Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Where's The Harm?: Free Speech And The Regulation Of Lies, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky
Where's The Harm?: Free Speech And The Regulation Of Lies, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky
UF Law Faculty Publications
False factual information has no First Amendment value, and yet the United States Supreme Court has accorded lies a measure of First Amendment protection. The First Amendment imposes something in the nature of a presumption against government interference in public discourse. This presumption is rooted in suspicion of the State's ability to distinguish facts from falsehoods as well as its motives for doing so. However, the presumption against regulation of false speech is not absolute. It can be overcome when verifiably false speech poses a direct threat of harm to individual interests. Unlike other countries, the United States has never …
Employee Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading Of Garcetti V. Ceballos, Elizabeth Dale
Employee Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading Of Garcetti V. Ceballos, Elizabeth Dale
UF Law Faculty Publications
In the two years since the decision came down, courts and commentators generally have agreed that the Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos sharply limited the First Amendment rights of public employees. In this Article, I argue that this widely shared interpretation overstates the case. The Court in Garcetti did not dramatically change the way it analyzed public employees' First Amendment rights. Instead, it restated the principles on which those claims rest, emphasizing management rights and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. By making those two theories the centerpiece of the decision, the Court in Garcetti defined public employee speech rights …
Death Or Transformation? Educational Autonomy In The Roberts Court, Elizabeth Dale
Death Or Transformation? Educational Autonomy In The Roberts Court, Elizabeth Dale
UF Law Faculty Publications
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decisions in Grutter and Gratz a number of commentators argued that the Court had begun to embrace a new constitutional doctrine that required deference to the decisions of some institutions. Most notably they asserted that the Court would defer within the field of education. But even as they suggested that the Court was more willing to explore the doctrine, those two opinions left several large questions unanswered: Did the Court's embrace of institutional autonomy extend beyond higher education, into the K-12 realm? If so, what were its bounds? Was the doctrine only relevant …