Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 9 of 9

Full-Text Articles in Law

Jefferson's Constitutions, Gerald F. Leonard Oct 2014

Jefferson's Constitutions, Gerald F. Leonard

Faculty Scholarship

Between 1787 and 1840, the Constitution gained a far more democratic meaning than it had had at the Founding, and Thomas Jefferson was a key figure in the process of democratization. But, while more democratic in inclination than many of the Framers, he fell far short of the radically democratic constitutionalism of his most important acolytes, Martin Van Buren and Andrew Jackson. This chapter of Constitutions and the Classics explains that Jefferson was actually much less attached to democracy and more to law as the heart of the republican Constitution. Compared to the 1830s founders of the nation’s democratic Constitution, …


Liberty, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain Oct 2014

Liberty, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

"To secure the blessings of liberty," the Preamble to the US Constitution proclaims, "We the People . . . ordain and establish this Constitution." The Constitution is said to secure liberty through three principal strategies: the design of the Constitution as a whole; structural arrangements, most notably separation of powers andfederalism; and protection of rights. This chapter focuses on this third strategy of protecting liberty, in particular, through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. We first examine the several approaches taken to the "Incorporation" of certain basic liberties "enumerated" in the Bill of Rights to apply to the state governments. We …


Congress's (Less) Limited Power To Represent Itself In Court: A Comment On Grove And Devins, Jack M. Beermann Sep 2014

Congress's (Less) Limited Power To Represent Itself In Court: A Comment On Grove And Devins, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In their recent article, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 571 (2014) Tara Leigh Grove and Neal Devins make the case against congressional litigation in defense of the constitutionality of federal statutes. They conclude that Congress, or a single House of Congress, may not defend the constitutionality of federal statutes in court even when the Executive Branch has decided not to do so but may litigate only in furtherance of Congress’s investigatory and disciplinary powers. Grove and Devins claim that congressional litigation in support of the constitutionality of federal statutes violates two separate but …


Fidelity, Change, And The Good Constitution, James E. Fleming Jul 2014

Fidelity, Change, And The Good Constitution, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In thinking about fidelity and change in constitutional interpretation, many have framed the basic choice as being between originalism and living constitutionalism. Consider, for example, Jack M. Balkin’s Living Originalism, Robert W. Bennett and Lawrence B. Solum’s Constitutional Originalism: A Debate, and John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport’s Originalism and the Good Constitution. I shall argue for the superiority of what Ronald Dworkin called “moral readings of the Constitution” and what what Sotirios A. Barber and I have called a “philosophic approach” to constitutional interpretation. By “moral reading” and “philosophic approach,” I refer to conceptions of the Constitution as …


Looking For Mr. (Or Ms.) Rights, Jack M. Beermann May 2014

Looking For Mr. (Or Ms.) Rights, Jack M. Beermann

Shorter Faculty Works

I am on the prowl. It’s 1 a.m. and I’ve been looking for Mr. (or Ms.) Rights all night. I’ve been hanging out in every Article of the Constitution of the United States and I have been deep into the pages of the United States Reports and the Federal Reporter. Oh, I have found plenty of negative rights, like the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and the right not to be twice placed in jeopardy for the same criminal act. But I need something more positive in my life. I want those things that make a …


Constitutional Exaptation, Political Dysfunction, And The Recess Appointments Clause, Jay D. Wexler May 2014

Constitutional Exaptation, Political Dysfunction, And The Recess Appointments Clause, Jay D. Wexler

Faculty Scholarship

The so-called Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution provides that: “The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”1 As of only a few years ago, I considered this clause so minor and quirky that I included it in a book about ten of the Constitution’s “oddest” clauses, right alongside such clearly weird provisions as the Title of Nobility Clause and the Third Amendment.2 Though I recognized that the Recess Appointments Clause was probably the least odd …


The Myth Of Strict Scrutiny For Fundamental Rights, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain Apr 2014

The Myth Of Strict Scrutiny For Fundamental Rights, James E. Fleming, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

Dissenting in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Scalia stated that, under the Due Process Clause, if an asserted liberty is a "fundamental right," it triggers "strict scrutiny" that almost automatically invalidates any statute restricting that liberty. For strict scrutiny requires that the challenged statute, to be upheld, must further a "compelling governmental interest" and must be "necessary" or "narrowly tailored" to doing so. Scalia also wrote that if an asserted liberty is not a fundamental right, it is merely a "liberty interest" that triggers rational basis scrutiny that is so deferential that the Court all but automatically upholds the statute in …


One(?) Nation Over-Extended, Gary S. Lawson Jan 2014

One(?) Nation Over-Extended, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The conventional wisdom prior to the founding was that republics needed to be small. The conventional wisdom today is that James Madison, and the example of the United States, proves this to be mistaken. But what if Madison was actually wrong and Montesquieu was right? In this article, I consider whether the United States has gotten too big for its Constitution, whether this massive size contributes to political dysfunction, and what might be done to remedy the problem if there is indeed a problem. I suggest that size can increase rather than decrease the dangers of faction because the increased …


Classical Liberal Constitution Or Classical Liberal Construction?, Gary S. Lawson Jan 2014

Classical Liberal Constitution Or Classical Liberal Construction?, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited Government (2013), Richard Epstein says that he "incorporates but goes beyond" originalist theory by calling for adjudication "in sync with" classical liberal theory political theory, which Professor Epstein claims underlies the Constitution. Without in any way detracting from the numerous virtues of this book, I argue that this is primarily a work of constitutional construction rather than constitutional interpretation. From the standpoint of interpretation, the background rules that best supplement the constitutional text are found in eighteenth-century fiduciary law rather than in classical liberal political theory, though the latter is …