Law Commons^™

Protecting Women's Voices: Preventing Retaliatory Defamation Claims In The #Metoo Context, Nicole Ligon

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The First Amendment And Algorithms, Stuart M. Benjamin

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

"The Road I Can't Help Travelling": Holmes On Truth And Persuadability, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Free Speech And Justified True Belief, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

Law often prioritizes justified true beliefs. Evidence, even if probative and correct, must have a proper foundation. Expert witness testimony must be the product of reliable principles and methods. Prosecutors are not permitted to trick juries into convicting a defendant, even if that defendant is truly guilty. Judges’ reasons, and not just the correctness of their holdings, are the engines of precedent. Lawyers are, in short, familiar with the notion that one must be right for the right reasons.

And yet the standard epistemic theory of the First Amendment—that the marketplace of ideas is the “best test of truth”—has generally …

Who Tells Your Story: The Legality Of And Shift In Racial Preferences Within Casting Practices, Nicole Ligon

Faculty Scholarship

Expressing racial preferences in casting calls and hiring practices is nothing new. Producers of television shows, movies, and Broadway musicals have regularly and explicitly sought to hire actors and actresses with certain physical characteristics, including race, in casting their productions. And, given that the industry seemingly accepted this standard when it favored white talent, the public heard little about it. To the extent controversy arose, courts quelled concerns in a swift and easy fashion, without consideration of the societal harms or impacts that stereotyped or limited portrayals of minorities in entertainment could have on the public’s perception of people of …

Beyond The Bosses' Constitution: The First Amendment And Class Entrenchment, Jedediah Purdy

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s “weaponized” First Amendment has been its strongest antiregulatory tool in recent decades, slashing campaign-finance regulation, public-sector union financing, and pharmaceutical regulation, and threatening a broader remit. Along with others, I have previously criticized these developments as a “new Lochnerism.” In this Essay, part of a Columbia Law Review Symposium, I press beyond these criticisms to diagnose the ideological outlook of these opinions and to propose an alternative. The leading decisions of the antiregulatory First Amendment often associate free speech with a vision of market effi­ciency; but, I argue, closer to their heart is antistatist fear of entrench­ment …

New Problems For Subsidized Speech, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

The constitutionality of conditional offers from the government is a transsubstantive issue with broad and growing practical implications, but it has always been a particular problem for free speech. Recent developments suggest at least three new approaches to the problem, but no easy solutions to it. The first approach would permit conditions that define the limits of the government spending program, while forbidding conditions that leverage funding so as to regulate speech outside the contours of the program. This is an appealing distinction, but runs into some of the same challenges as public forum analysis. The second approach would treat …

Common Sense And Key Questions, Stuart M. Benjamin

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Algorithms And Speech, Stuart M. Benjamin

Faculty Scholarship

One of the central questions in free speech jurisprudence is what activities the First Amendment encompasses. This Article considers that question in the context of an area of increasing importance – algorithm-based decisions. I begin by looking to broadly accepted legal sources, which for the First Amendment means primarily Supreme Court jurisprudence. That jurisprudence provides for very broad First Amendment coverage, and the Court has reinforced that breadth in recent cases. Under the Court’s jurisprudence the First Amendment (and the heightened scrutiny it entails) would apply to many algorithm-based decisions, specifically those entailing substantive communications. We could of course adopt …

Analogies And Institutions In The First And Second Amendments: A Response To Professor Magarian, Darrell A.H. Miller

Faculty Scholarship

In this essay, Professor Darrell Miller responds to Professor Gregory Magarian's criticism of the manner in which judges, advocates, and scholars have used the First Amendment to frame Second Amendment interpretive questions.

La Interseccion De La Responsabilidad Extracontractual Y El Derecho Constitucional Y Los Derechos Humanos, George C. Christie

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Implementing First Amendment Institutionalism, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Nonsense And The Freedom Of Speech: What Meaning Means For The First Amendment, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

A great deal of everyday expression is, strictly speaking, nonsense. But courts and scholars have done little to consider whether or why such meaningless speech, like nonrepresentational art, falls within “the freedom of speech.” If, as many suggest, meaning is what separates speech from sound and expression from conduct, then the constitutional case for nonsense is complicated. And because nonsense is so common, the case is also important — artists like Lewis Carroll and Jackson Pollock are not the only putative “speakers” who should be concerned about the outcome.

