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Full-Text Articles in Law

Why (Only) Esops?, Robert C. Hockett Oct 2006

Why (Only) Esops?, Robert C. Hockett

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Discounting, On Stilts, Douglas A. Kysar Aug 2006

Discounting, On Stilts, Douglas A. Kysar

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This paper provides a critical overview of several articles presented at the Intergenerational Discounting and Intergenerational Equity Conference held at the University of Chicago Law School on April 27-28, 2006. First, it demonstrates that conventional normative justifications offered for the use of discounting future costs and benefits for policy analysis in the intergenerational context do not withstand scrutiny. Second, it observes that the compensatory transfers that are sometimes thought to sanitize the cost-benefit procedure in the intergenerational context are deeply problematic, both in their theoretical construction and in their practical adequacy for the tasks they are being deployed to accomplish. …


Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies In Corporate Law, Margaret M. Blair, Lynn A. Stout Apr 2006

Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies In Corporate Law, Margaret M. Blair, Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This Article has two goals: to praise Professor Robert Clark as a remarkable corporate scholar, and to explore how his work has helped to advance our understanding of corporations and corporate law. Clark wrote his classic treatise at a time when corporate scholarship was dominated by a principal-agent paradigm that viewed shareholders as the principals or sole residual claimants in public corporations and treated directors as shareholders' agents. This view naturally led contemporary scholars to believe that the chief economic problem of interest in corporate law was the "agency cost" problem of getting corporate directors to do what shareholders wanted …