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Full-Text Articles in Law

A Revised Monitoring Model Confronts Today's Movement Toward Managerialism, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas Jan 2021

A Revised Monitoring Model Confronts Today's Movement Toward Managerialism, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

There are many lessons to be drawn from the sweep of history. In law, the compelling story repeatedly told is the observable co-movement of law on the one hand, and economic, social, and political changes on the other hand. Aberrations, however, do arise but generally do not persist in the long term. Contemporary corporate law seems to be on the cusp of such an abnormality as legal developments and proposed reforms for corporate law are currently conflicting with the direction in which the host environment is moving. This article identifies a series of contemporary judicial and regulatory corporate governance developments …


The Sec's Shareholder Proposal Rule: Creating A Corporate Public Square, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas Jan 2021

The Sec's Shareholder Proposal Rule: Creating A Corporate Public Square, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, we take advantage of this Symposium’s goals to think broadly about the future of Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the shareholder proposal rule. We set forth a vision for the rule to address boardroom insularity by likening the shareholder proposal rule as the public square for shareholders. The existence of such a forum would redound to the benefit of investors, officers, and boards of directors as a fount of current and useful information about their investors’ and stakeholders’ concerns.


Delaware's Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures And Tectonic Shifts In Delaware Corporate Law, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas Jan 2018

Delaware's Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures And Tectonic Shifts In Delaware Corporate Law, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Brief Of Corporate Law Professors As Amici Curie In Support Of Respondents, John C. Coates, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, Henry B. Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier H. Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian Jm Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott Jan 2015

Brief Of Corporate Law Professors As Amici Curie In Support Of Respondents, John C. Coates, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, Henry B. Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier H. Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian Jm Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt …


Irrevocable Proxies, Deborah A. Demott Jan 2008

Irrevocable Proxies, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

This short article explores the circumstances under which the power to vote shares owned by another may be made irrevocable. Irrevocable proxies often serve as integral ingredients within corporate governance arrangements because they serve as mechanisms that enable alliances among shareowners or enhance the holder’s voting power in disproportion to the holder’s residual economic interest in the corporation. The rights and duties of holders of irrevocable proxies are best understood against a background of common-law agency relationships, in which agent and principal always have the power–albeit having contracted otherwise–to terminate their relationship and the agent’s actual authority. Courts in the …


Proprietary Norms In Corporate Law: An Essay On Reading Gambotto In The United States, Deborah A. Demott Jan 1996

Proprietary Norms In Corporate Law: An Essay On Reading Gambotto In The United States, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Arrangements Which Protect Minority Shareholders Against Squeeze-Outs, F. Hodge O'Neal Jan 1961

Arrangements Which Protect Minority Shareholders Against Squeeze-Outs, F. Hodge O'Neal

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Oppugnancy And Oppression In Close Corporations: Remedies In America And In Britain, F. Hodge O'Neal Jan 1959

Oppugnancy And Oppression In Close Corporations: Remedies In America And In Britain, F. Hodge O'Neal

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.