This Article is the first to explore thoroughly the relationship between …

Public Discourse, Expert Knowledge, And The Press, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay identifies and elaborates two complications raised by Robert Post’s Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom, and in doing so attempts to show how Post’s theory can account for constitutional protection of the press. The first complication is a potential circularity arising from the relationships between the concepts of democratic legitimation, public discourse, and protected social practices. Democratic legitimation predicates First Amendment coverage on participation in public discourse, whose boundaries are defined as those social practices necessary for the formation of public opinion. But close examination of the relationships between these three concepts raises the question of whether public discourse …

Second Things First: What Free Speech Can And Can’T Say About Guns, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Blocher responds to Gregory Magarian’s article on the implications of the First Amendment for the Second.

Aiming At The Wrong Target: The "Audience Targeting" Test For Personal Jurisdiction In Internet Defamation Cases, Sarah H. Ludington

Faculty Scholarship

In Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002), the Fourth Circuit crafted a jurisdictional test for Internet defamation that requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant specifically targeted an audience in the forum state for the state to exercise jurisdiction. This test relies on the presumption that the Internet — which is accessible everywhere — is targeted nowhere; it strongly protects foreign libel defendants who have published on the Internet from being sued outside of their home states. Other courts, including the North Carolina Court of Appeals, have since adopted or applied the test. The …

Sorrell V. Ims Health And The End Of The Constitutional Double Standard, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Crisis In The Legal Profession: Don’T Mourn, Organize!, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Viewpoint Neutrality And Government Speech, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

Government speech creates a paradox at the heart of the First Amendment. To satisfy traditional First Amendment tests, the government must show that it is not discriminating against a viewpoint. And yet if the government shows that it is condemning or supporting a viewpoint, it may be able to invoke the government speech defense and thereby avoid constitutional scrutiny altogether. Government speech doctrine therefore rewards what the rest of the First Amendment forbids: viewpoint discrimination against private speech. This is both a theoretical puzzle and an increasingly important practical problem. In cases like Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, the …

The Dogs That Did Not Bark: The Silence Of The Legal Academy During World War Ii, Sarah H. Ludington

Faculty Scholarship

During World War II, the legal academy was virtually uncritical of the government’s conduct of the war, despite some obvious domestic abuses of civil rights, such as the internment of Japanese-Americans. This silence has largely been ignored in the literature about the history of legal education. This Article argues that there are many strands of causation for this silence. On an obvious level, World War II was a popular war fought against a fascist threat, and left-leaning academics generally supported the war. On a less obvious level, law school enrollment plummeted during the war, and the numbers of full-time law …

Transforming Property Into Speech, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Unshackling Speech (Book Review), David L. Lange

Faculty Scholarship

Reviewing, Brian C. Anderson and Adam D. Thierer, A Manifesto for Media Freedom (2008))

Book Review, Jennifer L. Behrens

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, And The Triumph Of The Crits?, Guy-Uriel Charles

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay examines the Court's recent decision in Virginia v. Black. It argues that Black signifies a different approach to the constitutionality of statutes regulating cross burnings. It shows how the Court's conservatives have essentially accepted the intellectual framework and the mode of analysis suggested previously by the critical race theorists. In particular, this Essay explores the role that Justice Thomas plays in the case. The Essay explains Justice Thomas's active participation as a matter of epistemic authority and epistemic deference.

Civil Rights And Civil Liberties: Whose “Rule Of Law”?, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

To What Extent Does The Power Of Government To Determine The Boundaries And Conditions Of Lawful Commerce Permit Government To Declare Who May Advertise And Who May Not?, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Silence Is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under The First Amendment, Erwin Chemerinsky

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Quo Vadis, Posadas?, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Scholarship

This examination looks at Virginia's ban on speech advertising motorcycles and revisits the question raised in the Posadas decision - may a state ban speech about a legal product the state could ban if it so desired. This article uses comparisons to the government employee speech cases to further illuminate the issue.

Foucault In Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, And Hardwired Censors, James Boyle

Faculty Scholarship

This is an essay about law in cyberspace. I focus on three interdependent phenomena: a set of political and legal assumptions that I call the jurisprudence of digital libertarianism, a separate but related set of beliefs about the state's supposed inability to regulate the Internet, and a preference for technological solutions to hard legal issues on-line. I make the familiar criticism that digital libertarianism is inadequate because of its blindness towards the effects of private power, and the less familiar claim that digital libertarianism is also surprisingly blind to the state's own power in cyberspace. In fact, I argue that …

More Speech Is Better, Erwin Chemerinsky

Faculty Scholarship

In this Reply, Professor Chemerinsky argues that the application of First Amendment principles to private institutions is desirable. Under traditional law, the free speech interests of private institutions are always favored over the free speech interests of individuals. Transporting First Amendment norms to the private sector is desirable because more speech is generally best and private power can chill and prevent speech just as much as government actions. Courts should balance the competing free speech interests of institutions and individuals, rather than always siding with the institution over the individual.