Law Commons^™

The Law Of Corporate Purpose, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

Delaware corporate law requires directors to manage firms for the benefit of the firm’s shareholders, and not for any other constituency. Delaware jurists have been clear about this is in their case law, and they are not coy about it in extra-judicial settings, such as in speeches directed at law students and practicing members of the corporate bar. Nevertheless, the reader of leading corporate law scholarship is continually exposed to the scholarly assertion that the law is ambiguous or ambivalent on this point, or even that case law affirmatively empowers directors to pursue non-shareholder interests. It is shocking, and troubling, …

Toward A Critical Corporate Law Pedagogy And Scholarship, André Ddouglas Pond Cummings, Steven A. Ramirez, Cheryl L. Wade

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

In recent years, the publicly held corporation has assumed a central position in both the economic and political spheres of American life. Economically, the public corporation has long acted as the key institution within American capitalism. Politically, the public corporation now can use its economic might to sway electoral outcomes as never before. Indeed, individuals who control public firms wield more economic power and political power today than ever before. These truths profoundly shape American society. The power, control, and role of the public corporation under law and regulation, therefore, hold more importance than ever before.

Even though corporate …