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Full-Text Articles in Law

Preemption And Theories Of Federalism, Robert R. M. Verchick, Nina A. Mendelson Jan 2009

Preemption And Theories Of Federalism, Robert R. M. Verchick, Nina A. Mendelson

Book Chapters

American government is an experiment in redundancy, with powers and duties shared among federal, state, and local decision makers. The arrange­ment is designed to divide power, maximize self-rule, and foster innovation, but it also can breed confusion. In the areas of public safety and environ­mental protection, state and federal leaders (to name the two most active players in these disputes) are often seen jockeying for the inside track, hoping to secure the resources or authority needed to promote their views of the public good or gain politically. To outside observers, the best outcomes are not obvious. For example, should the …


Legal Frameworks And Institutional Contexts For Public Consultation Regarding Administrative Action: The United States, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2009

Legal Frameworks And Institutional Contexts For Public Consultation Regarding Administrative Action: The United States, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Written for a forthcoming book on e-governance and e-democracy, this essay summarizes the current state of play in electronic rulemaking in the United States. It thus focuses on a context in which the use of electronic consultation by “executive branch” actors engaged in policy-making has been developing for over a decade, and has reached a point of considerable, although not final maturity. Initially developed haphazardly, agency-by-agency, it is now (albeit with friction in the gears) moving towards a centralized regime. The practice is rarely consultative in the full sense the book as a whole will address; while the public is …


Rulemaking And The American Constitution, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2009

Rulemaking And The American Constitution, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

A Constitution that strongly separates legislative from executive activity makes it difficult to reconcile executive adoption of regulations (that is, departmentally adopted texts resembling statutes and having the force of law, if valid) with the proposition that the President is not ‘to be a lawmaker’. Such activity is, of course, an essential of government in the era of the regulatory state. United States courts readily accept the delegation to responsible agencies of authority to engage in it, what we call ‘rulemaking’, so long as it occurs in a framework that permits them to assess the legality of any particular exercise. …