Law Commons^™

Theorizing And Generalizing About Risk Assessment And Regulation Through Comparative Nested Analysis Of Representative Cases, Jonathan B. Wiener, Brendon Swedlow, Denise Kall, Zheng Zhou, James K. Hammitt

Faculty Scholarship

This article provides a framework and offers strategies for theorizing and generalizing about risk assessment and regulation developed in the context of an on-going comparative study of regulatory behavior. Construction of a universe of nearly 3,000 risks and study of a random sample of 100 of these risks allowed us to estimate relative U.S. and European regulatory precaution over a thirty-five-year period. Comparative nested analysis of cases selected from this universe of ecological, health, safety, and other risks or its eighteen categories or ninety-two subcategories of risk sources or causes will allow theory-testing and -building and many further descriptive and …

Structuring U.S. Innovation Policy: Creating A White House Office Of Innovation Policy, Stuart M. Benjamin, Arti K. Rai

Faculty Scholarship

This article begins with a discussion of innovation’s importance to the future well-being of American society. The authors then discuss limitations of the current federal framework for making innovation policy. Specifically, the relative absence of innovation from the agenda of Congress and many relevant federal agencies manifests the confluence of two regulatory challenges: first, the tendency of political actors to focus on short-term goals and consequences; and second, political actors’ reluctance to threaten powerful incumbent actors. Courts, meanwhile, lack sufficient expertise and the ability to conduct the type of forward-looking policy planning that should be a hallmark of innovation policy. …

Reinventing The Sec By Staring Into Its Past, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Why The Chinese Public Prefer Administrative Petitioning Over Litigation, Taisu Zhang

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, the Chinese public, when facing disputes with government officials, have preferred a non-legal means of resolution, the Xinfang system, over litigation. Some scholars explain this by claiming that administrative litigation is less effective than Xinfang petitioning. Others argue that the Chinese have historically eschewed litigation and continue to do so habitually. This paper proposes a new explanation: Chinese have traditionally litigated administrative disputes, but only when legal procedure is not too adversarial and allows for the possibility of reconciliation through court-directed settlement. Since this possibility does not formally exist in modern Chinese administrative litigation, people tend to …

Executive Preemption, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

Preemption of state regulatory authority by national law is the central federalism issue of our time. Most analysis of this issue has focused on the preemptive effects of federal statutes. But as Justice White observed in INS v. Chadha,“[f]or some time, the sheer amount of law . . . made by the [administrative] agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by Congress through the traditional process.” Whether one views this development as a “bloodless constitutional revolution” or as a necessary “renovation” of the constitutional structure in response to the complexity of modern society, the advent of the administrative state …

Administrative Law Agonistes, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger Noll, Barry R. Weingast, Daniel B. Rodriguez

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes And The Nondelegation Doctrine, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

The nondelegation doctrine is the subject of a vast and everexpanding body of scholarship. But nondelegation literature, like nondelegation law, focuses almost exclusively on delegations of power to administrative agencies. It ignores Congress's other delegate-the federal judiciary.

This Article brings courts into the delegation picture. It demonstrates that, just as agencies exercise a lawmaking function when they fill in the gaps left by broad statutory delegations of power, so too do courts. The nondelegation doctrine purports to limit the amount of lawmaking authority Congress can cede to another institution without violating the separation of powers. Although typically considered only with …

Why De Minimis?, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

De minimis cutoffs are a familiar feature of risk regulation. This includes the quantitative individual risk thresholds for fatality risks employed in many contexts by EPA, FDA, and other agencies, such as the 1-in-1 million lifetime cancer risk cutoff; extreme event cutoffs for addressing natural hazards, such as the 100 - year - flood or 475 - year - earthquake; de minimis failure probabilities for built structures; the exclusion of low - probability causal models; and other policymaking criteria. All these tests have a common structure, as I show in the Article. A de minimis test, broadly defined, tells the …

Policy Analysis For Natural Hazards: Some Cautionary Lessons From Environmental Policy Analysis, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

When Do Interest Groups Use Electronic Rulemaking?, John M. De Figueiredo

Faculty Scholarship

This paper analyzes how electronic rulemaking is affecting the propensity of interest groups to file comments and replies at the Federal Communications Commission. The paper shows that exogenous events and a handful of issues drive filing behavior. Implications of the analysis are discussed.

