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Full-Text Articles in Law

Globally Speaking - Honoring The Victims' Stories: Matsuda's Human Rights Praxis, Berta E. Hernández-Truyol Apr 2014

Globally Speaking - Honoring The Victims' Stories: Matsuda's Human Rights Praxis, Berta E. Hernández-Truyol

UF Law Faculty Publications

Globally speaking, international law and the vast majority of domestic legal systems strive to protect the right to freedom of expression. The United States’ First Amendment provides an early historical protection of speech—a safeguard now embraced around the world. The extent of this protection, however, varies among states.

The United States stands alone in excluding countervailing considerations of equality, dignitary, or privacy interests that would favor restrictions on speech. The gravamen of the argument supporting such American exceptionalism is that free expression is necessary in a democracy. Totalitarianism, the libertarian narrative goes, thrives on government control of information to ...


Not A Free Press Court?, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky Jan 2012

Not A Free Press Court?, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky

UF Law Faculty Publications

The last decade has been tumultuous for print and broadcast media. Daily newspaper circulation continues to fall precipitously, magazines struggle to survive, and network television audiences keep shrinking. In the meanwhile, cable news is prospering, mobile devices are contributing to increased news consumption, and many new media outlets appear to be thriving. Despite the dynamism in the media industry, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts has taken up relatively few First Amendment cases directly involving the media. The Court has addressed a number of important free speech cases since 2005, but thus far the only Roberts Court decisions ...


Incendiary Speech And Social Media, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky Jan 2012

Incendiary Speech And Social Media, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky

UF Law Faculty Publications

Incidents illustrating the incendiary capacity of social media have rekindled concerns about the "mismatch" between existing doctrinal categories and new types of dangerous speech. This Essay examines two such incidents, one in which an offensive tweet and YouTube video led a hostile audience to riot and murder, and the other in which a blogger urged his nameless, faceless audience to murder federal judges. One incident resulted in liability for the speaker, even though no violence occurred; the other did not lead to liability for the speaker even though at least thirty people died as a result of his words. An ...


Government Sponsored Social Media And Public Forum Doctrine Under The First Amendment: Perils And Pitfalls, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky Jul 2011

Government Sponsored Social Media And Public Forum Doctrine Under The First Amendment: Perils And Pitfalls, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky

UF Law Faculty Publications

The goal of this article is to provide guidance to lawyers trying to navigate the morass that is the U.S. Supreme Court’s public forum jurisprudence in order to advise government actors wishing to establish social media forums.


Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience As First Amendment Ideal, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky Jan 2010

Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience As First Amendment Ideal, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky

UF Law Faculty Publications

Assumptions about audiences shape the outcomes of First Amendment cases. Yet the Supreme Court rarely specifies what its assumptions about audiences are, much less attempts to justify them. Drawing on literary theory, this Article identifies and defends two critical assumptions that emerge from First Amendment cases involving so-called core speech. The first is that audiences are capable of rationally assessing the truth, quality, and credibility of core speech. The second is that more speech is generally preferable to less. These assumptions, which I refer to collectively as the rational audience model, lie at the heart of the marketplace of ideas ...


Anonymity In Cyberspace: What Can We Learn From John Doe?, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky Jan 2009

Anonymity In Cyberspace: What Can We Learn From John Doe?, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article examines the evolution of the law governing libel suits against anonymous "John Doe" defendants based on Internet speech. Between 1999 and 2009, courts crafted new First Amendment doctrines to protect Internet speakers from having their anonymity automatically stripped away upon the filing of a libel action. Courts also adapted existing First Amendment protections for hyperbole, satire, and other nonfactual speech to protect the distinctive discourse of Internet message boards. Despite these positive developments, the current state of the law is unsatisfactory. Because the scope of protection for anonymous Internet speech varies greatly by jurisdiction, resourceful plaintiffs can make ...


