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2006

Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Institution
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Articles 1 - 30 of 49

Full-Text Articles in Law

Harmonizing Preferential Rules Of Origin In The Wto System, John J. Barceló Iii Dec 2006

Harmonizing Preferential Rules Of Origin In The Wto System, John J. Barceló Iii

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Preferential arrangements (bilateral and multilateral free trade areas and GSP systems (preferences for developing countries)) are emerging everywhere in the world trading system and are causing concern because they discriminate against non-members and add complexity, distortions and inconsistency to the global system. Rules of origin (ROOs) linked to these arrangements are a significant part of the problem. More and more they have become the source in their own right of distortions in trade patterns, complexity, non-transparency and inconsistency. This essay argues that WTO members should authorize negotiations seeking to harmonize preferential ROOs (rules of origin linked to preferential arrangements) around …


Antitrust And Competition Law Update: U.S. V. Visa: Government Wins Major Rule Of Reason Case, William Kolasky, Robert Bell, Lee Greenfield, Veronica Kayne, Jim Lowe, Doug Melamed, Thomas Mueller, Ali Stoeppelwerth Oct 2006

Antitrust And Competition Law Update: U.S. V. Visa: Government Wins Major Rule Of Reason Case, William Kolasky, Robert Bell, Lee Greenfield, Veronica Kayne, Jim Lowe, Doug Melamed, Thomas Mueller, Ali Stoeppelwerth

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Antitrust Series

On September 17, 2003, the Second Circuit issued an important decision in U.S. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 2003 WL 22138519 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2003). The court affirmed a district court ruling invalidating Visa and Mastercard rules that prohibit member banks from issuing American Express or Discover.1 The district court had found that these ìexclusionary rulesî substantially harmed competition and failed scrutiny under a rule of reason analysis. Visa is noteworthy both because it is a (relatively rare) government win in a major rule of reason case ó with the Second Circuit affirming the trial courtís rigorous inquiry into the …


An Instrumental Theory Of Market Power And Antitrust Policy, Jeffrey L. Harrison Oct 2006

An Instrumental Theory Of Market Power And Antitrust Policy, Jeffrey L. Harrison

UF Law Faculty Publications

Since Judge Hand's pivotal opinion in United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa), the possession of monopoly power has been treated as presumptively legal. The focus of the antitrust laws since then has been on defining when that power is abused. This approach to market power cannot be squared with the prevailing view that antitrust law is grounded in economic theory. To understand why, one must see market power for what it is: the ability of a firm to raise prices above competitive levels and to profitably keep them there. Seen in this light, market power is indistinguishable from …


Understanding Single-Firm Behavior: Empirical Perspectives Session, Jonathan Baker, Luke Froeb, Robert Marshall, Wally Mullin, David Reitman, F. Michael Scherer, Clifford Winston Sep 2006

Understanding Single-Firm Behavior: Empirical Perspectives Session, Jonathan Baker, Luke Froeb, Robert Marshall, Wally Mullin, David Reitman, F. Michael Scherer, Clifford Winston

Presentations

In 2006 and 2007, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) cohosted hearings on single-firm conduct and antitrust law. For more information, consult the hearings information page or contact the Legal Policy Section at singlefirmconduct@usdoj.gov.


Economic Evidence In Antitrust: Defining Markets And Measuring Market Power In Paolo Buccirossi, Jonathan Baker, Timothy Bresnahan Sep 2006

Economic Evidence In Antitrust: Defining Markets And Measuring Market Power In Paolo Buccirossi, Jonathan Baker, Timothy Bresnahan

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

This paper addresses an important aspect of the interdisciplinary collaboration between law and economics: the use antitrust courts can and should make of empirical industrial organization economics, in light of the expansion of empirical knowledge generated during the last few decades. First we show how courts can apply what economists have learned about identification of alternative theories of industry structure and firm strategy to the problems of defining markets and determining whether market power has been exercised. We emphasize that the same analytic issues arise regardless of whether the evidence on these concepts is quantitative or qualitative. Second we show …


