Law Commons^™

Transparency And Public Participation In The Rulemaking Process: Recommendations For The New Administration, Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin, Evan Mendelson

All Faculty Scholarship

Each year, federal regulatory agencies create thousands of new rules that affect the economy. When these agencies insulate themselves too much from the public, they are more likely to make suboptimal decisions and decrease public acceptance of their resulting rules. A nonpartisan Task Force on Transparency and Public Participation met in 2008 to identify current deficiencies in agency rulemaking procedures and develop recommendations for the next presidential administration to improve the quality of regulations and the legitimacy of regulatory proceedings. This report summarizes the Task Force's deliberations, indicating ways that federal agencies could do a better job of seeking citizen …

The Relation Between Regulation And Class Actions: Evidence From The Insurance Industry, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick

All Faculty Scholarship

Standard law and economics models imply that regulation and litigation serve as substitutes. We test this by looking at the incidence of insurance class actions as a function of measures of regulatory enforcement. We also look specifically at whether states with clear regulatory standards regarding the use of OEM parts experience less litigation over this issue. We find no evidence of substitution between regulation and litigation. We also examine the possibility that litigation is more frequent in states where regulators are more likely to be captured by industry interests, finding no support for this hypothesis either. Instead, litigation is more …

Agency Self-Regulation, Elizabeth Magill

All Faculty Scholarship

Discretion is at the center of most accounts of bureaucracy. Legal scholars in particular have called for agency supervisors, such as Congress, the courts, or the President, to tame that agency discretion. Strangely absent from these accounts is a ubiquitous phenomenon: administrative agencies routinely limit their own discretion when no source of authority requires them to do so.

This Article aims to create a category of such "self-regulation" and argue that scholars have been mistaken to ignore it. It first defines the category of self-regulation, including the feature of administrative law that makes the category interesting, which is that courts …