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Full-Text Articles in Law
Understanding Settlement In Damages (And Beyond), Chris Guthrie
Understanding Settlement In Damages (And Beyond), Chris Guthrie
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
For all of the ways in which the Sabia case is extraordinary, its outcome--settlement--is decidedly ordinary. In most civil litigation, as in the Sabias' litigation against Dr. Maryellen Humes and Norwalk Hospital, "[s]ettlement is where the action is." Roughly two-thirds of all cases settle (and most of the rest are resolved through motions). Why do most cases settle? Given the costs, delay, and unpleasantness of the litigation process, why do any cases go to trial? To address these questions--that is, to explain why most cases settle as well as why some cases "fail" to settle and result in trial--legal academics …
The Lawyer's Philosophical Map And The Disputant's Perceptual Map: Impediments To Facilitative Mediation And Lawyering, Chris Guthrie
The Lawyer's Philosophical Map And The Disputant's Perceptual Map: Impediments To Facilitative Mediation And Lawyering, Chris Guthrie
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Riskin's categorization of mediation has engendered much debate among academics and practitioners. Although most in the mediation community accept Riskin's positive assertion that mediation as currently practiced includes both facilitation and evaluation, a vocal group of purist critics rejects Riskin's pluralist view of mediation on normative grounds. These purist critics -- including such prominent mediator-scholars as Professors Kim Kovach, Lela Love," and Josh Stulberg -- argue that mediation is in fact, and should be, solely a facilitative process "designed to capture the parties' insights, imagination, and ideas that help them to participate in identifying and shaping their preferred outcomes." For …
Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory Of Litigation Behavior, Chris Guthrie
Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory Of Litigation Behavior, Chris Guthrie
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Legal scholars have developed two dominant theories of litigation behavior: the Economic Theory of Suit and Settlement,which is based on expected utility theory, and the Framing Theory of Litigation, which is based on prospect theory. While Professor Guthrie acknowledges the explanatory power of these theories, he argues that they are flawed because they portray litigants solely as calculating creatures. These theories disregard any role emotion might play in litigation decision making. Guthrie proposes a mplementary theory-the Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior-that views litigants as both calculating and emotional creatures. With roots in economics, cognitive psychology, and social psychology, the …
Psychology, Economics, And Settlement: A New Look At The Role Of The Lawyer, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin
Psychology, Economics, And Settlement: A New Look At The Role Of The Lawyer, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Law and economics models of litigation settlement, based on the behavioral assumptions of rational choice theory, ignore the many psychological reasons that settlement negotiations can fail, yet they accurately predict that vast majority of lawsuits will settle short of formal adjudication. What explains this? We present experimental data that suggests lawyers might evaluate the settlement vs. adjudication decision from a perspective more closely akin to "rational choice theory" than will non-lawyers and, consequently, increase the observed level of settlement. We then evaluate whether the hypothesized difference between lawyers and non-lawyers is likely to lead to more efficient dispute resolution, concluding …
Psychological Barriers To Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin
Psychological Barriers To Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The traditional economic model of settlement breakdown -- as developed by Priest and Klein -- provides an important first step in understanding why some lawsuits settle and others go to trial. Rational miscalculation undoubtedly pushes some litigants into court who might otherwise reach out-of-court settlement. Absent miscalculation, however, some litigants still find themselves in court. We have presented experimental evidence suggesting that these litigants may proceed to trial because psychological barriers to value maximizing behavior impede their settlement efforts. Indeed, our research empirically grounds the hypothesis that psychological barriers are powerful causal agents of trials. The usefulness of this evidence …
Opening Offers And Out-Of-Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go A Long Way, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin
Opening Offers And Out-Of-Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go A Long Way, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
When two litigants resolve a dispute through out-of-court settlement rather than trial, they realize joint gains of trade equal to the sum of the costs both parties would have incurred had they obtained a trial judgment minus the costs they incur reaching settlement. This opportunity for mutual gain causes most civil lawsuits to settle out-of-court. Yet, in spite of the opportunity for joint gain, negotiations fail in a significant number of lawsuits. One reason for this surprising result is that even when joint gains are substantial and obvious to the litigants, they still must agree on a method of dividing …