Cfius And The Role Of Foreign Direct Investment In The U.S.: Hearing Before The Subcomm. On Domestic And International Monetary Policy, Trade And Technology Of The H. Comm. On Financial Services, 109th Cong., Apr. 27, 2006 (Statement Of Professor Daniel K. Tarullo, Geo. U. L. Center), Daniel K. Tarullo Apr 2006

Cfius And The Role Of Foreign Direct Investment In The U.S.: Hearing Before The Subcomm. On Domestic And International Monetary Policy, Trade And Technology Of The H. Comm. On Financial Services, 109th Cong., Apr. 27, 2006 (Statement Of Professor Daniel K. Tarullo, Geo. U. L. Center), Daniel K. Tarullo

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.


Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, Robert H. Lande Apr 2006

Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This article examines five common beliefs about antitrust damages and shows they all are untrue.

Myth #1. Antitrust violations give rise to treble damages.

Myth #2. There is "duplication" of antitrust damages because many defendants pay six-fold or more damages.

Myth #3. Courts should go easy on defendants when formulating liability rules or calculating overcharges because the awarded damages from a finding of an antitrust violation are so severe.

Myth #4. The size of the harms caused by antitrust violations, even by such "hardcore" violations as naked cartels, is relatively modest, and criminal penalties resulting from violations are out of …


The Antitrust Legality Of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements, James F. Ponsoldt, W. Hennen Ehrenclou Apr 2006

The Antitrust Legality Of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements, James F. Ponsoldt, W. Hennen Ehrenclou

Scholarly Works

Several federal courts of appeal have recently ruled on the issue of whether a pharmaceutical patent infringement settlement, pursuant to which a generic drug manufacturer agrees to forgo marketing a particular drug in return for monetary payments from a patent-holding “pioneer” drug manufacturer, is a violation of antitrust law. These payments are termed “reverse payments” because, contrary to normal settlements, the plaintiff makes a lump sum payment to the defendant. Reverse payments have sparked considerable academic comment and controversy. Even more recently, the Federal Trade Commission (“Commission”) and the Solicitor General have expressed views on the issue, in the context …


Standards Ownership And Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Mar 2006

Standards Ownership And Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust law is a blunt instrument for dealing with many claims of anticompetitive standard setting. Antitrust fact finders lack the sophistication to pass judgment on the substantive merits of a standard. In any event, antitrust is not a roving mandate to question bad standards. It requires an injury to competition, and whether the minimum conditions for competitive harm are present can often be determined without examining the substance of the standard itself.

When government involvement in standard setting is substantial antitrust challenges should generally be rejected. The petitioning process in a democratic system protects even bad legislative judgments from collateral …


Net Neutrality: Hearing Before The Senate Committee On Commerce, Science And Transportation, 109th Cong., Feb. 7, 2006 (Statement Of J. Gregory Sidak, Visiting Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), J. Gregory Sidak Feb 2006

Net Neutrality: Hearing Before The Senate Committee On Commerce, Science And Transportation, 109th Cong., Feb. 7, 2006 (Statement Of J. Gregory Sidak, Visiting Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), J. Gregory Sidak

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.


The Law Of Exclusionary Pricing, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2006

The Law Of Exclusionary Pricing, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The success of the Areeda-Turner test for predatory pricing and the Supreme Court's adoption of demanding proof requirements in its 1993 Brooke Group decision have made it very difficult for plaintiffs to win conventional predatory pricing claims. While many challenges to exclusionary pricing continue to be made, the legal theory has evolved away from classical predation to a variety of other theories. These include challenges to quantity and market share discounts, single item and package discounts, and various purchasing practices, including slotting fees, overinvestment in fixed cost assets, and overbuying of variable cost inputs. Plaintiffs have enjoyed somewhat greater success …


Ip Antitrust: Keeping The Free-Market Innovation Machine Working, William Kolasky Jan 2006

Ip Antitrust: Keeping The Free-Market Innovation Machine Working, William Kolasky

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Antitrust Series

One of the most thoughtful books in recent years on how innovation drives economic growth is Professor William Baumol’s The Free-Market Innovation Machine. In it, Professor Baumol shows that over the past 150 years, per capita incomes in a typical free market economy have risen at unprecedented levels. He argues that the engine driving this growth is the competitive pressure a well-functioning free market economy places on firms to invest in innovation and to share new technologies with the firms that can use it most efficiently.


