Law Commons^™

The American Law Institute’S New Principles Of Aggregate Litigation, Sam Issacharoff, Carolyn Kuhl, Francis Mcgovern, Stephanie Middleton, John Beisner

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Rollen Und Rollenverständnisse Im Transnationalen Privatrecht [Roles And Role Perceptions In Transnational Private Law], Ralf Michaels

Faculty Scholarship

Downloadable Document is in German

Summary

1. The private lawyer’s role is inseparably connected with the paradigms and doctrines of private law. This is so because the role played by private lawyers constitutes a large part of their understanding of the discipline. At the same time, the shared understanding of the discipline has necessary consequences for the roles played by lawyers in it.

2. Roles and role perceptions in private law are contingent upon space and time. The most important factor affecting private lawyers today is the growing detachment of private law from the state, through globalization, Europeanization, and privatization …

Most Claims Settle: Implications For Alternative Dispute Resolution From A Profile Of Medical-Malpractice Claims In Florida, Neil Vidmar, Mirya Holman, Paul Lee

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Securities Class Actions As Public Law, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market provides a wide-ranging criticism of and thoughtful reforms for securities class actions....However, both their critique of contemporary class actions and their model of the reforms they propose leave unexamined a good many matters relevant to both the criticism and reform of securities class actions....Bratton and Wachter earn high marks for being less passionate and much more thoughtful than others in the chorus calling for reform; indeed, their observations are among the most thoughtful to be found in this area. Nonetheless, their analysis is incomplete in many important areas, and in addition to …

Special Incentives To Sue, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

In an effort to strengthen private enforcement of federal law, Congress regularly employs plaintiff-side attorneys’ fee shifts, damage enhancements, and other mechanisms that promote litigation. Standard economic theory predicts that these devices will increase the volume of suit by private actors, which in turn will bolster enforcement and encourage more voluntary compliance with the law. This Article challenges the conventional wisdom. I use empirical evidence to demonstrate that special incentives to sue do not dependably generate more litigation. More crucially, when such incentives do work, they often trigger a judicial backlash against the very rights that Congress sought to promote. …