Law Commons^™

The Symbols Of Governance: Thurman Arnold And Post-Realist Legal Theory, Mark Fenster

UF Law Faculty Publications

This article is an effort to provide both the intellectual context of Thurman Arnold's work and, through his work, a better sense of where and how the study of law turned after realism. The article is in five parts. Part I describes Arnold's relationship with legal realism, looking at the earliest part of his academic career when, as a mainstream realist, he performed empirical studies of local and state court systems. Part II is Arnold's proposed field of "Political Dynamics," an interdisciplinary approach to the symbols of law, politics, and economics. Part III considers Arnold's authorial voice in Symbols and …

A Different Sort Of Justice: The Informal Courts Of Public Opinion In Antebellum South Carolina, Elizabeth Dale

UF Law Faculty Publications

Studies of nineteenth century legal history assume that the antebellum South, and antebellum South Carolina in particular, had a legal culture shaped by honor culture and marked by the hierarchical assumptions and extralegal violence that honor culture engendered. In this article, I offer a modification of that well-established account. While I do not question the influence of honor on South Carolina's antebellum legal culture, I suggest that the state had a second, shame-based system of popular justice, in which women played a prominent role. As was the case with honor culture, this second form of extralegal justice, which I have …

Looking For Law In All The Wrong Places: Outlaw Texts And Early Women's Advocacy, Kristin (Brandser) Kalsem

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Recent Supreme Court decisions such as Atkins v. Virginia and Lawrence v. Texas specifically address the linkages between shifting cultural attitudes and the evolution of law. In this Article, I examine the mutually constitutive relationship between legal and cultural developments from a historical perspective and illustrate the necessity of looking to sources that I define as outlaw texts in order to access invaluable information about the process of legal change.

To demonstrate how a study of outlaw texts can enrich our understanding and critical consideration of law and legal history, this Article presents detailed analyses of specific examples of nineteenth-century …

Standard Terms Contracting In The Global Electronic Age: European Alternatives, James Maxeiner

All Faculty Scholarship

This article examines American, European Union and German standard terms laws from an American perspective. It considers not only current law, but significant aspects of the development of these bodies of law. It sets out general issues involved in standard terms laws and summarizes American law. It notes the origin of American concepts in Europe and examines standard terms in the struggle over revision of the Uniform Commercial Code. It looks at the law of the European Union and its origin in the consumer movement. It considers in detail the law of one Member State as an example, that of …

Not So Great Moments In Trial Advocacy: Clement Vallandigham, Richard H. Underwood

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The subject of this comment is "The Lawyer as Hero." Being the contrarian that I am, I thought I would present the story of someone who I do not consider to have been a hero—Clement L. Vallandigham. History has not been kind to him. I am sure those of you who do remember his name think of him as a traitor and a rascal—a loathsome individual. But to some, and for a time, he was a hero and a champion in court. This just goes to show that one person's hero is another person's goat.

A Short History Of Poverty Lawyers In The United States, Deborah J. Cantrell

Publications

No abstract provided.

Law And Judicial Duty, Philip A. Hamburger

Faculty Scholarship

Two hundred years ago, in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall delivered an opinion that has come to dominate modern discussions of constitutional law. Faced with a conflict between an act of Congress and the U.S. Constitution, he explained what today is known as "judicial review." Marshall described judicial review in terms of a particular type of "superior law" and a particular type of "judicial duty." Rather than speak generally about the hierarchy within law, he focused on "written constitutions."

He declared that the U.S. Constitution is "a superior, paramount law" and that if "the constitution is superior to any …