Pharmabulletin Issue 3, Fall 2005, Mark Heller, Hollie Baker, Robert Barry, James Burling, Suyong Kim Jan 2006

Pharmabulletin Issue 3, Fall 2005, Mark Heller, Hollie Baker, Robert Barry, James Burling, Suyong Kim

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Antitrust Series

On August 15, 2005, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Association of American Medical Colleges released a joint report that examines possible steps to accelerate drug discovery and development. The report, entitled Drug Development Science: Obstacles and Opportunities for Collaboration Among Academia, Industry and Government, is the product of a two-day conference among leaders from the pharmaceutical industry, academia, and FDA. The goal of the conference and the report was to explore means of overcoming the high failure rate for tentative drug candidates.


New Safe “Round Trip Investment” Circular Lightens The Regulatory Burden On Venture Capital Investments In China, Lester Ross Jan 2006

New Safe “Round Trip Investment” Circular Lightens The Regulatory Burden On Venture Capital Investments In China, Lester Ross

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Antitrust Series

The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), China’s foreign exchange regulatory authority, recently clarified the PRC’s overall attitude with respect to offshore VC investments by setting out clearer registration procedures and expressly permitting VC transactions involving offshore SPV structures, subject to compliance with foreign exchange registration requirements. This clarification was set forth in the Circular on Issues Relating to Financing through Offshore Special Purpose Vehicles by Domestic Residents and Round Trip Investment (Circular No. 75), promulgated on October 21, 2005, with effect from November 1, 2005. Circular No. 75 supersedes two SAFE circulars promulgated earlier this year, Circular No. 11 …


The Status Of Wto Rules In U.S. Law, John J. Barceló Iii Jan 2006

The Status Of Wto Rules In U.S. Law, John J. Barceló Iii

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Under U.S. implementing legislation and recent court decisions the WTO agreements and rulings have neither direct nor even indirect effect within the U.S. legal system. Political-economic theory can explain this result and the paradox of Congressional support (even mandate) for the more legally binding WTO dispute settlement regime that emerged from the Uruguay Round appearing side-by-side with Congressional insistence on a firewall of separation between WTO law and the U.S. legal system. It can also explain the few exceptional cases - for example, the TRIPS and Government Procurement Agreements - in which the parties adopted a form of quasi-direct effect. …


Guideline Institutionalization: The Role Of Merger Guidelines In Antitrust Discourse, Hillary Greene Jan 2006

Guideline Institutionalization: The Role Of Merger Guidelines In Antitrust Discourse, Hillary Greene

Faculty Articles and Papers

With the growth of the administrative state, agency-promulgated enforcement policy statements, typically referred to as guidelines, have become ubiquitous in the U.S. federal system. Yet, the actual usage and impact of such guidelines is poorly understood. Often the issuing agencies declare the guidelines to be nonbinding, even for themselves. Notwithstanding this disclaimer, the government, private parties, and even the courts frequently rely on the guidelines in a precedent-like manner. In this Article, Professor Greene examines the evolution of one system of enforcement policy guidelines - the U.S. federal antitrust merger guidelines - and finds that these guidelines have acted as …


Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, Robert H. Lande Jan 2006

Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The purpose of this commentary is to analyze some of the empirical issues that help lay the foundation for the policy conclusions in the excellent and provocative article by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion (hereinafter "D&E"). To oversimplify, D&E asserts that discounts usually are procompetitive. It also concedes, but essentially in its footnotes, that discounts can be anticompetitive, but argues that these anticompetitive situations are so rare they should have little impact on public policy. D&E then asserts that efficiencies from discounts are common and significant. It then asserts that the only way to bring clarity, predictability, and an …


