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2014

Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Institution
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Articles 1 - 30 of 58

Full-Text Articles in Law

How Not To Apply Actavis, Michael A. Carrier Dec 2014

How Not To Apply Actavis, Michael A. Carrier

NULR Online

No abstract provided.


Potential Competitive Effects Of Vertical Mergers: A How-To Guide For Practitioners, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley Dec 2014

Potential Competitive Effects Of Vertical Mergers: A How-To Guide For Practitioners, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The purpose of this short article is to aid practitioners in analyzing the competitive effects of vertical and complementary product mergers. It is also intended to assist the agencies if and when they undertake revision of the 1984 U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines. Those Guidelines are out of date and do not reflect current enforcement or economic thinking about the potential competitive effects of vertical mergers. Nor do they provide the tools needed to carry out a modern competitive effects analysis. This article is intended to partially fill the gap by summarizing the various potential competitive harms and benefits that ...


Deterrence And Antitrust Punishment: Firms Versus Agents, Keith Hylton Dec 2014

Deterrence And Antitrust Punishment: Firms Versus Agents, Keith Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust enforcement regimes rely on two types of penalties for deterrence: penalties against the violating firm and penalties against the agents of the violating firm. In this paper I examine the economics of punishing agents versus firms. My area of application is antitrust, but the argument applies generally to other fields in which the government has the choice between punishing the agent, the firm, or both. This analysis suggests that whenever the firm has an incentive, given existing penalties, to engage in some illegal act that may result in relatively modest punishment for its agents, it can almost always induce ...


Recent Journalism Awards Won By "Old," "New," And "Hybrid" Media, Robert H. Lande, Thomas J. Horton, Virginia Callahan Dec 2014

Recent Journalism Awards Won By "Old," "New," And "Hybrid" Media, Robert H. Lande, Thomas J. Horton, Virginia Callahan

All Faculty Scholarship

This compares the quality of the "old" media to that of the "new" media by determining how often each type of media source wins major journalism awards. It divides media sources into three categories: old, new and hybrid. New media is limited to publications that were started purely as online news publications. Old media is classified in the traditional sense to include such newspapers as the New York Times. Hybrid media combines elements of both new and old media. Our research compares the number of Pulitzer Prizes and other major journalism awards won by these three types of media sources ...


Toward A Patent Exhaustion Regime For Sustainable Development, 32 Berkeley J. Int'l Law. 330 (2014), Benjamin Liu Dec 2014

Toward A Patent Exhaustion Regime For Sustainable Development, 32 Berkeley J. Int'l Law. 330 (2014), Benjamin Liu

UIC John Marshall Law School Open Access Faculty Scholarship

This Article argues that the current exhaustion doctrine, when applied to the refurbishing industry, fails to balance its mandate of promoting technological progress with the broader program of sustainable development and is therefore unsuitable for countries on the modernization path. First, what constitutes an infringing “making” remains underdetermined. Second, the evidentiary hurdle for proving legal refurbishment is too onerous for the low margin and under-resourced refurbishing industry. Finally, the all-or-nothing approach to judging infringement fails to account for the nuanced cost-benefit nexus that exists between patentees, refurbishers, and society at large and discourages private ordering. To recalibrate the balance between ...


Market Power Without Market Definition, Daniel A. Crane Dec 2014

Market Power Without Market Definition, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Antitrust law has traditionally required proof of market power in most cases and has analyzed market power through a market definition/market share lens. In recent years, this indirect or structural approach to proving market power has come under attack as misguided in practice and intellectually incoherent. If market definition collapses in the courts and antitrust agencies, as it seems poised to do, this will rupture antitrust analysis and create urgent pressures for an alternative approach to proving market power through direct evidence. None of the leading theoretic approaches—such as the Lerner Index or a search for supracompetitive profits ...


Resolving Competition Related Disputes Under The Aml: Theory & Practice, Susan Beth Farmer Nov 2014

Resolving Competition Related Disputes Under The Aml: Theory & Practice, Susan Beth Farmer

Presentations

This presentation was given at the European China Law Studies 2014 Conference, Making, Enforcing and Accessing the Law, in Hong Kong. The presentation addresses the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), the MOFCOMM, NDRC, and SAIC, and litigation before the Supreme People's Court.