Death Or Transformation? Educational Autonomy In The Roberts Court, Elizabeth Dale Jan 2008

Death Or Transformation? Educational Autonomy In The Roberts Court, Elizabeth Dale

UF Law Faculty Publications

In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decisions in Grutter and Gratz a number of commentators argued that the Court had begun to embrace a new constitutional doctrine that required deference to the decisions of some institutions. Most notably they asserted that the Court would defer within the field of education. But even as they suggested that the Court was more willing to explore the doctrine, those two opinions left several large questions unanswered: Did the Court's embrace of institutional autonomy extend beyond higher education, into the K-12 realm? If so, what were its bounds? Was the doctrine ...


Where's The Harm?: Free Speech And The Regulation Of Lies, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky Jan 2008

Where's The Harm?: Free Speech And The Regulation Of Lies, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky

UF Law Faculty Publications

False factual information has no First Amendment value, and yet the United States Supreme Court has accorded lies a measure of First Amendment protection. The First Amendment imposes something in the nature of a presumption against government interference in public discourse. This presumption is rooted in suspicion of the State's ability to distinguish facts from falsehoods as well as its motives for doing so. However, the presumption against regulation of false speech is not absolute. It can be overcome when verifiably false speech poses a direct threat of harm to individual interests. Unlike other countries, the United States has ...


Employee Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading Of Garcetti V. Ceballos, Elizabeth Dale Jan 2008

Employee Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading Of Garcetti V. Ceballos, Elizabeth Dale

UF Law Faculty Publications

In the two years since the decision came down, courts and commentators generally have agreed that the Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos sharply limited the First Amendment rights of public employees. In this Article, I argue that this widely shared interpretation overstates the case. The Court in Garcetti did not dramatically change the way it analyzed public employees' First Amendment rights. Instead, it restated the principles on which those claims rest, emphasizing management rights and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. By making those two theories the centerpiece of the decision, the Court in Garcetti defined public employee speech ...


Institutional Academic Freedom Or Autonomy Grounded Upon The First Amendment: A Jurisprudential Mirage, Richard H. Hiers Jan 2007

Institutional Academic Freedom Or Autonomy Grounded Upon The First Amendment: A Jurisprudential Mirage, Richard H. Hiers

UF Law Faculty Publications

In recent decades, several federal judges and Supreme Court Justices have stated that, at some time or another in the past, the Court determined that public universities or their professional schools are entitled to institutional academic freedom (or institutional autonomy) under the First Amendment. Notwithstanding the views of many learned commentators, the Court has never so held. Concurring opinions and dicta do not constitute Constitutional law. This article traces the series of misattributions, misreadings and other errors that have contributed to the present peculiar state of confusion in regard to these matters.


Introducing A Takedown For Trade Secrets On The Internet, Elizabeth A. Rowe Jan 2007

Introducing A Takedown For Trade Secrets On The Internet, Elizabeth A. Rowe

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article explores, for the first time, an existing void in trade-secret law. When a trade-secret owner discovers that its trade secrets have been posted on the Internet, there is currently no legislative mechanism by which the owner can request that the information be taken down. The only remedy to effectuate removal of the material is to obtain a court order, usually either a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. When a trade secret appears on the Internet, the owner often loses the ability to continue to claim it as a trade secret and to prevent others from using ...


Institutional Academic Freedom - A Constitutional Misconception: Did Grutter V. Bollinger Perpetuate The Confusion?, Richard H. Hiers Jan 2004

Institutional Academic Freedom - A Constitutional Misconception: Did Grutter V. Bollinger Perpetuate The Confusion?, Richard H. Hiers

UF Law Faculty Publications

This article begins with a review of language that eventually gave rise to the concept of institutional academic freedom, and includes a summary of lower court decisions embracing that concept or notion. The second part identifies certain constitutional problems in connection with the idea that institutional academic freedom can somehow be derived from or based upon the First Amendment. The third part describes and analyzes language in the Court's Grutter decision, language that may or may not have the effect of validating the concept of institutional academic freedom under the First Amendment.


