Law Commons^™

The Second Circuit's Role In Expanding The Sec's Jurisdiction Abroad, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Greenmail, The Control Premium And Shareholder Duty, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Second Circuit's Role In Expanding The Sec's Jurisdiction Abroad, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

International Securities Regulation: London's "Big Bang" And The European Securities Markets, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Itsfea's Effect On Either An Implied Cause Of Action For Damages By Contemporaneous Traders Or An Action For Damages Or Rescission By The Party In Privity With The Inside Trader, William K.S. Wang

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Brooklyn Law School -- New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Breakfast Roundtables, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Start Making Sense: An Analysis And Proposal For Insider Trading Regulation, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Reinventing The Outside Director: An Agenda For Institutional Investors, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman

Faculty Scholarship

Managerialist rhetoric puts the institutional investor between a rock and a hard place. The institutional investor is depicted as a paper colossus, alternatively greedy and mindless, but in all events a less important corporate constituency than that other kind of investor, the "real" shareholder. The unspoken corollary is that, regardless of the institution's investment strategy, its interests may appropriately be ignored.

An institution that trades stock frequently is considered a short-term shareholder without a stake in the future of the corporation. According to the familiar argument, the short-term shareholder has no more legitimate claim on management's attention than does a …

Enforcement Of Securities Laws Violations In The United Kingdom, James J. Fishman

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This article examines the weaknesses of the present system of enforcement and suggests changes to make it more effective. The article is divided into three parts: an analysis of the enforcement provisions of the Financial Services Act, the prosecution of securities offenses since its implementation, and the viability of self-regulatory enforcement.

The Logic And (Uncertain) Significance Of Institutional Shareholder Activism, Edward B. Rock

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Generating Precedent In Securities Industry Arbitration, David A. Lipton

Scholarly Articles

The author charts the progress made by the securities industry’s dispute resolution system as it went from judicial litigation to a system that relies almost exclusively on arbitration. Further advances were made by the adoption of the 1989 Rules Amendments, which, by introducing prehearing conferences and setting deadlines for document exchanges, cleared up many procedural issues. However, one serious problem remains: The present system does not provide a means to generate case precedent. The author suggests various ways to cure this defect.

Transfer, Pledge, Clearance And Settlement In The Japanese And United States Securities Markets, Charles W. Mooney Jr., Atsushi Kiyami

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Within academia, paradigm shifts occur regularly, some more important than others. As the takeover wave of the 1980s ebbs, a significant shift now appears to be in progress in the way the public corporation is understood. Above all, the new thinking emphasizes that political forces shaped the modern corporation. While the old paradigm saw the structure of the corporation as the product of a Darwinian competition in which the most efficient design emerged victorious, this new perspective sees political forces as constraining that evolutionary process and possibly foreclosing the adoption of a superior organizational form. Thus, my colleague Professor Mark …

Bondholder Coercion: The Problem Of Constrained Choice In Debt Tender Offers And Recapitalizations, John C. Coffee Jr., William A. Klein

Faculty Scholarship

The past decade saw the flourishing of risky, high-yield corporate debt, often called "junk" bonds. Too many companies took on too much debt, and the chickens are now coming home to roost as these bonds have begun to default with increasing frequency.The magnitude of the problem is potentially enormous; by one estimate, $318 billion of debt has either defaulted already or trades at yields indicating the market's skepticism that it will be repaid on maturity.

Facing the prospect of default, corporate issuers are seeking to restructure or recapitalize their financial structures at a correspondingly increased pace. The market force driving …

Competitive Deregulation Of Financial Services Activity In Europe After 1992, Caroline Bradley

Articles

No abstract provided.