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Faculty Scholarship

Duke Law

Legislation

Direct democracy

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Law

For Whom The Tel Tolls: Can State Tax And Expenditure Limits Effectively Reduce Spending?, Thad Kousser, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Ellen Moule Jan 2008

For Whom The Tel Tolls: Can State Tax And Expenditure Limits Effectively Reduce Spending?, Thad Kousser, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Ellen Moule

Faculty Scholarship

Can voters stop state governments from spending at high rates through the enactment of tax and expenditure limits (TELs), or do these laws become dead letters? We draw upon the principal-agent literature to theorize that TELs – one of the most frequent uses of the initiative process across the country – may be circumvented by the sorts of elected officials who would inspire their passage.

In order to investigate our claim, we conduct an event study. First, we test for the effectiveness of TELs across states using a differences-in-differences model. Second, we dissect our treatment variable using different legal provisions …


The Dual Path Initiative Framework, Elizabeth Garrett, Mathew D. Mccubbins Jan 2007

The Dual Path Initiative Framework, Elizabeth Garrett, Mathew D. Mccubbins

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Social Choice, Crypto-Initiaives, And Policymaking By Direct Democracy, Thad Kousser, Mathew D. Mccubbins Jan 2005

Social Choice, Crypto-Initiaives, And Policymaking By Direct Democracy, Thad Kousser, Mathew D. Mccubbins

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


When Does Government Limit The Impact Of Voter Initiatives?, Elisabeth R. Gerber Jan 2004

When Does Government Limit The Impact Of Voter Initiatives?, Elisabeth R. Gerber

Faculty Scholarship

Citizens use the initiative process to make new laws. Many winning initiatives, however, are altered or ignored after Election Day. We examine why this is, paying particular attention to several widely-ignored properties of the post-election phase of the initiative process. One such property is the fact that initiative implementation can require numerous governmental actors to comply with an initiative’s policy instructions. Knowing such properties, the question then becomes: When do governmental actors comply with winning initiatives? We clarify when compliance is full, partial, or not at all. Our findings provide a template for scholars and observers to better distinguish cases …