"Whimsy Little Contracts" With Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis Of Consumer Understanding Of Arbitration Agreements, Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis, Yuxiang Liu Nov 2014

"Whimsy Little Contracts" With Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis Of Consumer Understanding Of Arbitration Agreements, Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis, Yuxiang Liu

Working Papers

Arbitration clauses have become ubiquitous in consumer contracts. These arbitration clauses require consumers to waive the constitutional right to a civil jury, access to court, and, increasingly, the procedural remedy of class representation. Because those rights cannot be divested without consent, the validity of arbitration agreements rests on the premise of consent. Consumers who do not want to arbitrate or waive their class rights can simply decline to purchase the products or services covered by an arbitration agreement. But the premise of consent is undermined if consumers do not understand the effect on their procedural rights of clicking a box ...


Teece's Competing Through Innovation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Oct 2014

Teece's Competing Through Innovation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This essay reviews David J. Teece's book, Competing Through Innovation: Technological Strategies and Antitrust Policies (2013).


Non-Price Competition In “Substitute" Drugs: The Ftc's Blind Spot, Gregory Dolin Oct 2014

Non-Price Competition In “Substitute" Drugs: The Ftc's Blind Spot, Gregory Dolin

All Faculty Scholarship

As the recent case of United States v. Lundbeck illustrates, the Federal Trade Commission’s lack of knowledge in medical and pharmacological sciences affects its evaluation of transactions between medical and pharmaceutical companies that involve transfers of rights to manufacture or sell drugs, causing the agency to object to such transactions without solid basis for doing so. This article argues that in order to properly define a pharmaceutical market, one must not just consider the condition that competing drugs are meant to treat, but also take into account whether there are “off-label” drugs that are used to treat a relevant ...


Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro Oct 2014

Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.

As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply ...


Ftc V. Lundbeck: Is Anything In Antitrust Obvious, Like, Ever?, Chris Sagers, Richard M. Brunell Oct 2014

Ftc V. Lundbeck: Is Anything In Antitrust Obvious, Like, Ever?, Chris Sagers, Richard M. Brunell

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

In FTC v. Lundbeck, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bench verdict finding a merger to monopoly, followed by a 1400% price increase, not only legal, but effectively not even subject to antitrust. The result followed from the district court's view that peculiarities in the market for hospital-administered drugs rendered it essentially immune from price competition. That being the case, the court found that even products very plainly substitutable on any traditional "functional interchangeability" analysis are not in the same "relevant market" for purposes of rules governing horizontal mergers. We think the court's analysis was incorrect for a number ...


The Appropriate Legal Standard And Sufficient Economic Evidence For Exclusive Dealing Under Section 2: The Ftc’S Mcwane Case, Steven C. Salop, Sharis A. Pozen, John R. Seward Aug 2014

The Appropriate Legal Standard And Sufficient Economic Evidence For Exclusive Dealing Under Section 2: The Ftc’S Mcwane Case, Steven C. Salop, Sharis A. Pozen, John R. Seward

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The FTC recently found McWane, Inc. liable for unlawful monopoly maintenance by a 3-1 majority. The dispute among the FTC Commissioners raises important and interesting issues regarding the law and economics of exclusive dealing and the proper evaluation of the competitive effects of exclusionary conduct. Commissioner Wright’s Dissent proposes and utilizes a new legal standard that requires the plaintiff to show “clear evidence” of harm to competition before shifting the burden to the defendant to show procompetitive efficiency benefits. This burden of proof and production on the plaintiff is much higher than showing “probable effect” based on a preponderance ...


Arresting The Fraud, Singapore Management University Aug 2014

Arresting The Fraud, Singapore Management University

Perspectives@SMU

Proper internal controls are important in fraud prevention


Death By Daubert: The Continued Attack On Private Antitrust, Christine P. Bartholomew Aug 2014

Death By Daubert: The Continued Attack On Private Antitrust, Christine P. Bartholomew

Journal Articles

In 2011, with five words of dicta, the Supreme Court opened Pandora’s box for private antitrust enforcement. By suggesting trial courts must evaluate the admissibility of expert testimony at class certification, the Court placed a significant obstacle in the path of antitrust class actions. Following the Supreme Court’s lead, most courts now permit parties to bring expert challenges far earlier than the traditional summary judgment or pretrial timing. Premature rejection of expert testimony dooms budding private antitrust suits — cases that play an essential role in modern antitrust enforcement. The dangers for private antitrust plaintiffs are compounded by the ...