Vertical Restraints On Competition, Franklin A. Gevurtz Jan 2006

Vertical Restraints On Competition, Franklin A. Gevurtz

McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles

This report addresses the application of United States "antitrust" - or what other nations commonly refer to as "competition" - law to agreements between sellers and purchasers of goods and services, when those agreements impact competition. In other words, this report is concerned with "vertical," as opposed to "horizontal," restraints (horizontal referring to agreements between competitors). This report will proceed in two parts. Part I will provide a broad overview of the relevant statutes, enforcement mechanisms, and approach ofUnited States law to vertical restraints. Part II will discuss how United States law currently applies to specific vertical restraints.


The Size Of Cartel Overcharges: Implications For U.S. And Ec Fining Policies, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande Jan 2006

The Size Of Cartel Overcharges: Implications For U.S. And Ec Fining Policies, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The purpose of this article is to examine whether the current cartel fine levels of the European Union (EU) and the United States are at the optimal levels. We collected and analyzed the available information concerning the size of the overcharges caused by hard-core pricing fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation agreements. Data sets of United States cartels were assembled and examined. These cartels overcharged an average of 18% to 37%, depending upon the data set and methodology employed in the analysis and whether mean or median figures are used. Separate data sets for European cartels also were analyzed, which …


Articulating Trade Offs: The Political Economy Of State Action Immunity, Hillary Greene Jan 2006

Articulating Trade Offs: The Political Economy Of State Action Immunity, Hillary Greene

Faculty Articles and Papers

Antitrust uses economic analysis to assess various trade-offs involving efficiency. Even assuming that a competition matter implicates purely economic matters it can be exceedingly difficult to determine and measure all the relevant factors, assign them proper weights, decide on the appropriate time frames, assess the pertinent interactions, and conduct the trade-off calculations. Not surprisingly, different members of the antitrust community often take vastly differing positions regarding the economic consequences of a particular antitrust doctrine as well as the significance of those consequences. When potentially anti-competitive conduct occurs in the context of state regulation, the challenge to achieving a sensible accommodation …


The "Modernisation" Of European Community Competition Law: Achieving Consistency In Enforcement-Part Ii (With P. Cassinis), David J. Gerber Jan 2006

The "Modernisation" Of European Community Competition Law: Achieving Consistency In Enforcement-Part Ii (With P. Cassinis), David J. Gerber

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Fielding A Team For The Fans: The Societal Consequences And Title Vii Implications Of Race-Considered Roster Construction In Professional Sport, N. Jeremi Duru Jan 2006

Fielding A Team For The Fans: The Societal Consequences And Title Vii Implications Of Race-Considered Roster Construction In Professional Sport, N. Jeremi Duru

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

Professional sports organizations' relationships with their players are, like other employer-employee relationships, subject to scrutiny under the antidiscrimination mandates embedded in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Professional sports organizations are, however, unique among employers in many respects. Most notably, unlike other employers, professional sports organizations attract avid supporters who identify deeply with the teams and their players. To the extent an organization racially discriminates, therefore, such discrimination creates the risk that fans will identify with the homogenous or racially disproportionate roster that results. The consequences of such race-based team identification are wide-reaching and potentially tragic. Through …


Overvalued Equity And The Case For An Asymmetric Insider Trading Regime, Thom Lambert Jan 2006

Overvalued Equity And The Case For An Asymmetric Insider Trading Regime, Thom Lambert

Faculty Publications

This article argues for an asymmetric insider trading policy under which insider trading that decreases the price of an overvalued stock is generally permitted, but insider trading that increases the price of an undervalued stock is generally prohibited. Concluding that the net investor benefits of price-decreasing insider trading exceed those of price-enhancing insider trading, the article argues that an asymmetric insider trading regime likely represents the bargain that shareholders and corporate managers would strike if they were legally and practically able to negotiate an insider trading policy. Current insider trading doctrine would permit regulators to impose such an asymmetric insider …


Antitrust Modernization: Looking Backwards, Stephen Calkins Jan 2006

Antitrust Modernization: Looking Backwards, Stephen Calkins

Law Faculty Research Publications

Once again a national commission is attempting to address problems in antitrust law and enforcement. At this writing, the Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC) is well underway. The AMC has identified 25 issues for study, and is receiving comments and holding hearings. This brief Article looks backward at previous efforts to use commissions to improve antitrust. It reviews those efforts, evaluates the results, and provides some lessons (and cautions) for other modernizers.