Precaution Against Terrorism, Jonathan B. Wiener, Jessica Stern

Faculty Scholarship

Stunned by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration adopted a new National Security Strategy in September 2002. The UK government took a similar stance. This new strategy calls for anticipatory attacks against potential enemies with uncertain capacities and intentions, even before their threat is imminent. Rather than wait for evidence of weapons of mass destruction, it shifts the burden of proof, obliging ‘‘rogue’’ states to show that they do not harbor weapons of mass destruction or terrorist cells, or else face the possibility of attack. This new strategy amounts to the adoption of the Precautionary Principle …

Justification, Legitimacy, And Administrative Governance, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Richard Stewart, in his classic article ‘The Reformation of American Administrative Law,’ argues that the demise of the ’transmission belt’ model of administrative governance creates a crisis of agency legitimacy, and he skeptically surveys a range of possible solutions to the legitimacy crisis. I claim that Stewart’s skepticism is misguided. It may be true that no feasible administrative structure is democratically legitimate; but it is also true, given the logic of moral justification, that in every choice situation confronted by agency decisionmakers, or by those who design agencies, there is some morally permissible and justified choice (perhaps a choice that …

Against “Individual Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique Of Risk Assessment, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Regulating Section 527 Organizations, Guy-Uriel Charles, Gregg D. Polsky

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis And The Pricing Of Fear And Anxiety, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Risk assessment is now a common feature of regulatory practice, but fear assessment is not. In particular, environmental, health and safety agencies such as EPA, FDA, OSHA, NHTSA, and CPSC, commonly count death, illness and injury as costs for purposes of cost-benefit analysis, but almost never incorporate fear, anxiety or other welfare-reducing mental states into the analysis. This is puzzling, since fear and anxiety are welfare setbacks, and since the very hazards regulated by these agencies - air or water pollutants, toxic waste dumps, food additives and contaminants, workplace toxins and safety threats, automobiles, dangerous consumer products, radiation, and so …

The Allocation Of Resources By Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation And Administrative Regulation, John M. De Figueiredo, Rui J.P. De Figueiredo Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

One of the central concerns about American policy making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions - legislative, administrative, and legal - is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a …

Introduction, To Cost-Benefit Analysis, Matthew D. Adler, Eric A. Posner

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, Matthew D. Adler, Eric A. Posner

Faculty Scholarship

Cost-benefit analysis is routinely used by government agencies in order to evaluate projects, but it remains controversial among academics. This paper argues that cost-benefit analysis is best understood as a welfarist decision procedure and that use of cost-benefit analysis is more likely to maximize overall well-being than is use of alternative decision-procedures. The paper focuses on the problem of distorted preference. A person's preferences are distorted when his or her satisfaction does not enhance that person's well-being. Preferences typically thought to be distorted in this sense include disinterested preferences, uninformed preferences, adaptive preferences, and objectively bad preferences; further, preferences may …

Law And Incommensurability: Introduction, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Incommensurability And Cost-Benefit Analysis, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Judicial Restraint In The Administrative State: Beyond The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Arguments for judicial restraint point to some kind of judicial deficit (such as a democratic or an epistemic deficit) as grounds for limiting judicial review. ("Judicial review" is used in this Article to mean, essentially, the judicial invalidation of statutes, rules, orders and actions in virtue of the Bill of Rights, or similar unwritten criteria.). The most influential argument for judicial restraint has been the Countermajoritarian Difficulty. This is a legislature-centered argument: one that points to features of *legislatures*, as grounds for courts to refrain from invalidating *statutes*. This Article seeks to recast scholarly debate about judicial restraint, and to …

Rule-Making And Policy Formulation In South African Administrative-Law Reform, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Rule Of Too Much Law? The New Safety/Soundness Rulemaking Responsibilities Of The Federal Banking Agencies, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Positive Canons: The Role Of Legislative Bargains In Statutory Interpretation, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger G. Noll, Barry R. Weingast

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Structure And Process, Politics And Policy: Administrative Arrangements And The Political Control Of Agencies, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger D. Noll, Barry R. Weingast

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Legal Education And Public Policy, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Administrative Institutions And The Administrative Process, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Book Review, Administrative Law, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Constitutionalism, Bureaucracy, And Corporatism, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Busfare Increases And Administrative Irregularities, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.