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Paying For Risk: Bankers, Compensation, And Competition, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead
Paying For Risk: Bankers, Compensation, And Competition, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead
Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers
Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way. They presume that the financial crisis was caused by CEOs who failed to supervise risk-taking employees. The responses focus on executive pay, believing that executives will bring non-executives into line—using incentives to manage risk-taking—once their own pay is regulated. What they overlook is the effect on non-executive pay of the competition for talent. Even if executive pay is regulated, and executives act in the bank’s best interests, they will still be trapped into providing incentives that encourage risk-taking by non-executives due to the negative externality that arises …