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Full-Text Articles in Law

Inside The Arbitrator's Mind, Chris Guthrie, Susan D. Franck, Anne Van Aaken, James Freda, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski Jan 2017

Inside The Arbitrator's Mind, Chris Guthrie, Susan D. Franck, Anne Van Aaken, James Freda, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Arbitrators are lead actors in global dispute resolution. They are to global dispute resolution what judges are to domestic dispute resolution. Despite its global significance, arbitral decision making is a black box. This Article is the first to use original experimental research to explore how international arbitrators decide cases. We find that arbitrators often make intuitive and impressionistic decisions, rather than fully deliberative decisions. We also find evidence that casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that arbitrators render “split the baby” decisions. Although direct comparisons are difficult, we find that arbitrators generally perform at least as well as, but never …


Customizing Employment Arbitration, Randall Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin Jan 2012

Customizing Employment Arbitration, Randall Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

According to the dispute resolution literature, one advantage of arbitration over litigation is that arbitration enables the parties to customize their dispute resolution procedures. For example, parties can choose the qualifications of the arbitrator(s), the governing procedural rules, the limitation period, recoverable damages, rules for discovery and the presentation of evidence and witnesses, and the specificity of required arbitrator findings. While other scholars have questioned whether parties to arbitration agreements frequently take advantage of this customization, there is little solid empirical information about the topic. In this article, we study the arbitration clauses found in a random sample of 910 …


Misjudging, Chris Guthrie Jan 2007

Misjudging, Chris Guthrie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Judging is difficult. This is obviously so in cases where the law is unclear or the facts are uncertain. But even in those cases where the law is as clear as it can be, and where the relevant facts have been fully developed, judges might still have difficulty getting it right. Why do judges misjudge? Judges, I will argue, possess three sets of "blinders": informational blinders, cognitive blinders, and attitudinal blinders. These blinders make adjudication on the merits - by which I mean the accurate application of governing law to the facts of the case - difficult. This difficulty, in …


Blinking On The Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, Chris Guthrie, Andrew J. Wistrich Jan 2007

Blinking On The Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, Chris Guthrie, Andrew J. Wistrich

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

How do judges judge? Do they apply law to facts in a mechanical and deliberative way, as the formalists suggest they do, or do they rely on hunches and gut feelings, as the realists maintain? Debate has raged for decades, but researchers have offered little hard evidence in support of either model. Relying on empirical studies of judicial reasoning and decision making, we propose an entirely new model of judging that provides a more accurate explanation of judicial behavior. Our model accounts for the tendency of the human brain to make automatic, snap judgments, which are surprisingly accurate, but which …


Demand For A Jury Trial And The Selection Of Cases For Trial, Joni Hersch Jan 2006

Demand For A Jury Trial And The Selection Of Cases For Trial, Joni Hersch

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This paper uses a unique data set to examine how parties in civil litigation choose whether to demand a jury trial or to waive this right and whether trial forum influences the probability of trial versus settlement. Plaintiffs are more likely to demand trial by jury when juries are relativety more favorable to plaintiffs in similar cases and jury trials are relatively less costly than bench trials. Cases in which jury trials are demanded are 5.5 percentage points more ikely to settle without a trial than cases in which jury trials are waived. This differential settlement rate by potential trial …


Insights From Cognitive Psychology, Chris Guthrie Jan 2004

Insights From Cognitive Psychology, Chris Guthrie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

My goal in this paper is to explore cognitive psychology's place in the dispute resolution field. To do so, I first look back and then look forward. Looking back, I identify the five insights from cognitive psychology that have had the biggest impact on my own dispute resolution teaching and scholarship. Looking forward, I identify my five hopes for the future of cognitive psychology in the dispute resolution field.


Damages: Using A Case Study To Teach Law, Lawyering, And Dispute Resolution, Chris Guthrie Jan 2004

Damages: Using A Case Study To Teach Law, Lawyering, And Dispute Resolution, Chris Guthrie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Seven law school faculty members and one practicing attorney recently developed and taught a wholly new kind of law course based on an already published case study, Damages: One Family's Legal Struggles in the World of Medicine, by Barry Werth, an investigative reporter who spent several years researching to write the book. Damages, an in-depth account of a medical malpractice case, presents the perspectives of the injured family, the defendant physician, the lawyers, and the three mediators. In this Symposium Introduction, the authors provide a summary of Werth's book, explain why they decided to create a course based on his …


Understanding Settlement In Damages (And Beyond), Chris Guthrie Jan 2004

Understanding Settlement In Damages (And Beyond), Chris Guthrie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

For all of the ways in which the Sabia case is extraordinary, its outcome--settlement--is decidedly ordinary. In most civil litigation, as in the Sabias' litigation against Dr. Maryellen Humes and Norwalk Hospital, "[s]ettlement is where the action is." Roughly two-thirds of all cases settle (and most of the rest are resolved through motions). Why do most cases settle? Given the costs, delay, and unpleasantness of the litigation process, why do any cases go to trial? To address these questions--that is, to explain why most cases settle as well as why some cases "fail" to settle and result in trial--legal academics …


Panacea Or Pandora's Box?: The Costs Of Options In Negotiation, Chris Guthrie Jan 2003

