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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Return Of Bargain: An Economic Theory Of How Standard Form Contracts Negotiation Between Businesses And Consumers, Jason S. Johnston Mar 2006

The Return Of Bargain: An Economic Theory Of How Standard Form Contracts Negotiation Between Businesses And Consumers, Jason S. Johnston

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This paper analyzes standard form contracts between firms and individual consumers (and borrowers). It presents a mix of anecdotal and empirical evidence from a large number of industries demonstrating a widespread pattern in which firms refrain from enforcing the typically clear bright line performance obligations that such standard form contracts set out (such as a consumer credit repayment terms, or a retail consumer's right to return goods). Instead, firms routinely give their supervisory employees the discretion to bargain around such terms. Within a simple and informal model, the paper explains such delegated, discretionary renegotiation as a means by which ...


Choice, Consent, And Cycling: The Hidden Limitations Of Consent, Leo Katz Feb 2006

Choice, Consent, And Cycling: The Hidden Limitations Of Consent, Leo Katz

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Most legal scholars assume that if V consents to allow D to do something to him, such consent makes D's actions legally and morally acceptable. To be sure, they are willing to make an exception when consent is given under a specified list of conditions: Force, fraud, incompetence, third-party effects, unequal bargaining power, commodification, paternalism - all of these may be grounds for rejecting the validity of V's consent. We might call scholars who take this view of consent quasi-libertarians. In this Article, I argue against the quasi-libertarian view of consent. My central claim is that the validity of ...