Comments To The U.S. Sentencing Commission Concerning Antitrust Fines, Robert H. Lande Jul 2014

Comments To The U.S. Sentencing Commission Concerning Antitrust Fines, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This Comment was submitted to the US Sentencing Commission on behalf of the American Antitrust Institute. It makes three important points, all of which concern the US Sentencing Commission's Antitrust Guidelines' cartel overcharge presumption.

First, the evidence demonstrates there currently is significant underdeterrence of price fixing and other anticompetitive forms of collusion. Second, the general approach to calculating cartel fines embodied in the US Sentencing Commission Guidelines, under which the enforcers and ultimately the courts calculate antitrust fines based upon a very specific presumed overcharge, is sound and in the public interest. Third, the 10% cartel overcharge presumption in ...


Trade, Bert Chapman Jul 2014

Trade, Bert Chapman

Libraries Faculty and Staff Scholarship and Research

Provides a historical overview of analysis of U.S. foreign trade policy during the early decades of the country's history. Examines bilateral U.S. trade relations with France and Great Britain, provides import and export statistics, details on commodities and products imports and exported, trade statistics, and information on the political and economic factors shaping U.S. trade during this period.


Compelled Disclosure Of Internet Interconnection Agreements Creates Anticompetitive Risks, Daniel A. Lyons Jun 2014

Compelled Disclosure Of Internet Interconnection Agreements Creates Anticompetitive Risks, Daniel A. Lyons

Boston College Law School Faculty Papers

No abstract provided.


U.S. Vs. European Broadband Deployment: What Do The Data Say?, Christopher S. Yoo Jun 2014

U.S. Vs. European Broadband Deployment: What Do The Data Say?, Christopher S. Yoo

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

As the Internet becomes more important to the everyday lives of people around the world, commentators have tried to identify the best policies increasing the deployment and adoption of high-speed broadband technologies. Some claim that the European model of service-based competition, induced by telephone-style regulation, has outperformed the facilities-based competition underlying the US approach to promoting broadband deployment. The mapping studies conducted by the US and the EU for 2011 and 2012 reveal that the US led the EU in many broadband metrics.

• High-Speed Access: A far greater percentage of US households had access to Next Generation Access (NGA) networks ...


Competition Policy And The Technologies Of Information, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jun 2014

Competition Policy And The Technologies Of Information, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

When we speak about information and competition policy we are usually thinking about oral or written communications that have an anticompetitive potential, and mainly in the context of collusion of exclusionary threats. These are important topics. Indeed, among the most difficult problems that competition policy has had to confront over the years is understanding communications that can be construed as either threats to exclude or as offers to collude or facilitators of collusion.

My topic here, however, is the relationship between information technologies and competition policy. Technological change can both induce and undermine the use of information to facilitate anticompetitive ...


Tesla And The Car Dealers' Lobby, Daniel A. Crane Jun 2014

Tesla And The Car Dealers' Lobby, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Tesla Motors, the offspring of entrepreneur Elon Musk (who brought us Pay-Pal and SpaceX), is the most exciting automotive development in many decades and a marquee story of American technological dynamism and innovation. The company’s luxury electric cars have caused a sensation in the auto industry, including a review by Consumer Reports calling Tesla’s Model S the best car it ever tested. Despite the acclaim, Tesla faces enormous challenges Despite the acclaim, Tesla faces enormous challenges in penetrating an automotive market that has been dominated for a century by internal combustion engines. Not only must it build cars ...


Antitrust And The Close Look: Transaction Cost Economics In Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp May 2014

Antitrust And The Close Look: Transaction Cost Economics In Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This paper briefly examines the contributions of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to antitrust analysis, focusing on vertical integration and its contractual substitutes, mainly, minimum and maximum resale price maintenance, vertical nonprice restraints, tying, bundled discounts and exclusive dealing and related exclusionary contracts.