Civil Monetary Remedies Available To Federal Antitrust Enforcers, Stephen Calkins Jan 2006

Civil Monetary Remedies Available To Federal Antitrust Enforcers, Stephen Calkins

Law Faculty Research Publications

No abstract provided.


Major Events And Policy Issues In Ec Competition Law, 2004-2005 (Part 1), John Ratliff Jan 2006

Major Events And Policy Issues In Ec Competition Law, 2004-2005 (Part 1), John Ratliff

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Antitrust Series

This article is designed to offer an overview of the major events and policy issues related to Arts 81, 82 and 86 EC in 2004–2005. The article follows the format of previous years and is divided into three sections: — A general overview of major events (legislation and notices, European Court cases, European Commission decisions, ECN developments and new sector inquiries). — Discussion of current policy issues, including cartel enforcement, private actions and Art.82 EC modernisation. — An outline of certain areas of specific interest, notably competition and the liberal professions, the Commission’s ‘‘Sport and 3G’’ review and a DG …


Who Should Recover What For Late Trading And Market Timing?, Richard A. Booth Jan 2006

Who Should Recover What For Late Trading And Market Timing?, Richard A. Booth

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Rankings, Reductionism, And Responsibility, Frank Pasquale Jan 2006

Rankings, Reductionism, And Responsibility, Frank Pasquale

Faculty Scholarship

After discussing how search engines operate, and sketching a normative basis for regulation of the rankings they generate, this piece proposes some minor, non-intrusive legal remedies for those who claim that they are harmed by search engine results. Such harms include unwanted (but high-ranking) results relating to them, or exclusion from high-ranking results they claim they are due to appear on. In the first case (deemed inclusion harm), I propose a right not to suppress the results, but merely to add an asterisk to the hyperlink directing web users to them, which would lead to the complainant's own comment on …


Antitrust And Inefficient Joint Ventures: Why Sports Leagues Should Look More Like Mcdonald's And Less Like The United Nations, Stephen F. Ross, Stefan Szymanski Jan 2006

Antitrust And Inefficient Joint Ventures: Why Sports Leagues Should Look More Like Mcdonald's And Less Like The United Nations, Stephen F. Ross, Stefan Szymanski

Journal Articles

Antitrust law generally favors joint ventures that allow separate firms to integrate economic functions while continuing to compete as independent entities. In evaluating the risks to competition that joint ventures could pose, insufficient attention has been paid to the risk that joint ventures with market power may be structured so that the parties, acting in their independent self interest, will prevent the venture from providing innovative goods and services responsive to consumer demand. In these cases, it may be better if a single firm provided services rather than having them provided jointly.

We illustrate this problem by challenging the conventional …


Regulating Access To Databases Through Antitrust Law, 2006 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 7 (2006), Daryl Lim Jan 2006

Regulating Access To Databases Through Antitrust Law, 2006 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 7 (2006), Daryl Lim

UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship

It is largely uncontroversial that the “creative” effort in a database will be protected by copyright. However, any effort to extend protection to purely factual databases creates difficulties in determining the proper method and scope of protection. This Paper argues that antitrust law can be used to supplement intellectual property law in maintaining the “access-incentive” balance with respect to databases. It starts from the premise that a trend toward “TRIPs-plus” rights in databases, whatever its form, is inevitable. The reason is a simple, but compelling one: business needs shape the law. Various means of database access regulation are explored and …