and much of the procedural ...


A Regulatory Solution To Better Promote The Educational Values And Economic Sustainability Of Intercollegiate Athletics, Stephen F. Ross, Matt Mitten Jan 2014

A Regulatory Solution To Better Promote The Educational Values And Economic Sustainability Of Intercollegiate Athletics, Stephen F. Ross, Matt Mitten

Journal Articles

Currently there are several pending antitrust suits challenging NCAA rules restricting the economic benefits intercollegiate athletes may receive for their sports participation. Although remedying the inherent problems of commercialized college sports (primarily Division I football and men’s basketball) is a laudable objective, a free market solution mandated by antitrust law may have unintended adverse consequences. Judicial invalidation of these rules may inhibit universities from providing many athletes with a college education they would not otherwise receive, by eliminating or reducing the value of scholarships for many players whose economic value is less than the cost of an education. A ...


Defining Unreasonably Exclusionary Conduct: The 'Exclusion Of A Competitive Rival' Approach, Thom Lambert Jan 2014

Defining Unreasonably Exclusionary Conduct: The 'Exclusion Of A Competitive Rival' Approach, Thom Lambert

Faculty Publications

Unreasonably exclusionary conduct, the element common to monopolization and attempted monopolization offenses under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, remains essentially undefined. Federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have purported to define the term, but the definitions they have offered are so indeterminate as to be, in the words of one prominent commentator, “not just vague but vacuous.” Seeking to fill the void left by the courts, antitrust scholars have in recent years proposed four universal definitions of unreasonably exclusionary conduct. Each, however, is deficient: One would fail to deter a substantial amount of anticompetitive conduct, and the ...


The Influences Of Strategic Management On Antitrust Discourse, Hillary Greene, Dennis A. Yao Jan 2014

The Influences Of Strategic Management On Antitrust Discourse, Hillary Greene, Dennis A. Yao

Faculty Articles and Papers

This article examines how antitrust law and policy can benefit from ideas developed in the academic strategy field. Because accurate assessment and prediction of the effects of firm conduct depend in part on understanding individual firm capabilities, knowledge from the strategy field and other business fields complements the contributions from industrial organization economics (10). These business fields also offer theoretical and empirical challenges to the 10 paradigm, which dominates antitrust analysis. The article begins with a comparison between strategy and 10 and then illustrates how the strategy field can contribute to antitrust merger analysis. The article then assesses the influence ...


Patent Dialogue, Jonas Anderson Jan 2014

Patent Dialogue, Jonas Anderson

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

This Article examines the unique dialogic relationship that exists between the Supreme Court and Congress concerning patent law. In most areas of the law, Congress and the Supreme Court engage directly with each other to craft legal rules. When it comes to patent law, however, Congress and the Court often interact via an intermediary institution: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In patent law, dialogue often begins when Congress or the Supreme Court acts as a dialogic catalyst, signaling reform priorities to which the Federal Circuit often responds.

Appreciating the unique nature of patent dialogue has ...


Channeling And Contending With Bill Kovacic, Jonathan B. Baker Jan 2014

Channeling And Contending With Bill Kovacic, Jonathan B. Baker

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.