TCE generally assumes that business firms organize their activities so as to maximize their value, which they can do both by economizing and also by obtaining higher prices. Sensible antitrust policy recognizes that both advantageous contracting and monopoly can be profitable to a firm, and it can be expected to pursue both when they are available. Nevertheless, the ...


Should Section 5 Guidelines Focus On Economic Efficiency Or Consumer Choice?, Robert H. Lande May 2014

Should Section 5 Guidelines Focus On Economic Efficiency Or Consumer Choice?, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright is right that it would be desirable for the Commission to issue Section 5 antitrust guidelines. This article will demonstrate, however, that the best way to formulate Section 5 guidelines is to focus them on the goal of protecting consumer choice, rather than to embrace Commissioner Wright's proposal to neuter the FTC Act by confining it in an economic efficiency straitjacket. Only if Section 5 guidelines were formulated appropriately would they improve consumer welfare during the Commission's second century.


Antitrust, Regulatory Harm, And Economic Liberty, Alan J. Meese May 2014

Antitrust, Regulatory Harm, And Economic Liberty, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Innovating To Improve Access: Changing The Way Courts Regulate Legal Markets, Gillian K. Hadfield Apr 2014

Innovating To Improve Access: Changing The Way Courts Regulate Legal Markets, Gillian K. Hadfield

University of Southern California Legal Studies Working Paper Series

The vast majority of ordinary Americans lack any real access to courts as they struggle to navigate a world that is increasingly shaped by legal rules and obligations. Often this means simply forgoing legal rights and entitlements or giving up in the face of claims of wrongdoing. Among those who cannot avoid courts–such as those facing eviction, collection, or foreclosure and those seeking child support, custodial access, or protection from violence or harassment–the vast majority–as many as 99 percent in some cases–find themselves in court without any legal assistance at all. There are many reasons for ...


The Proposed Damages Directive: The Real Lessons From The United States, Robert H. Lande Mar 2014

The Proposed Damages Directive: The Real Lessons From The United States, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Europeans should be doubly cautious when they study the U.S. experience with private antitrust enforcement. Nevertheless, there are ten specific lessons they can learn. None, however, is consistent with the conventional wisdom in the international competition community that U.S.-style private enforcement has been a disaster. Each should help Europe objectively consider the Commission's proposed Directive concerning private enforcement of Competition law.


Peering Into The Comcast-Netflix Deal, Daniel A. Lyons Mar 2014

Peering Into The Comcast-Netflix Deal, Daniel A. Lyons

Boston College Law School Faculty Papers

No abstract provided.


Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2014

Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

United States antitrust policy is said to promote some version of economic welfare. Antitrust promotes allocative efficiency by ensuring that markets are as competitive as they can practicably be, and that firms do not face unreasonable roadblocks to attaining productive efficiency, which refers to both cost minimization and innovation. One important welfare debate is whether antitrust should adopt a “consumer welfare” principle rather than a more general “total welfare” principle.

The simple version of the consumer welfare test is not a balancing test. If consumers are harmed by reduced output or higher prices resulting from the exercise of market power ...


Merger Policy And The 2010 Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2014

Merger Policy And The 2010 Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

New Horizontal Merger Guidelines were issued jointly by the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission in August, 2010, replacing Guidelines issued in 1992 that no longer reflected either the law or government enforcement policy. The new Guidelines are a striking improvement. They are less technocratic, accommodating a greater and more realistic variety of theories about why mergers of competitors can be anticompetitive and, accordingly, a greater variety of methodologies for assessing them.

The unifying theme of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is to prevent the enhancement of market power that might result from mergers. The 2010 Guidelines state that “[a ...


Harm To Competition Under The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2014

Harm To Competition Under The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

In August, 2010, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission issued new Guidelines for assessing the competitive effects of horizontal mergers under the antitrust laws. These Guidelines were long awaited not merely because of the lengthy interval between them and previous Guidelines but also because enforcement policy had drifted far from the standards articulated in the previous Guidelines. The 2010 Guidelines are distinctive mainly for two things. One is briefer and less detailed treatment of market delineation. The other is an expanded set of theories of harm that justify preventing mergers or reversing mergers that have already occurred.

The ...