Panacea Or Pandora's Box?: The Costs Of Options In Negotiation, Chris Guthrie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The prescriptive literature on negotiation advises negotiators to generate, evaluate, and select from multiple options at the bargaining table. At first glance, this "option-generation prescription" seems unassailable. After all, negotiators can include in their agreements only those options that they actually consider, so the more options they consider, the more likely it seems they will reach an agreement that maximizes their preferences. Upon closer inspection, however, the option-generation prescription begins to appear vulnerable, for it rests on a questionable premise about negotiator behavior. The option-generation prescription assumes that negotiators will make rational decisions when selecting from multiple options; regardless of …


Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory Of Litigation Behavior, Chris Guthrie Jan 1999

Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory Of Litigation Behavior, Chris Guthrie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Legal scholars have developed two dominant theories of litigation behavior: the Economic Theory of Suit and Settlement,which is based on expected utility theory, and the Framing Theory of Litigation, which is based on prospect theory. While Professor Guthrie acknowledges the explanatory power of these theories, he argues that they are flawed because they portray litigants solely as calculating creatures. These theories disregard any role emotion might play in litigation decision making. Guthrie proposes a mplementary theory-the Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior-that views litigants as both calculating and emotional creatures. With roots in economics, cognitive psychology, and social psychology, the …


A "Party Satisfaction" Perspective On A Comprehensive Mediation Statute, Chris Guthrie, James Levine Jan 1998

A "Party Satisfaction" Perspective On A Comprehensive Mediation Statute, Chris Guthrie, James Levine

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

During the past fifteen years, the alternative dispute resolution movement has greatly altered the legal landscape. Courts, legislatures and administrative agencies have enacted more than 2000 laws dealing with mediation and other dispute resolution processes. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution have recently formed a unique partnership to assess whether a model or uniform mediation statute might remedy some of the problems caused by the current patchwork of often confusing and conflicting mediation laws. The task of drafting a comprehensive mediation statute poses many challenges. The drafters …


Psychology, Economics, And Settlement: A New Look At The Role Of The Lawyer, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin Jan 1997

Psychology, Economics, And Settlement: A New Look At The Role Of The Lawyer, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Law and economics models of litigation settlement, based on the behavioral assumptions of rational choice theory, ignore the many psychological reasons that settlement negotiations can fail, yet they accurately predict that vast majority of lawsuits will settle short of formal adjudication. What explains this? We present experimental data that suggests lawyers might evaluate the settlement vs. adjudication decision from a perspective more closely akin to "rational choice theory" than will non-lawyers and, consequently, increase the observed level of settlement. We then evaluate whether the hypothesized difference between lawyers and non-lawyers is likely to lead to more efficient dispute resolution, concluding …


Development Of An Early Identification And Response Model Of Malpractice Prevention, Ellen Wright Clayton, Gerald B. Hickson, James W. Pichert, Charles F. Federspiel Jan 1997

Development Of An Early Identification And Response Model Of Malpractice Prevention, Ellen Wright Clayton, Gerald B. Hickson, James W. Pichert, Charles F. Federspiel

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The dramatic rise in the incidence of malpractice claims over the past thirty years has revealed several problems with the U.S. system of medical dispute resolution. First, the sudden and unexpected increase in claims has created an insurance crisis wherein various medical specialists have had difficulty obtaining affordable insurance coverage. One such crisis occurred in Florida in the mid-1980's, when an inability of many physicians to procure medical malpractice coverage caused some to limit or curtail their practice. This resulted in access problems for the public. This phenomenon has disproportionately befallen physicians practicing obstetric medicine. Second, besides contributing to periodic …


Thinking Of Mediation As A Complex Adaptive System, J.B. Ruhl Jan 1997

Thinking Of Mediation As A Complex Adaptive System, J.B. Ruhl

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This article uses my work on complex adaptive systems to think about how litigation and mediation differ in terms of adaptive qualities, suggesting that mediation is indeed a more adaptive mode of dispute resolution in certain contexts.


Psychological Barriers To Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin Jan 1994

Psychological Barriers To Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The traditional economic model of settlement breakdown -- as developed by Priest and Klein -- provides an important first step in understanding why some lawsuits settle and others go to trial. Rational miscalculation undoubtedly pushes some litigants into court who might otherwise reach out-of-court settlement. Absent miscalculation, however, some litigants still find themselves in court. We have presented experimental evidence suggesting that these litigants may proceed to trial because psychological barriers to value maximizing behavior impede their settlement efforts. Indeed, our research empirically grounds the hypothesis that psychological barriers are powerful causal agents of trials. The usefulness of this evidence …


Opening Offers And Out-Of-Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go A Long Way, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin Jan 1994

Opening Offers And Out-Of-Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go A Long Way, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

When two litigants resolve a dispute through out-of-court settlement rather than trial, they realize joint gains of trade equal to the sum of the costs both parties would have incurred had they obtained a trial judgment minus the costs they incur reaching settlement. This opportunity for mutual gain causes most civil lawsuits to settle out-of-court. Yet, in spite of the opportunity for joint gain, negotiations fail in a significant number of lawsuits. One reason for this surprising result is that even when joint gains are substantial and obvious to the litigants, they still must agree on a method of dividing …