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Full-Text Articles in Law

Judging Monopolistic Pricing: F/Rand And Antitrust Injury, William H. Page Jan 2014

Judging Monopolistic Pricing: F/Rand And Antitrust Injury, William H. Page

UF Law Faculty Publications

In a 2013 opinion in Microsoft v. Motorola, Judge James Robart calculated “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” or RAND royalties that Motorola could lawfully charge Microsoft for licenses to use Motorola patents that were essential to two industry standards. Although the case involved only a claim for breach of contract, Judge Robart’s opinion regulated monopoly pricing, a task courts try to avoid in other contexts, claiming institutional incapacity. In this instance, however, Judge Robart identified standards that he believed adequately guided him in the task. He recognized that the economic purposes of the RAND commitment were to prevent owners of standards-essential patents …


The Law And Economics Of (Functional) Antitrust Standing In The United States And The European Union, Jeffrey L. Harrison Jan 2014

The Law And Economics Of (Functional) Antitrust Standing In The United States And The European Union, Jeffrey L. Harrison

UF Law Faculty Publications

To date, and despite pressures toward convergence, the United States and the European Union have taken different paths with respect to the enforcement of antitrust laws by private parties and, therefore, differ dramatically in levels of functional standing. U.S. law is more encouraging to private enforcement than E.U. law but has a narrower view of whom those private parties are permitted to be. In the European Union, the eligible parties are broad but the motivation of any single party to bring an action is quite low. In the United States, the substantive law and much of the procedural law flow …


“Antitrust's Least Glorious Hour”: The Robinson-Patman Act, Roger D. Blair, Christina Depasquale Jan 2014

“Antitrust's Least Glorious Hour”: The Robinson-Patman Act, Roger D. Blair, Christina Depasquale

UF Law Faculty Publications

In The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork explored many of antitrust’s misadventures. Specifically, Bork severely criticized the Robinson-Patman Act, which he characterized as “antitrust’s least glorious hour.” In this paper, we explore Bork’s criticism of the Robinson-Patman Act along with those of other legal scholars and economists. We analyze the central prohibitions of the act and explore their competitive implications. We also show that the act’s unfortunate prohibitions have been muted by the antitrust agencies’ benign neglect and three recent Supreme Court decisions.


The Transformation Of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, The Rule Of Reason, And Per Se Legality, D. Daniel Sokol Jan 2014

The Transformation Of Vertical Restraints: Per Se Illegality, The Rule Of Reason, And Per Se Legality, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

Robert Bork probably had the single most lasting influence on antitrust law and policy of anyone in the past 50 years. To read the 1978 Antitrust Paradox today, one is struck by how closely contemporary case law tracks Bork's policy prescriptions. The speed at which the transformation in law and policy occurred in antitrust is perhaps unprecedented across any area of common law. In the 1970s, antitrust jurisprudence and enforcement policies were in tension with industrial organization economics. Bork created a unified goal for antitrust based on a “consumer welfare prescription” to shape the development of the case law. The …