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Bringing Structure To The Law Of Injunctions Against Expression, Christina E. Wells
Bringing Structure To The Law Of Injunctions Against Expression, Christina E. Wells
Faculty Publications
Part I of this Article reviews the Court's cases regarding injunctions against speech, focusing first on the increasing elevation of rhetoric (as opposed to analysis) in the Court's prior restraint decisions. Part I also reviews the Court's other decisions involving injunctions and demonstrates that they too contain little, if any, analysis concerning the appropriateness of injunctive relief against expression. Part II examines Madsen's interaction with the Court's previous decisions and discusses how Madsen furthers the incoherence of the Court's previous cases. Part III explains that content discrimination principles, although superficially attractive, are inappropriate with injunctive relief because the content-based/content-neutral distinction's …
Differentiating The Free Exercise And Establishment Clauses, Carl H. Esbeck
Differentiating The Free Exercise And Establishment Clauses, Carl H. Esbeck
Faculty Publications
The purpose of the Establishment Clause is not to safeguard individual religious rights. That is the role of the Free Exercise Clause, indeed its singular role. The purpose of the Establishment Clause, rather, is as a structural restraint on governmental power. Because of its structural character, the task of the Establishment Clause is to limit government from legislating or otherwise acting on any matter "respecting an establishment of religion." The powers that fall within the scope of the foregoing clause (denied to government, hence within the sole province of religion) and the powers outside this clause (hence, authority vested in …
Charitable Choice And The Critics, Carl H. Esbeck
Charitable Choice And The Critics, Carl H. Esbeck
Faculty Publications
First, the statute prohibits the government from discriminating with regard to religion when determining whether providers are eligible to deliver social services under these programs. Second, the statute imposes on government the duty not to intrude into the religious autonomy of faith-based providers. Third, the statute imposes on both government and participating FBOs the duty not to abridge certain rights of the ultimate beneficiaries of these programs. I will touch on these three principles below, and do so in reverse order.
Silencing John Doe: Defamation And Discourse In Cyberspace, Lyrissa Lidsky
Silencing John Doe: Defamation And Discourse In Cyberspace, Lyrissa Lidsky
Faculty Publications
John Doe has become a popular defamation defendant as corporations and their officers bring defamation suits for statements made about them in Internet discussion fora. These new suits are not even arguably about recovering money damages but instead are brought for symbolic reasons — some worthy, some not so worthy. If the only consequence of these suits were that Internet users were held accountable for their speech, the suits would be an unalloyed good. However, these suits threaten to suppress legitimate criticism along with intentional and reckless falsehoods, and existing First Amendment law doctrines are not responsive to the threat …