Privacy Rights Versus Foia Disclosure Policy: The "Uses And Effects" Double Standard In Access To Personally-Identifiable Information In Government Records, Bill F. Chamberlin, Michael Hoefges, Martin E. Halstuk Jan 2003

Privacy Rights Versus Foia Disclosure Policy: The "Uses And Effects" Double Standard In Access To Personally-Identifiable Information In Government Records, Bill F. Chamberlin, Michael Hoefges, Martin E. Halstuk

UF Law Faculty Publications

The U.S. government maintains a vast amount of personally-identifiable information on millions of American citizens. Much of this information is contained in electronic databases maintained by federal agencies. Various Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requesters, such as journalists, marketers, and union organizers seek this information for different purposes including investigative reporting and targeted solicitations. These kinds of uses are known as "derivative uses" because this government-compiled information is requested for purposes other than the official purposes for which the information was originally gathered. These and other derivative uses of personally-identifiable information often implicate privacy concerns. Conversely, restrictions on public ...


Brandenburg And The United States' War On Incitement Abroad: Defending A Double Standard, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky Jan 2002

Brandenburg And The United States' War On Incitement Abroad: Defending A Double Standard, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky

UF Law Faculty Publications

While it is perfectly legitimate for the United States to attempt to persuade foreign citizens and media not to engage in advocacy of violent acts, the administration's rhetoric suggests that the United States expects foreign governments to take action against speech that would be protected by the First Amendment in the United States. What explains this apparent hypocrisy? Is this simply another example of the United States touting democracy at home while supporting despotism abroad? Or is the Brandenburg incitement standard so socially and culturally contingent that it is not appropriate for export, at least to the Arab Middle ...


Prying, Spying, And Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering And What The Law Should Do About It, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky Jan 1999

Prying, Spying, And Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering And What The Law Should Do About It, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky

UF Law Faculty Publications

The media's use of intrusive newsgathering techniques poses an increasing threat to individual privacy. Courts currently resolve the overwhelming majority of conflicts in favor of the media. This is not because the First Amendment bars the imposition of tort liability on the media for its newsgathering practices. It does not. Rather, tort law has failed to seize the opportunity to create meaninful privacy protection. After surveying the economic, philosophical, and practical obstacles to reform, this Article proposes to rejuvenate the tort of intrusion to tip the balance between privacy and the press back in privacy's direction. Working within ...


New Restrictions On Academic Free Speech: Jeffries V. Harleston Ii, Richard H. Hiers Oct 1995

New Restrictions On Academic Free Speech: Jeffries V. Harleston Ii, Richard H. Hiers

UF Law Faculty Publications

Notwithstanding academic freedom's venerable and near-sacrosanct place among academicians in the United States today, the Supreme Court first accorded it constitutional status only in the 1950s. The Court did not recognize First Amendment speech rights of public employees generally until 1968. In subsequent years, the Court evolved two separate lines of cases: the one relating to, and generally protective of, academic freedom in public colleges and universities; the other, relating to the speech rights of public school teachers and public employees in other work contexts. The Supreme Court has yet to address the question whether the severely restrictive standards ...


The Constitutional Considerations Of Multiple Media Ownership Regulation By The Federal Communications Commission, Jon L. Mills, John Moynahan, Richard Perlini, George Mcclure Jan 1975

The Constitutional Considerations Of Multiple Media Ownership Regulation By The Federal Communications Commission, Jon L. Mills, John Moynahan, Richard Perlini, George Mcclure

UF Law Faculty Publications

Promoting the dissemination of diverse ideas with a minimum of governmental interference is the goal of the first amendment in protecting free press and free media. This goal is implicit in the public interest mandate of the Communications Act of 1934. A precise balance between restraint and diversity in first amendment policy appears impossible, but the process of decision should reflect both, with deference to restraint where possible. The Federal Communication Commission's Order in Docket 18110 failed to strike such a balance; any future action regarding cross-ownership of broadcast stations by newspapers would benefit by an increased recognition of ...